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ABSTRACT
THE BOLSHEVIK AFTERLIFE: POSTHUMOUS REHABILITATION
IN THE POST-STALIN SOVIET UNION, 1953-1970
Samuel Arthur Casper
Benjamin Nathans
This dissertation explores how an illiberal, authoritarian state confronted and
attempted to make amends for its extraordinary history of mass violence, specifically the
Soviet Union’s efforts to posthumously exonerate eminent political, military, and cultural
figures executed in the 1930s and early 1940s. All of Iosif Stalin’s successors were
implicated, to one degree or another, in the Terror that swept the Soviet Union and
consumed much of the party-state’s founding elite. Yet in the months following the
dictator’s death in March 1953, a contingent within the new collective leadership began
to allow cases against certain “enemies of the people” who had been put to death to be
reopened, and their convictions to be vacated. This policy, which broke with decades of
Soviet precedent, was initially conceived as a means of discrediting deposed secret police
chief Lavrentii Beriia, but soon acquired more ambitious dimensions. This dissertation
foregrounds the official intentions that underpinned the decision to implement
posthumous rehabilitation, the investigative work that went into determining which
figures merited absolution and on what grounds, and efforts by the families of the
repressed to obtain recognition of and restitution for losses and suffering endured during
the era of High Stalinism. Posthumous rehabilitation thereby merged a symbolic
“resurrection” of the dead – through distinct but intertwined legal and political processes
– with tangible socio-economic benefits for their survivors. Drawing upon documents
generated by the USSR Procuracy, Council of Ministers, and Supreme Soviet, as well as
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the Central Committee of the Communist Party, citizens’ letters of petition, and memoirs,
this dissertation argues for posthumous rehabilitation as a crucial means through which
the post-Stalin Soviet government attempted to extract useable, redemptive narratives
from its cannibalistic past, and as an avenue for the families of the wrongfully repressed
to reassert their place in society.
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1

Introduction
In the Party death was no mystery, it had no romantic aspect.
It was a logical consequence, a factor with which one reckoned
and which bore rather an abstract character. Also death was
rarely spoken of and the word “execution” was hardly ever used;
the customary expression was “physical liquidation.” The words
“physical liquidation” again evoked only one concrete idea: The
cessation of political activity. The act of dying in itself was a
technical detail, with no claim to interest; death as a factor in a
logical equation had lost any intimate bodily feature.1
The deputies of the Central Intelligence Agency were in high spirits during their
meeting on May 16, 1956. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, First Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), had aired his regime’s dirty laundry, and
the American intelligence community was eager to exploit this move. Nearly three
months earlier Khrushchev delivered his bombshell speech “On the Cult of Personality
and Its Consequences” before a closed session of the CPSU’s 20th Party Congress, and as
Deputy Director of Plans Frank Wisner announced, the agency had recently acquired
what was purportedly a copy of the revelatory text. The organization’s leadership seemed
especially taken with Khrushchev’s disclosures about the posthumous rehabilitation
process underway at the time in the Soviet Union, as Inspector General Lyman
Kirkpatrick proposed that the Agency sponsor “an Animal Farm type piece on the Soviets
put to death by Stalin who have since been vindicated by the present leaders in Russia.”2
Director Allen Dulles endorsed the idea as “excellent,” but cautioned that while he was

1

Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon, trans. Daphne Hardy (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), 111.
Deputies’ Meeting, 16 May 1956, CREST Collection, document number CIARDR80B01676R002300190008-1, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/ciardp80b01676r002300190008-1 (accessed May 1, 2017). Many thanks to James Ryan for bringing this
document to my attention.
2
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prepared to allocate funding for such a venture, “he would withhold decision on whether
to make a movie out of it as was done in the case of the Animal Farm project.”3
Kirkpatrick and Dulles’ enthusiasm notwithstanding, the mooted paean to fallen
Old Bolsheviks never materialized, and the CIA found alternate ideological avenues
through which to contest the Soviets. But the avidness with which America’s spymasters
seized upon the stories of Iosif Stalin’s redeemed targets speaks to one of the enduring
dilemmas of mature socialism in the Soviet Union: what prompted the party-state to
concede that hundreds of thousands of individuals executed as “enemies of the people”
were in fact wholly innocent of the charges for which they had been condemned? Beyond
the potential propagandistic coup this decision offered to anti-Communist elements in the
West, it also threatened to upend the carefully constructed and diligently maintained
narrative of the early Soviet Union having been under existential threat from internal
enemies, which served as justification for the bloodletting and mass incarceration of the
1930s and 1940s. Yet during Khrushchev’s tenure as First Secretary over 900,000
individuals in the Soviet Union – living and dead alike – had their convictions for
putative counterrevolutionary crimes overturned and their names officially cleared.4 By
delving into the cases of some of the Soviet notables subjected to capital punishment
during the Great Terror – which represented a small minority of the verdicts that Soviet
3

Ibid. On the CIA’s covert funding of the animated adaptation of Animal Farm, produced in the UK, see
Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York:
The New Press, 2013), 247-248; Daniel J. Leab, Orwell Subverted: The CIA and the Filming of Animal
Farm (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).
4
Marc Elie, “Rehabilitation in the Soviet Union, 1953-1964: A Policy Unachieved,” in De-Stalinising
Eastern Europe, eds. Matthew Stibbe and Kevin McDermott (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 25. According to Elie, this figure represented approximately one
third of those who had been “politically repressed” up to 1964, including some who had been arrested and
had their sentences reversed under Khrushchev, though the vast majority dated to the Stalin years. On the
problematic nature of the term “de-Stalinization,” see Benjamin Nathans, “Myth, Memory, Trauma –
Coming to Terms” available at http://russianhistoryblog.org/2014/05/myth-memory-trauma-coming-toterms/ (accessed February 24, 2018).
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authorities revisited in the 1950s and 1960s, but loomed large in the party-state’s internal
discussions and public pronouncements – this dissertation plumbs one of the earliest and
most fraught instances of a modern state confronting its legacy of mass violence.5
Though the rehabilitation policies later promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev as part of
glasnost’ were more thoroughgoing and forthright about the fates of the disappeared, the
practices implemented by Stalin’s immediate heirs defined the longstanding goals and
parameters of this wide-ranging revisionist endeavor.
Why Rehabilitation, and For Whom?
For all its ubiquity in the Soviet and post-Soviet sphere, rehabilitation writ large,
and its posthumous permutation specifically, have remained underexplored in
contemporary scholarship relative to the amount of attention paid to the various purges
that roiled the USSR. One can hardly open a collection of documents relating to the early
Soviet Union without encountering names of dozens of prominent figures designated as
having been “repressed” and then “posthumously rehabilitated” without further
explication of what the latter status entailed or conferred upon recipients. Despite the
inroads in exploring the motivations, mechanisms, and scope of the Great Terror, the
process that sought, to a certain extent, to reverse or revise its excesses – albeit some two
decades after the fact – has remained obscure.6

5

According to partial data compiled by the Memorial Society, approximately 150,000 people who had been
sentenced to capital punishment were posthumously rehabilitated between 1953 and 1964. Although there
is no reliable indication of how many of these individuals were Party members, elites were likely
overrepresented relative to the overall number of executed persons, given the priority their cases were
shown; that said, they probably made up a small fraction of the total, given the fact that the vast majority of
those shot during the Terror were ordinary Soviet citizens. See “Zhertvy politicheskogo terrora v SSSR,”
available at base.memo.ru (accessed March 13, 2018).
6
Recent works that have broadened understanding of the character and course of the terror include Rolf
Binner and Marc Junge, Kak terror stal Bol’shim: Sekretnyi prikaz no. 00447 i tekhnologiia ego ispolneniia
(Moskva: AIRO-XX, 2003); Wendy Z. Goldman, Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in

4
In vindicating selected individuals who had been publicly branded “enemies of
the people” Stalin’s heirs exposed themselves to unprecedented liabilities, jeopardizing
the authority they had inherited from their forebear. Despite the suggestion that
rehabilitation was an outgrowth of popular clamoring for a reckoning with the partystate’s extraordinary history of domestic repression, at the time of Stalin’s death there
was no means by which the Soviet citizenry could pressure its rulers to embark on such a
sensitive endeavor. The impetus for rehabilitation was sparked within the halls of power,
and – even taking into account portrayals of Khrushchev’s decision-making as reckless
and impulsive – senior officials had to consider the liabilities inherent in admitting that
hundreds of thousands persecuted under false pretenses were indeed innocent.7 In their
estimation the payoffs evidently outweighed the potentially disastrous ramifications.
Given that the vast majority of the post-Stalin ruling clique were involved in, or directly
benefitted from the destruction of the old Communist Party cadres, having assumed posts

Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Paul Gregory, Terror by
Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin (An Archival Study) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009);
Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926-1941 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); David R. Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Repression and
Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Oleg Khlevniuk,
“The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-1938,” in Soviet History, 1917-53: Essays in Honour of R.W.
Davies, eds. Julian Cooper, Maureen Perrie and E.A. Rees (London and Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press,
1995), 158-176; Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007; Lynne Viola, The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin’s Special
Settlements (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); James Harris, ed., The Anatomy of
Terror: Political Violence under Stalin (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); idem., The
Great Fear: Stalin’s Terror of the 1930s (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Stephen
Kotkin, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941 (New York: Penguin Press, 2017).
7
For a generally admiring portrait of Khrushchev from one of his contemporaries that recognizes the
shortcomings in his “disposition” that isolated him from the rest of the Presidium and hastened his
downfall, see Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev Through
the Eyes of His Advisor, trans. Daphne Skillen (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons: 1991). Dmitrii
Shepilov – once one of Khrushchev’s closest collaborators within the Party and a central player in crafting
the Secret Speech who turned on his patron during the struggle with the Anti-Party Group – conversely
offers a scathing portrayal, depicting the First Secretary as a crass, boorish provincial who was at once out
of his depth and at the same time an inveterate conniver; see Dmitrii Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar: A
Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev, ed. Stephen V. Bittner, trans. Anthony Austin
(New Haven: Yale University Press: 2007).
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previously held by the purged, revisiting legal cases against supposed “enemies of the
people” dead nearly twenty years seemingly ran contrary to their interests. Thus a guiding
question for this dissertation is why the Party’s inner circle considered it prudent, and
perhaps even necessary to clear the names of so many who had been condemned by the
very government they served.8
The Soviet government did not generally solicit cases for posthumous
rehabilitation; the onus lay with relatives, friends, and occasionally erstwhile colleagues
to initiate the review of convictions by filing an appeal with the Procuracy (the state
prosecutor’s office), which was authorized to reopen criminal cases. This arrangement
required persons who had already suffered tremendous loss at the hands of the regime to
resubmit themselves and their loved ones to state scrutiny; that many were willing, if not
eager, to do so speaks to the benefits promised by rehabilitation beyond the symbolic
restoration of individuals’ good names. This is not to devalue the importance of
reputation within the postwar USSR. In a polity wracked by violent upheavals – selfinflicted and from abroad – the only remaining traces that many families had of the
disappeared were the memories of their deeds and contributions to the construction and
defense of socialism, and the inclusion of these exploits in the broader national narrative

8

Igal Halfin offers this explanation for the rationale behind posthumous political rehabilitation: “Surprising
as it may be in a Marxist, secular context, posthumous reinstatement made sense because spiritual
affiliation with the brotherhood of the elect was more important than life itself. In readmitting the dead into
its ranks, the Party accepted that their deaths were not in vain: they were human, they had names and
voices, and they should therefore be remembered. Thus, they became sacrifices after all (‘victims of
repression’) – opening comrades’ eyes to the dangers of cults of personality.” While this is a compelling
teleology of why the Party reopened its ranks to thousands of deceased former members, it does not
account for the particular practices that defined rehabilitation, nor the fact that political reinstatement was
always subordinate to legal exoneration. See Igal Halfin, Stalinist Confessions: Messianism and Terror at
the Leningrad Communist University (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 467 fn79.
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was a matter of great significance.9 That said, the survivors of those under consideration
for posthumous rehabilitation were seldom content to confine themselves to matters of
remembrance. While legal cases were under review they actively sought to refashion the
narrative of the Great Terror that the Procuracy and other investigative organs were
called upon to shape, and upon learning of their relatives’ exculpation many proved
remarkably adept in mobilizing this status to press claims upon the government that had
gone unanswered for decades. Conceived as a means of discrediting and disparaging the
pasts of the new collective leadership’s adversaries – first and foremost Lavrentii
Pavlovich Beriia and his secret police network, eventually Stalin himself, and then the socalled “Anti-Party Group – posthumous rehabilitation assumed dimensions that its
initiators could not have foreseen, as it ultimately became a ritualistic set of practices
through which the party-state and Soviet citizens grappled with and reframed notions of
loyalty, justice, retribution, and social belonging that had been rent asunder by the Stalin
regime’s descent into near self-destruction.
Precedents and Innovations
Posthumous rehabilitation, as a legal and political process, was in many respects
distinct from its Imperial Russian and Soviet precedents. Mass amnesties were not
unfamiliar occurrences under either the Romanovs or the Bolsheviks. It was customary
for the empire’s ruling dynasty to mark momentous occasions – such as the birth of a
royal heir – with blanket reprieves for certain classes of prisoners; notable examples
9

On memory practices and mass mortality in modern Russia, see Catherine Merridale, Night of Stone:
Death and Memory in Twentieth Century Russia (New York: Viking, 2001); and Alexander Etkind,
Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2013). Though Merridale deals extensively with the Great Terror and mentions the waves of returnees who
emerged from the “distant camps” over the course of the 1950s, she makes no mention of posthumous
rehabilitation, one of the quintessential arenas in which her chosen topics intersected.

7
included the 1856 remission of the surviving Decembrists upon Alexander II’s
assumption of the throne, and the release of some 2,000 political deportees in conjunction
with celebrations of the Romanov tercentenary in 1913.10 In addition to such coordinated
liberations, convicts could seek and were occasionally extended imperial pardons;
tellingly, the April 1906 Fundamental Law reserved the right for the sovereign to
commute or otherwise mitigate any sentence passed.11 These decisions were taken not in
the name of justice, but rather as a display of the autocrat’s capacity for mercy.
Soviet authorities acted very much in the vein of the monarchists they supplanted
when formulating their policy on juridical forgiveness. Amnesties were proclaimed to
coincide with the fifth and tenth anniversaries of the October Revolution in 1922 and
1927, the founding of the USSR in 1923, as well as the twentieth anniversary of the Red
Army in 1938.12 The single largest amnesty prior to Stalin’s death was implemented in
1945 in honor of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany; some 620,000 prisoners
serving sentences of three years and under – mostly handed down under wartime
provisions introduced in December 1941 – were afforded early releases from Gulag
camps and special settlements, and some 400,000 more saw their sentences reduced. As
Golfo Alexopoulous has demonstrated, the 1945 amnesty “represented an intensification

10

Thanks to this act of imperial magnanimity several notable revolutionaries were able to return from exile,
among them Menshevik leader Iulii Martov and Lev Kamenev. See Israel Getzler, Martov: A Political
Biography of a Russian Social Democrat (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
28; Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928 (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 132.
11
The relevant article reads: “The Sovereign Emperor has the right to pardon the accused, to mitigate the
sentence, and even to completely forgive transgressions, including the right to terminate court, actions
against the guilty and to free them from trial and punishment. Stemming from royal mercy, he also has the
right to commute the official penalty and to generally pardon all exceptional cases that are not subject to
general laws, provided such actions do not infringe upon civil rights or the legally protected interests of
others.” See “The Russian Fundamental Law of 23 April 1906,” available at
https://community.dur.ac.uk/a.k.harrington/fundlaws.html (accessed on February 15, 2018).
12
Golfo Alexopoulous, “Amnesty 1945: The Revolving Door of Stalin’s Gulag,” Slavic Review 64, 2
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or expansion of existing practice. It targeted the revolving majority of gulag prisoners –
those who served shorter sentences and whose eventual release was expected – while
doing nothing to stem the flow of prisoners coming in.”13 The sole innovation of the even
larger mass amnesty that Beriia engineered to solemnize Stalin’s passing, according to
Alexopoulous, was that it made no attempt to replenish the labor camp population, a
radical move for its time.
Convicts in the Soviet Union were also able, in principle, to seek clemency from
the state. Requests for pardons (khodotaistva o pomilovanii) were generally adjudicated
by the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was empowered to intervene in criminal cases.
Neither amnesties nor pardons, as forms of reprieve, necessitated the acknowledgment of
any wrongdoing on the part of the judiciary or other branches of the government; as in
imperial times, they were extended as emblematic of rulers’ clemency toward admitted
offenders. Critically, in most instances amnesties and pardons only provided for
prisoners’ physical release. They did not expunge individuals’ criminal records, which in
turn gave rise to a host of difficulties in housing, employment, and the receipt of social
benefits.14
Rehabilitation entailed an entirely novel set of admissions on the part of the
Soviet authorities. Rather than an official indulgence, rehabilitation was an express
recognition of miscarriages of justice; as linguist D. M. Fel'dman notes, the very term
"rehabilitation" had little to no connotation in the Imperial Russian or Soviet legal
contexts prior to 1953, and in fact it migrated from the political lexicon into common
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parlance over the course of the twentieth century. In the 1920s and 1930s,
“rehabilitation” referred to the process by which the Party restored to good standing
members who had been expelled or otherwise sanctioned for misconduct, and it was not
until the public disavowal of the so-called “Doctors’ Plot” in April 1953 that the term
acquired juridical significance.15 While most judicial verdicts in the USSR were subject
to cassation review, and could be modified or thrown out entirely by higher courts, from
December 1, 1934 such protections did not extend to counterrevolutionary crimes.16
Promulgated in the immediate aftermath of Sergei Kirov’s murder, a decree issued by the
Central Executive Committee denied those convicted of betraying the Revolution any
right to appeal; death sentences were to be carried out immediately.17 Controls remained
on the implementation of state violence, as in late autumn 1938, when approximately
110,000 prisoners were liberated at the close of the Ezhovshchina – so named for
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs Nikolai Ivanovich Ezhov, who oversaw the
Terror at its apex – and the following year nearly 1,000 NKVD operatives were arrested
for previous “violations of soviet legality.”18 Yet at the time state security declined to
authorize the streamlining of the existing review process, and it did not address – or
repudiate – the systemic nature of repressions against purported opponents of Soviet
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power perpetrated over the preceding years. Functionaries were also specifically
instructed to focus their oversight on “living persons,” thereby excluding from
consideration the hundreds of thousands of people put to death in 1937 and 1938.19
The first instances of posthumous rehabilitation in the Soviet Union in the closing
months of 1953 marked a decisive break with the efforts that preceded them. Rather than
skirting the question of the rectitude of sentences in counterrevolutionary cases,
rehabilitation was predicated upon vindicating the accused of the charges against them,
and in many instances dispelling the notion that their alleged conspiracies ever existed.
The most common formulation that accompanied rehabilitation reports – “in the absence
of a corpus delicti (za otsutstviem sostava prestupleniia)” – rejected convictions on the
precise grounds that the proffered evidence failed to demonstrate the commission of a
crime. The party-state thus took it upon itself to admit not only that repressed individuals
were innocent, but that the very charges with which they had been impugned had no
grounding in reality. For the dead, who had been liquidated with such urgency, denying
them the opportunity to dispute their vilification, this represented an unparalleled attempt
to set right the wrongs of the past.20 Such revisionism is all the more remarkable for the
fact that – unlike almost every other instance of contemporary state-driven truth-telling –
the rulers who spearheaded Soviet rehabilitation were often directly implicated in the
19
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crimes being decried, and professed themselves to be the legitimate successors of the
regime whose recourse to internal violence they now disavowed.21 The operating
assumption that transitional justice is the province of democratizing states has led
scholars to disregard the ways in which the decidedly illiberal Soviet Union of the 1950s
adopted policies that at times exceeded the standards set by post-authoritarian societies –
particularly with regard to property restitution to survivors – and performed the delicate
balancing act of admitting past atrocities without delegitimizing the wider Bolshevik
project.
Historiography
The rehabilitation process became the subject of scholarly inquest within a decade
of its inception. Western Sovietologists, eager to discern the USSR’s future course absent
the guidance of the only ruler it had known for most of its thirty-odd-year history, seized
upon the scanty information emerging from behind the Iron Curtain in the period
following the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, when reports eulogizing the
posthumously rehabilitated began appearing in Soviet press outlets and publications in
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earnest.22 Cold War-era Kremlin watchers saw in the rehabilitation process a portal onto
the decision-making process and political maneuverings of Stalin’s successors. Leopold
Labedz, one of the earliest and – given the limited array of material at his disposal – more
astute observers of Soviet rehabilitation, attributed its emergence to the demands of
Kremlin intrigues and the desire of members of the new collective leadership to ensure
their own survival. Based on official Soviet media and Khrushchev’s public
pronouncements, Labedz detects only mercenary considerations in the form and tempo of
the regime’s exoneration campaign.23 As the following chapters will demonstrate, far
more went into the resolution to initiate wide-scale rehabilitation and follow through on
its various aspects than wanton self-interest, but Labedz’s perspective proved to have
considerable staying power through the USSR’s remaining lifespan, as it is echoed in the
subsequent work of scholars seeking to make sense of the divulgences emanating from
Moscow and other Soviet administrative centers.
Jane P. Shapiro’s unpublished 1967 dissertation “Rehabilitation Policy and
Political Conflict in the Soviet Union, 1953-1964” marked the first full-length study of
Soviet exonerations in the post-Stalin years. Though Shapiro acknowledges the
limitations of her source base – composed exclusively of official Soviet materials
available in the West – she approaches rehabilitation as something of a barometer of the
new ruling circle’s capacity for reform and ability to distance itself from Stalin’s
repressive legacy. In Shapiro’s schema, the public discussion of eminent Union-wide,
republican Party, and military officials previously excised from Soviet history augured
22
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efforts by Khrushchev and similarly inclined bureaucrats – impelled by various special
interests – to dispel the lingering manifestations of coercion through state terror.24 In the
absence of any indication of how rehabilitation functioned in practice, Shapiro devotes
considerable attention to devising a taxonomy of the different modes of rehabilitation
predicated on the vagaries of Soviet linguistic choices.25 Although such fine distinctions
appear to have held little actual currency for those who spearheaded, implemented, or
benefitted from rehabilitation, they held considerable attraction for researchers as a
means of imposing a semblance of order on the seemingly arbitrary and inconsistent
currents of rehabilitation.
To give an example, in his study of rehabilitation, Albert P. Van Goudoever –
drawing upon essentially the same source-base as Shapiro, but with twenty years’ worth
of additional data – offers a streamlined selection of three types of rehabilitation (formal,
public, and posthumous) that he applies to the reinstated Party and military cadres under
consideration.26 By limiting their sample populations to Party and military elites – even
when writers, artists, scientists, and other specialists were among the publicly
rehabilitated – both Shapiro and Van Goudoever reinforce the impression prevalent
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during the Cold War that Stalinist state terror primarily befell the upper strata of Soviet
society;27 however, this perspective became increasingly untenable as the true extent of
the Terror began to emerge with the partial opening of the Soviet Union to outside
academics during glasnost’.
Rather than focusing their attention on the exalted martyrs of the 1930s,
researchers allowed into the USSR during Gorbachev’s glasnost’ – inspired in part by the
herculean efforts of civil society organizations such as Memorial – took as their subjects
the former political prisoners (known colloquially in Russian as zeks, short for
zakliuchennye) who emerged from the Gulag archipelago in the mid-1950s to a society
deeply suspicious of their presence and the feasibility or desirability of their
reintegration. Labor camp returnees – who required rehabilitation to reclaim their rights
even after serving out their sentences or being amnestied – found a remarkably
sympathetic audience in the form of foreign scholars eager to grant them voice. Stephen
F. Cohen and Nanci Adler best exemplify this approach, though they have reached
disparate conclusions regarding the regime’s role in facilitating or hindering survivors’
reintegration into a world that stigmatized and scorned them.
As he details in the opening chapter of his The Victims Return: Survivors of the
Gulag after Stalin, Cohen became a trusted intimate of Nikolai Bukharin’s second wife,
Anna Larina, and their children, thanks to his seminal biography of Bukharin; through
these connections Cohen was able to embed himself into the tightly-knit milieu of former
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elites who had been confined in the Gulag.28 Basing his narrative upon the life stories of
members of this group to which he had privileged access – frequently identified as his
“friends” – Cohen ties their fortunes to the machinations of competing factions within the
Kremlin: repentant reformers, headed and exemplified by Khrushchev, who “expended
more political capital on his anti-Stalinism than he acquired,” and unreconstructed
Stalinists, whose crowning objective, according to Cohen, was to mask the blood on their
hands.29 In presenting the rehabilitation of “Khrushchev’s zeks” as an integral component
of the reformist mission – one that bore moral underpinnings – Cohen directly challenges
the received image of rehabilitation as a purely opportunistic endeavor designed to ensure
the political longevity of its partisans. For indeed, if Khrushchev intended rehabilitation
to shield him from his foes within the Party, it ultimately failed in grand fashion in 1964
when he was toppled by Leonid Brezhnev and his circle – reductively branded “neoStalinists” by Cohen – and the Gulag survivors he promoted were purportedly consigned
to the margins of society, where they remained until Gorbachev’s redemptive rise to
power.30 Though this perspective effectively dispels the notion that rehabilitation was
pursued purely for the sake of power politics, Cohen’s near-exclusive reliance upon and
unstinting credulity of his informants’ subjective experiences serves to reinforce
mythologies that the circle built around themselves, and obscures the internal dynamics
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that drove the implementation of rehabilitation, which this project seeks to bring to the
fore.
While a great deal of Nanci Adler’s findings on the travails of Gulag returnees are
drawn from materials originally compiled by Cohen, Adler does not share his assessment
of the munificent impulse underlying rehabilitation; rather, she describes it as “a rearguard action to preserve entrenched power,” and the Soviet authorities’ attitude toward
political prisoners as “at best ambivalent, at worst destructive.”31 Adler posits an almost
entirely adversarial relationship between a duplicitous party-state “more interested in
rehabilitating its public image than in rehabilitating people” and citizens attempting to
eke their way back into “the big zone” of Soviet society after having escaped the camp
system “zone.”32 In light of the begrudging attitudes of Soviet officials and non-repressed
citizens that emerge in former political prisoners’ accounts, Adler asserts that many
former zeks, frustrated by “the limited character of official de-Stalinization,” began
“unofficially exonerating themselves,” constituting a demimonde that existed, in the
words of her subtitle, “beyond the Soviet system.”33
This perspective flies in the face of many documents uncovered over the course of
researching this study, which express deep disaffection with the pace of investigations
and the generosity of offered financial compensation, but are also cognizant of the fact
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that the only avenue for ameliorating one’s situation was through the party-state.34 In a
similar vein, Adler’s exclusive focus on living rehabilitees – and advocating on their
behalf – leads her to understate the import of posthumously rehabilitated figures, as when
she refers to bureaucrats’ attempts “to render the living rehabilitated returnees as
politically inactive as their posthumously rehabilitated comrades.”35 It is a central
contention of this dissertation that although the dead could not speak for themselves, with
the inauguration of posthumous rehabilitation being deceased proved to be no major
impediment to playing an outsized role in post-Stalin political developments.
Two emergent lines of historical inquiry within the growing bodies of scholarship
on the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev eras with which this dissertation is particularly
engaged are the themes of carceral reform and socio-cultural responses to the revelations
of the so-called “Khrushchev Thaw.”36 The bulk of this scholarship has been written
under the influence of the turn toward social history, which, in the Soviet context, has
privileged the experiences and perspectives of “ordinary” citizens over those of
recognized, “named” personages. While this study is primarily concerned with eminent
figures, it is influenced by the social turn in Soviet history through its focus on
interpersonal relationships and the material lives of returnees. Though it operated
according to unique imperatives, posthumous rehabilitation as a legal process was very
much embedded within the evolving judicial and penal environment of the 1950s and
34
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early 1960s, in which the Procuracy and courts saw their bailiwicks expanded at the
expense of the significantly reined-in organs of state security.
Such developments are most readily perceived in the wholesale reorganization of
the Soviet labor camp and special settlement system undertaken within months of Stalin
having exited the scene. As Marc Elie shows, the succession of amnesties between 1953
and 1957 that saw the outflow of millions of prisoners from the Gulag into surrounding
localities was intrinsically related to upper-level debates surrounding the course of
judicial reform; he attributes the hardships that many liberated prisoners faced to the
Kafkaesque dilemmas engendered by the lack of planning for this influx of vulnerable
people.37 In his work, Jeffrey Hardy details how the curtailment of arbitrary force within
the Gulag was achieved in part through the empowerment of camp procurators, whose
prestige increased as Khrushchev vested the All-Union Procuracy with increasing
authority (including purview over the legal aspect of rehabilitation), while Alan
Barenberg reveals how onetime slave laborers became industrial employees in Vorkuta’s
post-Stalin industrial enterprises.38 While coercion and repression remained firmly within
the state’s repertoire during these years, they were decisively disavowed as the first
recourse for many offenses that in the past would have been met with serious reprisals.39
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In moving away from the omnipresent threat of political violence as a ruling technique,
the Soviet government under Khrushchev attempted to appropriate and repurpose aspects
of the Stalinist system to meet its ends. Though it in many respects defied precedent, by
virtue of operating through the same institutions that enacted the Terror, posthumous
rehabilitation was very much a constituent component of this phenomenon. As with the
penal reforms discussed in the mentioned works, rehabilitation was often constrained by
vestiges of state oppression that could not be so easily excised.
Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform
after Stalin by Miriam Dobson effectively straddles the line between studies devoted to
issues of correctional policy and the literary and cultural realms. Her systematic treatment
of returnee’s petitions – the first of its kind – effectively charts a sort of transmission
history, whereby themes and concepts that supplicants for rehabilitation employed to
justify themselves migrated to and ultimately attained public expression in Khrushchev’s
anti-Stalinist rhetoric.40 In treating many sources similar to those that Dobson examines,
this dissertation is deeply indebted to her insights, though instead of reading petitions for
recurring literary tropes, as Dobson does, it delves into the ways in which the letter
writers sought to connect with their audiences, emphasizing their intent over their cultural
frame of reference. Although research into literary and popular responses to Khrushchev
and company’s admissions of Stalin’s transgressions has shed valuable light on the ways
in which Soviet intellectuals and the reading public wrestled with and assimilated these
revelations into their worldview, such works often reinforce a persistent impression that
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this study aims to complicate.41 Framing the period’s cultural history as one of reception
of and response to signals emanating from the center, many authors take the 20th Party
Congress as their point of departure, and treat it as the initiation Khrushchev’s efforts to
dismantle Stalin’s legacy.42 However, as an examination of the posthumous rehabilitation
process from its inception reveals, the Secret Speech was not so much the launch of a
new bold campaign to confront the Stalinist past with candor as it was a culmination and
appropriation of developments that had been proceeding quietly – though not entirely
beyond public view – for over two years prior to late February 1956.43
Grounded as this work is in historiographic trends, it is also informed by
anthropological perspectives. Most useful for the purposes of the present study is the
notion of “dead-body politics” that Katherine Verdery introduced in her study of bones
and corpses “that have become political symbols” in postsocialist Central and Eastern
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Europe.44 Under this scenario, “[parading] the dead bodies of famous men […] uses their
specific biographies to reevaluate the national past” and provide stability of meaning
within systems that have been cast into disarray by earth-shaking changes.45 Although in
the Soviet case actual mortal remains were rarely forthcoming, the death of Stalin and the
array of developments that followed were sufficiently disruptive to unsettle the
government’s established means of rule, as well as previously accepted patterns for
demonstrating loyalty.46 Within this uncertain context, figures who had been excluded
from the national master narrative following their imprisonment and execution could be
reintegrated into Soviet history to serve as anchors for a reconceived vision of the path to
state socialism, thereby granting them something akin to a political afterlife.47 This
perspective allows the following investigation of posthumous rehabilitation to
encapsulate official intentions and popular responses while envisioning both as
components of the search for stable meaning in the wake of tumultuous transformations.
In an effort to explain the rationale of posthumous rehabilitation to (presumably)
baffled American readers who, as denizens of a “secular society […] put little stock in
posthumous status,” journalist Adam Hochschild maintains that Soviet Communism was
“psychologically, a religious culture. Just as the Great Purge was Inquisitorial in its
44
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fervor, so rehabilitation, and posthumous restoration of Party membership, have offered a
kind of sainthood for martyrs.”48 This argument draws upon a well-established literature
that depicts state socialism as a “political religion,” and is echoed by Yuri Slezkine’s
recent work situating Bolshevism within the vein of millenarianism.49 Though one may
indeed detect in posthumous rehabilitation traces of a type of Marxist-Leninist
canonization, by focusing on outward homologies this perspective obscures the decidedly
pragmatic and instrumental motivations underpinning the process. Khrushchev and his
cohorts were adept at invoking the posthumously rehabilitated in moments of political
extremis, but at no point did they transform their erstwhile comrades into objects of any
sort of regular reverence. The kind of afterlife that posthumous rehabilitation promised in
the 1950s and 1960s was therefore one predicated on the ability of past actors to help
mediate present-day struggles, rather than the notion of an eternal reward for faithful, yet
repressed Communists.50
Old Bolsheviks and the Victim-Perpetrator Binary
This project is concerned with individuals sentenced to death for supposed
counterrevolutionary offenses – which fell under Article 58 of the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) penal code – as opposed to “conventional”
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criminal acts.51 Although, as Oleg Khlevniuk has pointed out, this distinction is
somewhat artificial and tenuous in the Soviet context, given that the “bulk of those
imprisoned for nonpolitical (bytovye) crimes were […] de facto political prisoners of the
regime” by virtue of the disproportionate punishments meted out for relatively minor
infractions, it still merits consideration in light of the fact that, as Alexopoulous says, “the
regime took its own categories seriously.”52 The focus on capital punishment cases is
born both of the fact that many high-profile individuals were sent before the firing squad
and the finality of a death sentence that has been carried out. It can be difficult to
conceive of how a polity attempts to make amends for past injustices when the most
directly injured parties are no longer among the living – particularly when they were
acolytes of and then violently eliminated by the very government that now recognizes
their blamelessness.
The figures around whom this study is constructed generally conform to a
common profile; this is a reflection predominantly of the types of individuals on whom
the central authorities focused their efforts in the decade following Stalin’s death. Most of
the men discussed – and the overwhelming majority of posthumous rehabilitees during
this period were indeed men – were born between the mid-1880s and the 1890s – making
them the prime age for participation in the revolutions of 1917 – though some were
contemporaries of Lenin and Trotsky, born in the 1870s, and a select few were barely
past adolescence when they were swept up into the Bolshevik cause during the Civil
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War.53 As Old Bolsheviks, almost all had enlisted in Lenin’s faction, or the pre-schism
Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party, prior to the October Revolution; several
joined other leftist parties that were eventually subsumed into the Communist Party, such
as the Jewish Labor Bund or the Azeri Hümmet, or were inducted through service in the
Red Army. Importantly, none were members of the so-called “Stalin generation” that
swelled the Party’s ranks after the ascendant General Secretary cemented his grip on
power in 1928.54 These early Party cadres, who played some of the most outsized roles
establishing Soviet power throughout the former tsarist empire, were particularly targeted
for elimination during the purges, and therefore figured particularly prominently among
the “true sons of the Party” whose reputations were redeemed in the first waves of
rehabilitation.55
A mode of rehabilitation that cannot be substantively examined in the present
thesis is the restoration of the rights of the “punished peoples” – national and ethnic
minorities deported en masse from their homelands within the USSR. These groups,
including most notably Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Volga Germans, Balkars, and
Kalmyks were subjected to collective punishment ostensibly on the grounds of
collaboration with Nazi occupiers during the war, and exiled from their homes to the
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Central Asian interior, where tens of thousands died from disease, exposure, and
starvation. Over the course of the second half of the Soviet century the government
acknowledged that many of these groups had been falsely maligned, and haltingly
allowed some to return to the lands from which they had been expelled, though the
repatriation process rarely proceeded smoothly and few were able to recuperate the
houses and property that had been lost as a result of official reprisals.56 While the
nomenclature of the procedures for rehabilitating political prisoners and “punished
peoples” is essentially identical, and the struggles of returned nationalities to reclaim
their possessions is immediately reminiscent of analogous efforts on the part of former
elites, the mechanisms of repression and remission were in most regards diametrically
opposed. Because the groups in question were collectively penalized as entire
communities, when they were cleared of wrongdoing blanket declarations of guiltlessness
– often from non-judicial organs – sufficed. However, the operating logic of individual
legal and political rehabilitation – of which the posthumous variant was a subset – was
predicated upon exhaustively reviewing the files assembled against suspected
counterrevolutionaries and thereby separately determining whether each figure under
consideration merited exculpation.
This dissertation actively avoids referring to most of its subjects as “victims,” as a
gesture toward two distinct trends that have remained largely unarticulated in the existing
scholarship.57 Unlike the vast majority of those arrested under Stalinism – or, for that
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matter, the groups targeted by the Nazis and other genocidal regimes – the elites swept up
during the purges of 1937-1941 were often implicated in the very same systems of
violence that ultimately claimed their lives. Despite Anton Antonov-Ovseenko’s adamant
insistence that “the difference between ‘victims and hangmen’ was absolute and
‘eternal,’”58 in actuality quite a few of the personages discussed herein were directly
involved in the devastating collectivization campaigns of the early 1930s; some sat on
regional NKVD troikas and signed off on mass executions and imprisonments; some
hectored and denounced their rivals and former comrades alike, out of ideological zeal,
vain attempts at self-preservation, or some combination thereof; others still personally
meted out revolutionary justice and terror through their positions in the judiciary and
state security. Russian historian Elena Zubkova observes that the purges were “often a
thoroughly confused conglomerate of ironic dramas and broken fates. Among the victims
were former informers and executioners, and among the loyal camp guards were genuine
executioners and potentially honest people deluded by a perverse conception of dutiful
service.”59
In light of their extensive involvement in the Soviet government’s repressive
apparatus, it is methodologically unsound to depict many of the posthumously
rehabilitated solely as victims. The avoidance of the term “victim” is also intended to
more accurately reflect the terminology employed contemporaneously by Soviet officials
and citizens alike. While “victim” has become ubiquitous in scholarly and popular
treatments of all those who endured Stalinist repression, it does not appear to have been
as widely embraced when the authorities first began to admit the innocence of certain
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“enemies of the people,” as emphasizing the heroism and honorable contributions of the
men in question remained the order of the day.
Sources
This study is based predominantly on archival documents held in former central
Soviet repositories in Moscow, namely the State Archive of the Russian Federation
(Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi federatsii, GARF), the Russian State Archive of
Contemporary History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii, RGANI), the
Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv
sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii, RGASPI), and the Russian State Archive of Literature and
Art (Rossiiskii gosudarsvennyi arkhiv literatury i isskustva, RGALI). The most frequently
referenced collection from GARF is that of the USSR General Procuracy, which contains
individual rehabilitation case files, internal communications between various branches of
the judiciary, and the Procuracy’s close interactions with the Central Committee and
specific Party leaders. Also of great value are the fondy of the USSR Council of Ministers
and Supreme Soviet, which preserve letters from applicants for rehabilitation, and the
Council of Ministers’ Housing Directorate, which fielded requests from former elites for
property restitution over the course of the 1950s.
The papers of the CPSU, bifurcated between RGASPI and RGANI, constitute
another major source-base for the dissertation. The records of the Central Committee
Presidium (prior to 1952 the Politburo) and the Party Control Committee found at
RGANI both comprise numerous deliberations relating to legal and political
rehabilitation, and RGASPI boasts an entire fond of accounts written by survivors of the
“lawlessness” of the 1930s-1950s in addition to the archives of numerous Old
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Bolsheviks.60 RGALI proved fruitful for its collection of personal papers from authors
who were both the subjects and recipients of rehabilitation appeals.
These materials, most of which were inaccessible to scholars until relatively
recently, are supplemented by published documentary collections, including the
indispensable series Reabilitatsiia: kak eto bylo (Rehabilitation: As It Happened), which
mines the holdings of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, an
institution that remains inaccessible to researchers. Beyond officially generated sources
and petitions to the authorities, this thesis turns to memoirs, diaries, and other ego
documents written by functionaries from the judiciary and affiliated government bodies,
as well as beneficiaries of rehabilitation. Combined, they allow one to access the
multifarious objectives and outcomes that made posthumous rehabilitation one of the
most contentious and consequential innovations of the decade following Stalin’s demise.
Chapter Outline
The dissertation consists of five interconnected, thematically arranged chapters.
Chapter One approaches the tentative first months and years of posthumous rehabilitation
through the prism of patronage networks. The Great Terror often targeted individuals
according to their personal and professional affiliations, and when Stalin’s heirs turned
on one of their own in a coordinated attack on Beriia it signaled an opportunity for
vindication to those who had clashed with the secret police chief and his circle in the
past. When the official mechanisms for initiating rehabilitation proved unresponsive or
insufficiently expeditious, survivors of the Transcaucasian Party elite reached out in

60

Recently some components of both the Politburo/Presidium fond as well as that of the Party Control
Committee have been transferred from RGANI to RGASPI; for the purposes of this study, references to
files will be maintained as they appeared in RGANI’s collection.

29
considerable numbers to Anastas Mikoian – the last remaining member of the Kremlin’s
“Caucasian clique” – to secure relief. In soliciting the intervention of Mikoian and other
erstwhile patrons still within the halls of power, rehabilitation seekers counted on the
continued viability of relationships that had been quiescent for the better part of two
decades; the traction that their cases gained stands as a testament to the deeply
personalized nature of the early rehabilitation process.
Building upon the findings from the previous section, Chapter Two applies a
microhistorical approach to the remarkable case of one of Mikoian’s ill-fated
acquaintances, the former Georgian Party Secretary Levan Davydovich Gogoberidze.
Having leveraged their family’s history with Mikoian, Gogoberidze’s sister, daughter,
and wife were able to directly influence the course of his rehabilitation, and also induce
the Procuracy to open a wide-ranging investigation into his possible whereabouts.
Despite the authorities’ repeated – and remarkable, for the time – assurances that Levan
Davydovich had been executed in March 1937, the remaining Gogoberidzes were
steadfast in their conviction that he was alive in one of the “distant camps” thanks to both
the Stalin-era assertion that those sentenced to death had received “ten years without the
right of correspondence,” and a steady stream of reported sightings at various Gulag
outposts that made their way to the family through the pipeline of recent returnees from
“the zone.” Though these rumors proved to be false, the lengths to which the Procuracy
was willing to go in order to verify them speak to the premium that the post-Stalin
authorities placed on uncovering what actually became of repressed Party luminaries in
light of the extremes of deception that marked the legacy of state violence they inherited.
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Chapter Three takes as its subject the central role that the various branches of the
judiciary – particularly the Procuracy – played in establishing the procedure of
rehabilitation, a critical topic largely overlooked by existing works. Although the Central
Committee reserved the prerogative to dictate which individuals were eligible for
consideration, the substantive legal work of rehabilitation, which consisted of extensive
reviews of case files and archival documents, interviews with witnesses, and devising
coherent narratives out of contradictory testimony – much of it extracted under duress –
fell to the Procuracy’s investigators, and was made binding through rulings of the USSR
Supreme Court’s subsidiary collegiums and plenums. The judiciary also bore partial
responsibility – in consultation with the organs of state security – for determining the
type and amount of information that would be provided to concerned citizens inquiring
after their disappeared relatives; the inability of these state institutions to effectively
coordinate the fictitious answers they routinely supplied engendered a serious credibility
gap among the populace. The limited mandate under which the Soviet judiciary operated
at this time obliged it to thoroughly dismantle certain Stalin-era fabrications to justify the
exoneration of thousands of Bolshevik stalwarts while it diligently maintained other
canards in the interest of concealing the Terror’s true toll and defending the Party line
from the contagion of Oppositionism.
The currents surrounding posthumous rehabilitation, the judiciary’s increased
clout under Khrushchev, and the Party’s determination to reassert control over the organs
of state security coalesced around a series of trials against the remnants of Beriia’s secret
police clan in Tbilisi, Moscow, and Baku between the autumn of 1955 and the spring of
1956. These hearings are the focus of the fourth chapter. The tribunals held in the

31
Georgian and Azerbaijani capital cities were widely publicized spectacles, while the one
in Moscow was held in camera; at each trial, posthumously rehabilitated individuals –
and particularly their suffering while in custody – were prominently invoked to
exemplify the former top-ranking secret policemen’s lawlessness and justify the death
sentences that were handed down against the majority of the fourteen accused. Though
the proceedings were in many respects reminiscent of the Terror’s show trials – insofar as
the guilty verdicts were predetermined – rather than opening a new spate of bloodletting,
they marked the last instance of political violence being used as a means of eliminating
internal rivals; from that point on Khrushchev and his cohort effectively wielded
accusations of complicity in past crimes against their adversaries, but spared the lives of
those who found themselves on the losing side of power struggles.
Having established the ways in which the Soviet government instrumentalized the
life stories of the posthumously rehabilitated to mediate the fraught aftermath of Stalin’s
demise, the fifth and final chapter considers what survivors of the exonerated sought to
gain – in material terms – through their participation in the rehabilitation process. Many
figures first discussed in the opening chapter reappear here, as they mobilized patronage
ties to secure concessions from the state in the form of improved housing, restored
property, financial assistance, and social privileges; in many instances those linked to the
anti-Beriia campaign were able to garner some of the earliest and most generous benefits.
The chapter traces the evolution of restitution to rehabilitees’ families from its largely
piecemeal beginnings to a bureaucratized procedure wherein the state’s obligations
before the rehabilitated were codified, though inconsistently met. Appeals from families
whose homes and belongings were seized during the Terror reveal an enduring sense of
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entitlement that withstood decades of stigmatization directed against “family members of
enemies of the people,” and proprietary feelings toward specific places and objects that
seemingly ran counter to the ethos of state or collective ownership espoused in the early
Soviet Union. This emphasis on reclaiming dwellings, belongings, and other trappings of
privilege indicates the centrality of material possessions to notions of elite identity that
relatives of the posthumously rehabilitated sought to recapture once they were restored
their civil rights.
Several Old Bolshevik families – including the Gogoberidzes, NaneishviliKosarevs, and Orakhelashvilis, among others – appear with some regularity across the
dissertation. This is a reflection first and foremost of their prominent representation in the
source base, but it is also intended to provide through lines between the chapters and
some indication of how specific families experienced the various aspects of rehabilitation
over the course of the decade-plus following Stalin’s death, a perspective that is largely
absent from existing studies. By tracing certain individuals and their extended circles
from their pre-Revolutionary activities to the circumstances of their arrests and
executions, and then continuing through the process of posthumous rehabilitation and the
restoration of some semblance of their families’ former lives, the dissertation attempts to
provide a more holistic image of posthumous rehabilitees and their families, and situates
itself within a narrative continuity that underscores the personal factors at play in some of
the most sensitive political decisions taken in the post-Stalin Soviet Union.
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Chapter One – Personal Patronage and the Genesis of Posthumous
Rehabilitation
…Anastas Ivanovich stood up so suddenly that we were all stupefied
(you can’t come up with another verb). And here are his words –
approximately, of course, but with a great guarantee for accuracy:
– Yes, we indeed dragged out rehabilitation for many years, rather
than acknowledging our mistake once and rehabilitating everyone
immediately. Why did we not do this? I say “we,” bearing myself in mind
personally: more than once I stood in for the General Secretary when he
was away… Why did we not do this? Who were we afraid of? You think
that we were afraid of each other? No! You can believe me. We were so
afraid of Him that his successors could not fear one another after the fear
of Him… So why did we enact “acts of rehabilitation,” rather than
exonerate everyone immediately? Why did we arrange the façade of court
proceedings for acquittals? Because if we had proceeded otherwise,
if we had proceeded according to our conscience, our people would
ultimately have been convinced that we were scoundrels! I remember
that Anastas Ivanovich hesitated for a moment. Then he concluded:
– Scoundrels! Which in actuality is what we were!61
In late December 1953 Antonina Aleksandrovna Kalmykova wrote to Nikita
Khrushchev from the Siberian city of Kansk, in southern Krasnoiarsk krai. Prior to his
arrest in November 1938, Kalmykova’s husband, Betal Edykovich Kalmykov, had served
as the First Secretary of the Kabardino-Balkar Party obkom for much of the 1930s, and
the announcement of Minister of Internal Affairs Lavrentii Pavlovich Beriia’s arrest in
June 1953 and execution that December over the airwaves and in the Soviet press
represented for Kalmykova an opportunity to free herself from exile and restore her
family’s good name. In her petition, Kalmykova insisted that both she and her husband
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were victims of “the despotism and lawlessness Beriia perpetrated.”62 Kalmykova’s
missive narrated the via dolorosa that she had tread since Betal’s repression: subjected to
repeated, brutal interrogations designed to force her to incriminate her husband and his
close friend Grigorii “Sergo” Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, she was driven to the brink
of suicide, then spent ten years confined to a labor camp and a further five in exile in
Krasnoiarsk.63 Kalmykova requested that Khrushchev clear the way for her to be reunited
with her last living relative, her daughter, and that the charges against her and Kalmykov
be reexamined in light of Beriia’s recent unmasking. Appended to her appeal was an
attestation from the director and Party committee chairman of the hydrolysis plant where
Kalmykova had been employed for the past three and a half years noting that she had
proven herself to be “hardworking,” and “honestly and diligently applie[d] herself to her
work.”64 With this inclusion Kalmykova seemingly attempted to signal though assiduous
labor her continued devotion to building socialism despite the misfortunes that had
befallen her – and her worthiness of absolution.
Neither Kalmykova’s family saga nor her contributions to the Soviet project
attracted Khrushchev’s notice, and her letter was appended to the growing file on Beriia’s
case without any sign that entreaties within had been taken up for consideration. Yet her
pleas did not ultimately go unanswered: at the end of the following April, Anastas
Ivanovich Mikoian, the great survivor of Soviet politics, forwarded an identical copy of
Kalmykova’s letter – sans the endorsement from her employers – as well as a second note
from her daughter and brother-in-law to the rest of the Central Committee, suggesting
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that the matter warranted further attention.65 It was no coincidence that the Kamykovs
directed their supplications to Mikoian after failing to gain traction with Khrushchev, as
Mikoian and Betal Kalmykov had served together in the North Caucasus, and were both
extremely close to Ordzhonikidze. That Kalmykova’s overtures found purchase with
Mikoian after Khrushchev was left unpursuaded underscores the centrality of patronclient and kinship relationships to the functioning of Soviet rule. Over the course of his
decades-long political career Mikoian proved himself to be particularly adept at
navigating this aspect of the system by mobilizing practices and affinities that were
forged in the crucible of revolutionary conspiracy on the borderlands of the Russian
Empire.66
Within the Kremlin of the mid-1950s and 1960s Mikoian came to represent the
interests of an array of Old Bolsheviks with whom he served in Transcaucasia (today’s
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) in the pre-Revolutionary and Civil War-era
Communist underground, many of whom began their radical careers under Sergo
Ordzhonikidze’s tutelage. As historian Erik Scott has shown in his study of the Georgian
diaspora within Russia and the Soviet Union, Communists who traced their political
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origins to this milieu emerged with a shared, engrained set of values: “the risk of arrest
meant that loyalty was prized and the danger of betrayal always present. For these
reasons, ideological commitment was wedded to a symbolic – and sometimes genetic –
sense of fraternity among the predominantly male socialists of the Caucasus, a region
where idealized male friendship was celebrated in poetry and practices of adoptive
kinship were deep-rooted.”67 Though Scott emphasizes the particularly Georgian
character of these circles, the multiethnic background of those who sought help from
Mikoian suggests that shared service in the Communist underground was an equally
strong locus of solidarity. Due in part to the particularly strong ties that existed among
Transcaucasian Bolsheviks, “the purges hit this community with exceptional force,” as
NKVD investigators recast longstanding interpersonal bonds as evidence of
counterrevolutionary conspiracies, thereby consuming almost an entire generation of
Party faithful.68 However, following the deposal of Beriia – himself a product of
Ordzhonikidze’s extended network – the surviving relatives of Mikoian’s disappeared
clients began to flood his office at the Council of Ministers (Sovmin) with requests for
aid; their letters, along with Mikoian’s reactions, are preserved in his personal files.
Unaware that their spouses, parents, and siblings had been summarily executed,
petitioners sought information about their possible whereabouts, demanded their legal
exoneration, and tried to extract material concessions, thereby reestablishing patronage
relationships that had lain dormant for nearly two decades. Rather than ignoring these
supplications, which arrived in the midst of major upheavals at the top of the Soviet
party-state, Mikoian upheld his commitments to his repressed comrades and their
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relations, taking an active part in securing their exculpation. Thus, in many of its earliest
instances the posthumous rehabilitation of former Soviet elites was fostered largely by
personalistic, patron-client and kinship relationships that could be traced back to the
earliest days of Soviet power.
Scholars have long acknowledged the important place of patronage ties in the
establishment, consolidation, and maintenance of Soviet power across the former Russian
Empire, though the issue of how the resulting networks manifested themselves beyond
political maneuvers and in daily life has only been incorporated into the research agenda
since the opening of the former Soviet archives.69 As Sheila Fitzpatrick observes,
“[p]atronage relations were ubiquitous among the Soviet elite,” to the point that “nobody
within the elites […] could live in a patronage-free environment.”70 As a prototypical
patron Ordzhonikidze “expected dedication, results, and loyalty [from clients]. But he
also offered protection, intervening energetically on behalf of ‘his people’ when they got
into trouble with the party, the secret police, or other control agencies”; by that same turn,
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members of Ordzhonikidze’s network were expected to alert him if there was trouble
bound his way from the periphery, forming “mutual-protection circles.”71
Beyond the exchange of political favors and support, patronage in the early Soviet
Union primarily expressed itself as a function of the state’s status as “the monopoly
distributor in a context of shortages of all goods and services. State monopoly meant that
allocation was a major function of Soviet bureaucracy. Shortages meant that access was a
matter of priority and privilege […] The ultimate allocational decisions were made by
bureaucrats – but on personalistic, not bureaucratic-legal reasons.”72 This access to and
preferential distribution of goods and services that were in short supply – which, for the
families of purged notables included justice (broadly understood), housing, and material
possessions – proved to be one of the most enduring aspects of patronage as practiced by
Mikoian into the 1950s and 1960s.73
Another one of “the normal prerogative[s] of power” wielded by Soviet patrons
that Fitzpatrick discusses was the ability “to intervene to protect subordinates, associates,
and clients who fell into the hands of the NKVD.”74 However, according to Mikoian’s
memoir, this perquisite was abrogated in the lead up to the Great Terror by a “special
Politburo decision forbidding Politburo members from interfering with the work of the
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NKVD.”75 This marked, in Fitzpatrick’s words, “a highly significant (albeit temporary)
change in the informal rules of the game” in which those in the upper echelons of Soviet
power were engaged.76 It also engendered a serious dilemma for exponents of patronage
like Mikoian: if patrons were incapable of safeguarding their clients from unjust
execution, what loyalty, if any, did they owe the latter’s survivors? Furthermore, if a
senior patron, such as Ordzhonikidze, was no longer on the scene was it incumbent upon
those with whom he had served in the past, such as Mikoian, to see to the needs of his
erstwhile clients? Materials from Mikoian and other leaders’ personal archives suggest
that despite the disruptions and upheavals of state-sponsored terror, which was
disproportionately aimed at kinship groups, patronage relationships among old Party
stalwarts proved to be surprisingly resilient and inheritable in the years following Stalin’s
death.77 However, those who benefitted from these arrangements could not and did not
simply take it for granted that after a decade and a half in disgrace they would be able to
pick up affairs where they had left off in 1937 or 1938; for most, the decision to seek out
Mikoian’s intercession was a product of the party-state’s perceived unresponsiveness to
their pressing concerns.
The most cited studies of Gulag returnees have tended to depict interactions
between survivors and the Soviet state as strictly adversarial, and therefore minimize the
contacts between privileged survivors and figures still within the Kremlin.78 This trend
has served to obscure the fact that rehabilitation policy in the period immediately
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following Stalin’s death was a highly hierarchical process that required close cooperation
between the families of the wrongfully repressed and representatives of the party-state.79
In her recent work on the year 1956 in Soviet Russia, Kathleen Smith observes that “the
simplest and fastest way to begin the rehabilitation process was to rely on direct ties to
very high officials,” and despite the disruptions of state terror and the infusion of new
cadres into the bureaucracy, “ties of kinship, histories of patronage, and traces of
friendship remained to link prisoners and rulers.”80 The controversy over who within the
Soviet government was responsible for initiating and pursuing rehabilitations was
litigated with particular vigor in the memoirs of the leaders involved and has
subsequently shaped researchers’ perspectives.
In taking credit for raising the issue of investigations against supposed “enemies
of the people,” Nikita Khrushchev was quick to denounce Kliment Efimovich
Voroshilov, Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich, and Georgii Maksimilianovich Malenkov for
their foot-dragging. Regarding Mikoian, however, Khrushchev was decidedly
circumspect: “I can’t remember specifically what position [Mikoian] took. As I recall,
[Mikoian] didn’t pursue an active policy, but he didn’t try to hold back the process of
exposing injustice.”81 Evidently stung by these allegations, Mikoian responded in his own
autobiography that in actuality it was he who had proposed forming a commission to
investigate Stalin-era political cases, “and there is no way that Nikita Sergeevich could
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have forgotten this.”82 Mikoian also pointed to the large number of families that sought
his help following Stalin’s death, and proudly claimed that of the dossiers he forwarded
to USSR Procurator General Roman Andreevich Rudenko, “there was not a single
occasion in which a case I sent was denied rehabilitation.”83 Although it was not possible
to review every letter that Mikoian forwarded to the Procuracy for the purposes of this
study – as many were not yet available to researchers – those consulted appear to bear out
this track record, as all of the cases Mikoian gave his imprimatur were eventually
reviewed and the charges dismissed.84
Stephen Cohen is among the few authors to acknowledge Mikoian’s interventions
“on behalf of many victims, sometimes on his own initiative,” basing this impression off
of individuals’ reminiscences.85 However, Cohen attributes this engagement to Mikoian’s
supposed “need for absolution” in light of his own involvement in the purges, and,
embracing Khrushchev’s account of the genesis of rehabilitation, contends that regardless
of Mikoian’s “degree of repentance, [he] could have done little had Khrushchev not
played his much larger role.”86 The thesis that rehabilitation constituted an act of
contrition is difficult to substantiate – or, for that matter, dismiss – beyond the
speculations of some of Mikoian’s contemporaries, but the documentary record from
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recently opened former Soviet repositories suggest that this understanding merits serious
complication. There is no indication that Mikoian waited for Khrushchev’s say-so before
involving himself in rehabilitations, as most of the letters he received arrived in the
immediate aftermath of Beriia’s execution in December 1953, well before Khrushchev
consolidated power.
Though archival materials cannot attest directly to Mikoian’s motivations, the
shared profile of the vast majority of “his people,” the grounds on which they based their
appeals, and the diligence Mikoian showed in taking care of them all strongly suggest
that while advocating for posthumous rehabilitation may indeed have helped to salve his
guilty conscience, his responses were largely conditioned by practices of kinship that had
seen him through his entire revolutionary and political career. Through this prism,
Mikoian’s actions can be framed as a way of fulfilling his obligation to protect his clients
and ensure their material well-being, something he was prevented from doing by the
extraordinary circumstances of the 1930s and early 1940s. For their own part, it was
incumbent upon the surviving relatives of the repressed to remind him of why they were
owed his loyalty, and what the stakes were should he fail to honor their requests. The
affective style on display in both letters to Mikoian and, to a certain extent, in his
responses is all the more pronounced when compared with the type of patronage
practiced by Kliment Voroshilov, whose correspondence reflects a far more hierarchical
streak.
Miriam Dobson, who has worked with Mikoian and other leaders’
correspondence on rehabilitation – including Kalmykova’s letter – is primarily concerned
with “ordinary” Soviet citizens, and therefore does not delve deeply into appeals by
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former elites.87 Dobson works off the assumption that individuals’ onetime status
afforded them special access to the halls of power without noting the fact that for the
better part of twenty years they had been part of one of the most stigmatized groups in the
USSR, and therefore could not count on official intervention on their behalf. In what she
terms the “art of petitioning,” Dobson perceives direct connections between imagery
evoked in prisoners’ appeals and tropes from early Soviet heroic narratives; however, by
emphasizing literary form over intended function, she elides the primary impetus of the
petitions, which was to persuade recipients of the rectitude of the appellant’s cause and
thereby secure their exoneration. This chapter diverges from Dobson’s approach by
foregrounding preexisting interpersonal and experiential ties between petitioners and
addressees, which played a crucial part in dictating the grounds upon which petitioners
based their claims, and the responsiveness of the parties they entrusted to shepherd their
cases.
Defining Mikoian’s Clients
Historians have pointed to the April 1953 announcement of the dismissal of the
case against the accused “doctor-saboteurs” as the official signal that provoked a flood of
rehabilitation appeals in mid-1953, but for those who turned to Mikoian the deposal of
Beriia that June proved to be far more portentous. The revelation that Beriia had been a
clandestine “enemy of the people” for the duration of his career as state security chief in
Transcaucasia, then as the region’s Party boss, and finally as head of the Union-wide
secret police, in Dobson’s words “gave rise to a variety of confused and sometimes
passionate reactions,” and prompted scores of those who attributed their falls from grace
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to Beriia’s malign influence to reemerge.88 As there was considerable overlap between
this cohort and Mikoian’s patronage network, within months of the announcement of
Beriia’s sentence Mikoian’s office had become a veritable clearinghouse for aggrieved
families seeking information about and exculpation of their missing relatives.
Who exactly, then, were “Mikoian’s people?” The vast majority of appellants
who sought his intervention in the first post-Stalin years could trace their connections to
Mikoian through the fight to establish Soviet power in the restive Caucasus during the
Civil War and in the years immediately following. Most were themselves either
Armenian (like Mikoian) or Georgian, though there were also ethnic Slavs and Jews
among them. The oil boomtown of Baku was a particularly important locus for this
cohort, both because of its pre-Revolutionary admixture of workers from various
backgrounds that made it a fertile breeding ground for Communist agitation and its
storied history during the Civil War. The heroism of the martyred 26 Commissars who
led the Baku Commune, as well as of the Bolsheviks who continued their struggle
underground after the Commune’s fall, was among the most potent of the Soviet state’s
founding myths, and out of the Baku cauldron emerged many of the USSR’s future
leaders, including Ordzhonikidze, Sergei Mironovich Kirov, and Mikoian.89
Mikoian and Ordzhonikidze, along with Stalin, comprised the notorious
“Caucasian Clique” within the Kremlin during the 1920s and 1930s, and befitting their
status – and in keeping with Union-wide practice – they seeded the provinces with their

88

Ibid., 34.
The canonical account of the Baku Commune is Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917–1918:
Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). On the
wide-ranging influence of the Transcaucasian network, see Gerald M. Easter, Reconstructing the State:
Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8288.
89

45
clients.90 Matters began to come to a head, however, when Beriia and his affiliates
supplanted several of Ordzhonikidze’s trusted friends in the Transcaucasian Party
apparat; many from the former group took refuge in Moscow in order to be closer to
their patron.91 From the capital, the “old guard that had allied itself with Ordzhonikidze”
grumbled and intrigued over Beriia’s supposed service in a pan-Turkic militia during the
Civil War: “Distinguished Caucasian Bolsheviks who traveled in top Kremlin circles did
not have nice things to say about Beria and particularly enjoyed bringing up his ties with
Musavat intelligence.”92 Ordzhonikidze’s suicide in February 1937, possibly prompted
by his older brother Papuliia’s arrest, stripped his clients of their chief advocate within
the Politburo, and before long those with close ties to him – including many other
relatives – were rounded up for execution or long imprisonment; those left behind
frequently held Beriia directly responsible for what they viewed as reprisals against
Ordzhonikidze’s “clan.”93 Mikoian remained a voice for Caucasian Old Bolsheviks at the
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top of the Party, but as discussed above his ability to guarantee individuals’ personal
security was compromised by external constraints as state repression against leading
cadres began to ramp up.
It bears mentioning that in at least two instances during the 1930s Mikoian
attempted to exert his influence to come to the aid of those he would later help achieve
rehabilitation, but to little apparent effect.94 In 1937 Mikoian was dispatched to Armenia,
along with Malenkov, to oversee the purge of the local Party apparat and intelligentsia.
One of his tasks while there was to sign off on a list of individuals marked for arrest that
the Armenian NKVD had prepared; on it he noticed the name of one of his oldest
comrades from the Party’s pre-Revolutionary illegal days, Daniil (Danush)
Aleksandrovich Shaverdian, which he struck off the list. Despite Mikoian’s efforts,
Shaverdian was still taken into custody, and ultimately died in a labor camp.95 In a move
that could have proven immensely costly for Mikoian, he also extended an extraordinary
offer of help to the family of Comintern official Gevork Sarkisovich Alikhanov, the
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stepfather of Elena Bonner.96 As Bonner described in her memoir, while imprisoned at
the Akhmolinsk Camp for Wives of Traitors to the Motherland – known as ALZhIR – her
mother, Ruf’, instructed her to pass on a note requesting assistance from Mikoian in
either 1939 or 1940. Bonner took the note in person to Mikoian’s dacha outside Moscow,
where she spoke first with his wife, who she recalled being “very kind to me, perhaps
excessively so.”97 She was then received by Mikoian himself, who admitted that it was
beyond his power to rescue Alikhanov, but proposed that Elena and her younger brother
come to live with his family; insulted by the suggestion, Bonner “replied very harshly,
almost rudely,” and did not see Mikoian again until after Stalin’s death.98
Even before Beriia’s formal conviction Mikoian mined his own personal history
as a Party fighter in the Caucasus to discredit the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)
chief, and in doing so he affirmed his connections to those who had fallen into disrepute
and physical destruction. Though Mikoian had not been an enthusiastic supporter of
Khrushchev and his supporters’ plot to depose Beriia, and was hesitant to swiftly consign
another member of the Party’s inner circle to the firing squad, once Beriia’s arrest had
been carried out Mikoian duly aligned himself with the winning faction.99 On the evening
of July 3, 1953 – little more than a week after Beriia had been taken into custody – at the
Central Committee Plenum convened to legitimize the palace coup, Mikoian took to the
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floor to address Beriia’s claim that during the Civil War in Baku he had infiltrated
Musavat counter-intelligence as a double agent on behalf of the Party. Mikoian soundly
dismissed this notion, as he insisted that he had been one of the only Party officials in the
city empowered to dispatch individuals on such missions. When questioned by Malenkov
as to who else possessed this authority, Mikoian mentioned two of his erstwhile
comrades, “Sarkis” and “Viktor,” referring to Sarkis (Sergei) Ivanovich Kas’ian and
Viktor Ivanovich Naneishvili, both of whom had been swept up in the prewar purges.100
Mikoian’s apparent lack of concern in associating himself with known “enemies of the
people” was underscored by his extremely familiar use of their first names without
patronymics, rather than identifying them simply by their last names; it stood to reason,
then, that both men’s families might eventually approach Mikoian seeking redress.
The profile that emerges of Mikoian’s clientele is thus of a group bound together
by both shared revolutionary experiences and persecution. Over the course of the first
three years following Stalin’s death Mikoian – as the last remaining member of the
“Caucasian Clique” – became something of an Old Bolshevik ombudsman, fielding
dozens, if not hundreds of requests from the intimates of those with whom he had crossed
paths in the nascent days of Soviet power. Their belief, articulated through scores of
letters, was that if someone like Beriia could be exposed for the enemy that he truly was,
then perhaps their honest Communist relatives – who stood alongside Mikoian during the
nascent Soviet republic’s darkest moments – could in turn be located and finally
redeemed.
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That said, onetime clients of Ordzhonikidze or Mikoian could not simply take it
for granted that their entreaties would be readily received in the Kremlin. For the vast
majority, their relationships with these men and the larger networks they cultivated had
been sundered by death, disappearances, extended incarceration, and dispossession;
indeed, after a patron had failed to shield so many comrades, could he be expected to help
rectify the situation for his clients’ survivors so long after the fact?
In one of the first rehabilitation letters to reach Mikoian, written in July 1953,
Elena Davydovna Gogoberidze, sister of the Baku underground member and onetime
Party Secretary of Georgia Levan Davydovich Gogoberidze, drew upon the themes of
shared service in the Caucasus, alignment with Ordzhonikidze, and past confrontations
with Beriia to articulate the overarching importance of clearing her brother’s name.
Gogoberidze opened her entreaty by noting that although she had also written to
Malenkov and Khrushchev, she was “appealing to you [Mikoian] as the only person
within the Party leadership who from his very youth over the course of many years knew
my brother Levan Davydovich Gogoberidze. I remember well how sincerely Levan loved
you.”101 Building off of the recent attacks upon Beriia in the Soviet press, Gogoberidze
stated that “it has become evident to me that the person who ruined Levan is an enemy of
the people,” insisting that Beriia had targeted him “deliberately, fearing denunciations”:
I doubt whether you knew for certain how much Beriia hated Levan
because at one time (1933) Levan had material in his hands that attested to
shameful facts of Beriia’s biography. Sergo ordered Levan to remain silent
until irrefutable evidence was collected. Over the next two to three years,
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if you recall, Levan was seriously ill, and then came 1936-1937 and Beriia
did away with him.102
By contrasting the fraternal love that Levan Gogoberidze bore Mikoian with the hatred
that Beriia harbored for Levan, Elena Gogoberidze articulated the deeply personal hue in
which political alliances and rivalries were cast within the Transcaucasian Bolshevik
context. If Mikoian reciprocated Levan’s affection, as she hoped, perhaps the damage
wrought by Beriia’s malice could, at some level, be undone.
Given the established animosity between Levan Gogoberidze and Beriia and the
length of time since the former’s disappearance, Elena Gogoberidze was not sanguine
about the possibility of her brother’s survival: “I implore you, Anastas Ivanovich, save
Levan if he is still alive – it has already been 17 years since we heard anything of
him.”103 Were he still alive, Elena reasoned, “there is a great deal he could reveal today –
after all, there are very few witnesses to the beginning of Beriia’s political career left
among the living.”104 She then urged Mikoian, “regardless of whether the Party currently
needs this type of testimony,” to “remember Levan, and if Levan has already died at least
save his name, the name of an honorable Bolshevik who walked the glorious path of a
fighter devoted to the Party and the people.”105
Many of the points Elena Gogoberidze raised were echoed – unwittingly – by
Elena Solomonovna Breitman, who also seized upon the public excoriation of Beriia as
an opportunity to realize her siblings’ redemption in January 1954. Breitman noted that it
“has come to my attention that in the indictment against Beriia the former Georgian
People’s Commissar of Agriculture Matikashvili Shalva Spirdonovich figures among
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those individuals who became victims of his criminal activities.”106 Breitman’s sister,
Anna Solomonovna, in addition to having participated in the struggle for Baku herself,
was married to Matikashvili and arrested alongside him, and Breitman believed that the
invocation of Matikashvili against Beriia “[cast] a new light” on Anna Solomonovna’s
case, as well as that of their brother, Aleksandr Solomonovich, who worked under
Mikoian at the People’s Commissariat of the Food Industry.107 Breitman further justified
her outreach by noting that she was “appealing personally to you, Comrade Mikoian, as
one of the leaders of the Party and country who personally knew the Breitmans since
1917.”108 Having had such a long acquaintance with her siblings, Breitman assumed that
Mikoian would be able to attest to their true characters, and inform his colleagues of the
egregious error that had been made in their cases.
Other rehabilitation-seekers fell back upon the familiar format of the Party
biography and rendered their requests in the guise of a record of their relatives’
revolutionary exploits. Artak Stambolstian devoted “[his] whole life from the age of
reason […] to the great cause of our Communist Party,” wrote his wife, Pavla Ivanovna
Galkina.109 Stamboltsian spent his youth in Tbilisi (then Tiflis) participating in
Bolshevik-led student circles, joining the Party in 1916, after which point he became a
professional revolutionary, working on behalf of the Soviets throughout Transcaucasia.
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He found himself in Baku during the heady days of the Commune, fighting “against the
German-Turks and Musavat counterrevolutionary bands” for which he later received a
“certificate of honor.”110 When a British expeditionary force occupied Baku, the Party
demonstrated its faith in Stamboltsian by selecting him to stay behind and “conduct
underground Party work in the city.”111 Galkina’s emphasis on Stamboltsian’s past
bravery served a dual purpose: it challenged the prevailing narrative that he had been an
enemy of the Party, and reminded Mikoian of events that he himself had witnesssed,
which might in turn impel him to advocate for his former comrades who no longer had a
voice and help prove their innocence before the Party and Soviet people.
Not every survivor who fit the above-mentioned profile needed or solicited
Mikoian’s help in drawing the state’s attention to their cause. In December 1953 Mariia
Viktorovna Naneishvili-Kosareva, Viktor Naneishvili’s daughter and the wife of
longtime Komsomol head Aleksandr Vasil’evich Kosarev, pled her case before both
Malenkov and Voroshilov, as chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers and Supreme
Soviet, respectively, in nearly identical letters. Writing from perpetual exile in Noril’sk,
Naneishvili-Kosareva sought to bring “certain facts” to the attention of the party-state
leadership “which might explain one of the reasons for Kosarev’s arrest.”112 Recounting
an incident that would eventually become a staple of the Soviet judiciary’s anti-Beriia
repertoire, Naneishvili-Kosareva described a visit that Azerbaijani headman and close
Beriia confidante Mir Dzhafar Bagirov paid her family in 1937. During dinner, Kosarev
proposed a toast to “true Bolshevik leadership in Transcaucasia, which does not currently

110

Ibid.
Ibid.
112
Artizov et al, eds., Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 79; for the version sent to Voroshilov, four days after the
original, see GARF f. 7523, op. 85, d. 255, ll. 71-72.
111

53
exist there,” a transparent dig at Beriia’s handling of affairs in the region.113 Several
months after Beriia assumed the reigns of the NKVD from Nikolai Ezhov in autumn
1938, he came in person to the Government House to seize the Komsomol secretary.114
Naneishvili-Kosareva asked the arresting officers whether she was also to be detained,
and though she was initially assured that they had no designs on her, as Kosarev was
being led out Beriia instructed his subordinates to “take her too.”115
In light of the speciousness of the grounds upon which Naneishvili-Kosareva was
sentenced to ten years in the distant camps, followed by a second conviction that made
her exile “perpetual,” and Beriia’s recent unmasking, she conjectured that there was
“every reason” to review her case.116 Malenkov apparently agreed with her assessment,
and the following month he suggested that Rudenko “inquire into this case.”117
Naneishvili-Kosareva did not hear back from the authorities until May 8, 1954, when an
officer from the local branch of state security came to her home and announced her full
rehabilitation; she was subsequently put on a flight to Krasnoiarsk and from there was
dispatched to Moscow to confirm her allegations regarding Bagirov with Chairman of the
Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Cheptsov
and Deputy Chief Military Procurator D. I. Kitaev.118 Thanks to the extraordinary
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circumstances of her and her husband’s arrest, which had direct bearing on the partystate’s ongoing investigation into Beriia’s circle, Naneishvili-Kosareva was able to seize
the Soviet government’s attention and secure a quite early rehabilitation for herself.
Tellingly, though, when the judicial system proved less attentive to subsequent requests,
it was Mikoian to whom she and her family turned for support.
The Non-Responsive State: Patronage over Bureaucratic Inertia
Beriia’s trial and execution alongside those of his closest lieutenants figured
heavily into Mikoian’s eventual clients’ correspondence, as they were convinced that
they and their disappeared relations would be vindicated by the revelations resulting from
these proceedings. Their personal propinquity to and investment in the results of Beriia’s
prosecution caused many to expect that the relevant authorities would handle their
dossiers expeditiously. Yet they were dismayed to discover that the Procuracy, Central
Committee, and the organs of state security did not treat their petitions with the sense of
priority that they believed they were due, and it was only when more conventional
avenues appeared to be a dead end that most relatives of the repressed ventured to contact
Mikoian. Personal patronage was therefore not the first recourse of most who sought out
Mikoian’s help, but rather a last resort when standard channels of redress appeared deaf
or otherwise inured to their pleas.
Antonina Kalmykova’s second attempt to draw attention to her plight was among
a rash of letters that arrived at Mikoian’s door in April 1954. As with Elena Gogoberidze,
Kalmykova found an explanation for her family’s persecution in Beriia’s “devious
struggle (intriganskuiu bor’bu) against the prominent Party leader Sergo
the website of the House on the Embankment museum. The two were reunited in Noril’sk following Elena
Aleksandrovna’s arrest during the postwar sweep of “children of enemies of the people.”
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Ordzhonikidze.”119 This conflict led Beriia to “[aim] his stinger at those with whom
Sergo maintained business and friendly relations, and who indirectly from Comrade
Sergo’s mouth could have learned of Beriia’s criminal activities in the past.”120
Kalmykova highlighted the fact that following Kamykov’s arrest, NKVD officers
charged with searching the family apartment were specifically ordered to locate any
personal correspondence between Kalmykov and Ordzhonikidze. With Betal “slandered”
as an enemy of the people, and the Party “meanly deceived” regarding his “supposedly
hostile conduct,” any tangible ties between him and Ordzhonikidze could be employed
“to cast a shadow of mistrust on Sergo’s cherished memory.”121 Having remained loyal to
the Ordzhonikidzes, Kalmykova trusted that Mikoian would in turn keep faith with her
and her husband.
Raisa Konstantinovna Mikadze, the wife of the onetime head of Transcaucasian
State Trade Archil Vissarionovich Mikadze, recounted in detail how Beriia intrigued
against her husband – who had snubbed Beriia by “avoiding and ignoring” him – prior to
his arrest in 1936.122 Raisa Konstantinovna received an eight-year sentence as the wife of
an enemy of the people, and even after release was plagued by her criminal record, which
“horribly complicate[d] [her] existence.”123 Yet she took solace in the fact that Beriia’s
actual character had been exposed: “Now, after the unmasking of the real enemy of the
people Beriia, one of whose victims was my husband, I hope and believe that the truth,
finally, will prevail. Now I am not afraid to petition (khlopotat’) for my innocently
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victimized husband, an honest Communist.”124 No longer threatened by reprisal from
Beriia, Mikadze initially contacted the Chief Military Procuracy, where she was
“promised […] that they would track down and review” her husband’s case.”125 As this
pledge had yet to materialize – Mikadze did not indicate how long she had been kept
waiting – she trusted that Mikoian’s “intervention […] would render invaluable help and
expedite the search for A. Mikadze.”126
Emboldened by Beriia’s toppling, Natal’ia Evgen’evna Chizhova compiled all of
the necessary documentation for her own exoneration and provided it to the Leningradregion branch of the MVD in March 1954; her daughter later informed her that the
Leningrad MVD subsequently forwarded these materials to the Procuracy’s headquarters
in Moscow. Having waited for any sign of further progress for eight months, she solicited
Mikoian’s input. Chizhova and her second husband, the eventual First Secretary of the
Belorussian Party Nikolai Fedorovich Gikalo, became acquainted while they were both
working under Mikoian at the Northern Caucasus Party kraikom in Rostov-on-Don
during the 1920s; Chizhova’s responsibilities within the press department included
weekly reports to Mikoian on the work of the region’s newspapers.127 In the “difficult
seventeen years” since her and her husband’s arrest, Chizhova claimed to have drawn
moral support from Mikoian’s example, as she “clung to an old Party leader, who taught
the young workers to fight for the Party line.”128 During that time Chizhova declined to
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“[turn] to [Mikoian] for help” in expunging her conviction, but with Beriia out of office
she finally “decided to do so.”129
Chizhova bemoaned the fact that Gikalo could neither “request the review of his
case” nor “prove that he was innocent,” as the MVD had informed her eight years earlier
– falsely – that he “died in 1943 somewhere in the camps.”130 Because Chizhova had
been sentenced as the “wife of an enemy of the people,” she was at a loss for “how to
rehabilitate [her]self,” given that she could not refute charges predicated entirely on her
husband’s legal status.131 Chizhova emphasized that it was because she had “yet to
receive an answer from the Procuracy on my petition to expunge my conviction” that she
was asking Mikoian’s help in the form of a telephone call to the Procuracy confirming
that he knew her “as an honest Party member, a participant in the Civil War, never part of
the Opposition.”132 She assured Mikoian that “if I am readmitted into the Party’s trust I
will prove myself worthy of it.”133 With this promise Chizhova recognized that for the
party-state, one’s worthiness of legal redemption was inextricably tied to one’s political
reliability, which would therefore be a central component of any argument Mikoian
might make in her favor.
Writing to Mikoian at around the same time as Chizhova, the wife and daughter,
respectively, of Mikoian’s fellow Armenians Suren Petrovich Akopian and Sergei
Kas’ian – the “Sarkis” of the Baku underground – detailed how the Party and government
leadership’s initially promising responses to their inquiries seemingly foundered once
they reached state security or the Procuracy. Kas’ian’s surviving family contacted both
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Khrushchev and Malenkov in January 1954 in light of Beriia’s denunciation and were
cheered to learn in July that the government had authorized the Georgian MVD to reopen
Kas’ian’s case.134 Their relief was tempered by the fact, however, that “up to this point
we do not have any results from the case review, and we do not even know whether
Sergei Ivanovich is alive or not.”135 Likewise, Petrosian’s wife, Marusia Makovetskaia,
noted that on May 15th of the same year she addressed herself to Khrushchev “with a
request to give the order to review and rehabilitate my husband”; Khrushchev passed this
on to Rudenko four days later, after which point Makovetskaia and her children received
no reports of further progress.136
Mark Natanovich Belen’kii and Abram Lazarevich Gilinskii were both Mikoian’s
deputies at the People’s Commissariat of the Food Industry during the mid-1930s, though
the Baku-born, Sorbonne-trained Belen’kii first encountered Mikoian in the Azerbaijani
capital in 1919. When their wife and daughter, respectively, wrote to Mikoian in 1954,
both had been awaiting some word of the men for months, if not years. Gilinskii’s
daughter, N. A. Stechkina, claimed that she had “appealed repeatedly to the organs of
internal affairs in order to find him, but up to the present time” she had not gotten any
substantive replies.137 If Mikoian’s memoir is to be believed, Belen’kii’s arrest in
November 1937 particularly affected him. When Stalin told him that Belen’kii had been
taken into custody, Mikoian vociferously protested his innocence, entering into a “sharp
and pointed debate with Stalin.” The following week Stalin presented Mikoian with a
transcript of Belen’kii’s interrogation, in which he confessed to the charges against him;
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Mikoian described reading the document as “such a blow,” though it is unclear if his
main concern was for his deputy or how such a development might bode for him.138
Belen’kii’s wife, Natal’ia Vladimirovna, was arrested two months after her husband and
sentenced as a “family member of a traitor to the Motherland (chlen semei izmennika
Rodiny, or ChSIR),” but was released early from her camp term due to illness. At the time
of writing, October 1954, Belen’kaia was living in the Golden Ring city of Zagorsk
(previously and currently Sergiev Posad), which was within 100 kilometers of Moscow,
and therefore technically off-limits to former political prisoners; however, Mikoian had
already pulled some strings behind the scenes to help her live closer to her daughter,
Tat’iana (later the wife of author Anatolii Rybakov).139 Belen’kaia protested that in July
she had written to the Procuracy about reopening her husband’s case, and received
confirmation that his file had been taken up for review, but in the intervening months
nothing had become of the investigation, and so she requested a “huge favor (velikaia
pros’ba) of Mikoian, that he “facilitate the expedition of the inquiry into the case.”140
Although Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva was shown exceptional treatment when
she approached the authorities regarding her and Kosarev’s case, her experience in
seeking the expiation of her father Viktor – also invoked by Mikoian in July 1953 against
Beriia – was far more typical of the obstructions faced by other members of the extended
138
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Transcaucasian Bolshevik network. Along with her brother Pavel, Naneishvili-Kosareva
gave voice to their apparent dismay at the delay in their father’s rehabilitation, but the
siblings struck a conciliatory tone in acknowledging the issues inherent in the process. In
their February 1955 appeal to Mikoian they revealed that eight months had passed since
their initial overture to the Military Procuracy, yet it was evident that their “father’s case
still has not been reviewed.”141 The Naneishvilis professed to “understand all the
complexity and difficulty of analyzing our father’s case, as he is no longer alive and
cannot refute all the false accusations raised against him,” but contended that “surely his
entire life as a revolutionary-Bolshevik itself refutes all the vile accusations.”142 If Viktor
Naneishvili’s revolutionary bona fides alone were insufficient to ensure timely
consideration of the accusations against him, Pavel and Mariia grasped, then the
intervention of one of his last remaining comrades was imperative. Trusting in the ability
of a concerned benefactor to spur on the Soviet bureaucracy, the Naneishvilis and other
families in their situation carefully avoided casting aspersions on the bodies responsible
for carrying out rehabilitations.
Some of Mikoian’s bolder clients were far less guarded in their assessments of the
process’ initial shortcomings. Rita Emmanuilovna Kornblium was something of an
outlier among those who sought Mikoian’s favor: born in 1908, she was easily a decade
younger than most of the other supplicants, her ex-husband, the playwright and Russian
Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) activist Vladimir Mikhailovich Kirshon, was
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part of the creative intelligentsia rather than the Party elite, and she and Kirshon
dissolved their marriage after less than a decade together, some five years before his
arrest and execution in 1937.143 Although Kornblium and Kirshon had separated
acrimoniously, she doggedly pursued his rehabilitation by dint of the fact that she raised
his two sons and her professed belief in the value of his work as a proletarian author and
playwright. By the time she first contacted Mikoian in late January 1955, Kornblium had
already “sent four petitions to KGB Chairman Comrade Serov and appealed twice to the
Military Procuracy” for official information regarding Kirshon’s place and cause of
death, but she had yet to “receive a death certificate for him.”144 Kornblium also raised
the possibility of rehabilitating Kirshon with Rudenko in June 1954, but as she pointedly
observed, “despite the fact that many petitions which were lodged at the same time as
mine have received decisions that fully, morally satisfied them, this whole time the
Procuracy has answered me that Kirshon’s case has still not arrived from the KGB.”145
The discrepancies in response time on the authorities’ part led Kornblium – like
Elena Gogoberidze – to speculate that there remained elements within the security
apparatus that had a vested interest in keeping the truth about Kirshon under wraps:
Over the past 17-18 years my sons and I have drained the bitter cup of
suffering, and the totally inexplicable delay in the review of Kirshon’s
case currently places us in an even more difficult and awkward position
143
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and gives rise to suspicions that perhaps there remain some forces that
have an interest in the fact that “Kirshon’s case remains unexamined
(vnute).” What else can explain such a situation, when in 7 months’ time
the Military Procuracy cannot get the files from Vladimir Kirshon’s
case?146
As justified as Kornblium’s misgivings were, the candor with which she expressed them
was apparently a political liability. The heavily modified second iteration of her letter to
Mikoian that the latter ultimately submitted to the Central Committee for consideration in
August 1955 was stripped of any intimations about the suspect loyalties of certain cadres,
and in reference to her petition to Rudenko Kornblium only mentioned – albeit
inaccurately –that it had been a year and a half since she first reached out to him.147 The
modified tack that Kornblium adopted suggests that the ability of even a highly placed
patron like Mikoian to ensure the expedition of his clients’ cases was dependent – at least
in part – on their complaints being couched in terms that did not question the integrity of
the judicial or security organs, even in light of perceived obstruction in their handling of
cases that, for the survivors of the repressed, were of the utmost urgency.
One of the last families to seek Mikoian’s relief also experienced one of the
longest intervals between their first contact with representatives of the party-state and
their resort to personal patronage. Asatur Stepanovich Kakhoian, one of the elder
statesmen of Transcaucasian Bolshevism, with a Party stazh (tenure) dating to 1898, was
– in the words of his son Karlos – “arrested at the hands of Beriia’s traitors (Berievskikh
izmennikov)” in Georgia in 1937.148 Eager to capitalize on the anti-Beriia sentiment in
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circulation, Karlos petitioned Malenkov in November 1953; though the actual text of the
message is not preserved in Kakhoian’s Procuracy file, there is record of Malenkov’s
secretariat forwarding the note to newly-minted KGB head Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov
with instructions to “inform the petitioner of the results of the investigation.”149 Karlos
and his sister, Elena, later learned that their father’s case had been placed under the
purview of the Georgian republican KGB, and as the inquiry wound its way though the
state security system over the next thirteen months they put themselves at investigators’
disposal.150 Karlos – whose own conviction as the son of an enemy of the people was also
under consideration – was tasked with tracking down exculpatory documents and
witnesses, including attestations from Baku Commissar Stepan Shaumian and Stalin’s
revolutionary cohort Simon “Kamo” Petrosian’s sisters, as well as members of the
Kas’ian family.151 The siblings were informed on July 25, 1955 that the investigation had
concluded and its findings were being passed on to Moscow for confirmation, but by the
time Karlos reached out to Mikoian already five months had passed and no verdict was
forthcoming.152 Karlos entreated Mikoian “to take an interest in our case and if possible
expedite its confirmation,” a gesture for which he would be “deeply grateful.”153
“Now You Are My Only Hope”: Personal Knowledge and the Utility of
Rehabilitation
Given that some 15 years – if not more – had passed since Mikoian’s last contact
with the families soliciting his benefaction, most petitioners felt compelled to justify
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themselves before the longstanding Presidium member, and explain how he was uniquely
positioned to render them assistance.154 In doing so, they revealed many of the operating
assumptions that underlay Mikoian’s patronal obligations before them. The opening
gambit of Raisa Mikadze’s letter touched upon these precise ideas. She described Archil
Mikadze as someone Mikoian “knew personally in the past. I will not begin to describe
him, and only say that no one who knows him believed or believes in his guilt. Those
who knew him well and trusted in him included such people as Sergo Ordzhonikidze,
Kamo and other famous Party figures, who, unfortunately, are no more. Now you are my
only hope”155 As the final exponent of the once-predominant Caucasian contingent in the
Kremlin, Mikoian was the only remaining person of influence who could attest to
Mikadze’s true character, and it therefore fell to him, according to Raisa Konstantinovna,
to impress this knowledge upon the functionaries at the Chief Military Procuracy. This
same sentiment was expressed across numerous letters addressed to Mikoian, such as the
one from the Naneishvili siblings, who maintained that he knew their “father better than
anyone else (luchshe drugikh znavshego ottsa),” including Elena Stasova and Lev
Shaumian, which therefore made him uniquely qualified to advocate for Viktor
Naneishvili’s rehabilitation.156
Patronage-seekers approached Mikoian with a clear sense of what he could do on
their behalf, and how the rehabilitation of their disappeared relatives would tangibly
improve their lives. Elena Gogoberidze’s overture to Mikoian highlighted one of the most
immediate, concrete benefits that he, as someone with access to the Soviet state’s deepest
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secrets, could provide to Ordzhonikidze and his erstwhile clients: information about the
whereabouts and status of their loved ones. Most families of elites sentenced to capital
punishment in the 1930s had been told that their relatives were serving “ten years in the
distant camps, without the right of correspondence,” and this campaign of misinformation
on the part of the state security organs and judiciary continued unabated for the better
part of the next two decades. Next of kin were systematically fed contradictory reports
about “inmates’” conditions, but as the years passed without any sign of their imminent
emergence from the Gulag many began to suspect the worst. Thus the rehabilitation
appeals that crossed Mikoian’s desk were just as much concerned with locating missing
persons as they were with exonerating the wrongfully convicted.157
Many writers to Mikoian further justified their pleas for information and aid as an
expression of concern for the welfare of their children, whose youths had been
irrevocably marked by the repression of one or both of their parents. Antonina
Kalmykova’s family had been devastated by both Stalin’s purges and the ravages of war.
As she reported to Mikoian, upon her arrest her three children – two sons and a daughter
– took shelter with Ordzhonikidze’s wife until the war’s outbreak, when her sons, “while
valiantly defending the Motherland, perished heroically.”158 Desperate to be reunited with
her remaining kin, Kalmykova entreated Mikoian for “the chance to live as an equal
member of socialist society, let me at least at the end of my life be with my one living
child – with my daughter, and with this give my daughter, a member of the Komsomol,
the opportunity to become a member of the Communist Party in the future”;159 for a
Communist stalwart like Kalmykova, there was no future for her daughter outside the
157
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Party. Unsure of her husband’s ultimate fate, Kalmykova clung to the unlikely prospect
of seeing him again, and closed her lengthy letter by urging Mikoian to “help me to learn
the truth, where is Betal and is he alive?”160 Other appeals, though no less impassioned,
were much more circumspect with regard to their subjects’ likelihood of survival.
Elena Breitman stated that she had no idea if her sister, brother-in-law, or brother
were still alive when she penned her overture to Mikoian, but made a point of “requesting
their full rehabilitation even in the event that they are not.”161 Both of her siblings had
“left behind children whom I raised and who unjustly bear the stigma of their parents
having been ‘enemies of the people,’” and her interest in their futures animated her
appeal in equal measure with her desire to learn what ultimately became of her
disappeared relatives.162 Pavla Galkina pessimistically averred that it was “hardly
necessary to search for [Artak Stamboltsian] among the living” when conducting his
rehabilitation, given the amount of time that had transpired since he was taken into
custody.163 That said, she still considered Stamboltsian’s vindication critical for her
“daughter’s sake – Artak Stamboltsian’s daughter, because as a repressed person her
father did not have a hand in her upbringing (otets ee ne stal, kak repressirovannyi, na ee
zhiznennom puti).”164 Though Mikoian could not overcome the legacy of familial rupture
engendered by the Terror, he was able to contribute to freeing Stambotsian and Galkina’s
daughter from the enduring repercussions of being branded a child of an enemy of the
people.
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Marusia Markovetskaia likewise bristled at her children having “suffered for their
entire young lives because of their father, as though they were children of an enemy of
the people, when their father was with the underground, and then under Soviet power
gave his whole life to the cause of building Communism.”165 Markovetskaia begged
Mikoian to aid her in “remedy[ing] the error” of Akopian’s persecution by “speak[ing]
with Comrade Rudenko and affirm[ing] that Akopian S. P. is an honest, faithful
Communist, and that he must be rehabilitated, independent of whether or not he is
alive.”166 For Kas’ian’s daughter, Ruzanna, the “blot” that she, her mother, and her sister
– herself a single parent to two children – bore as “the family of an enemy of the people”
constituted a “serious moral outrage.”167 Even though they were unaware “whether Sergei
Ivanovich is alive or not,” the remaining Kas’ians’ “main priority is the rehabilitation of
Kas’ian and his family from the ignominious sobriquet enemy of the people”; as the
family of “an old revolutionary,” for them the question of his reputation as a true
Communist held more currency than the (unlikely) possibility of his return from physical
exile.168
None of Mikoian’s clients challenged, in principle, the category of “enemy of the
people”; indeed, some avidly adopted it to describe Beriia and others whom they held
accountable for their families’ decades of suffering. Their common objection was to the
fact that this brand had been unjustly applied to their relatives and, by extension,
themselves. Karlos Kakhoian assured Mikoian that he was not seeking “some sort of
illegal favoritism (kakoi nibud’ nezakonnoi protektsii),” suggesting that the descendants
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of true opponents of the Soviet regime did not merit succor from an eminent figure like
Mikoian.169 Were Asatur Kakhoian “actually an ‘enemy of the people,’” Karlos
continued, “even you would not want to utter his name, and this would be correct.”170
Fortunately for Karlos and his family, the Georgian authorities’ case review had entirely
exculpated his father and proven him to be a steadfast, “humble (skromnim) Communist,”
who was therefore wholly deserving both of his place in Mikoian’s memory and any
assistance the Deputy Sovmin Chairman could offer.171
The Artists’ Warrior: Voroshilov and His Circle
An instructive point of comparison to the variety of correspondence Mikoian
received and the type of patronage he practiced can be found in the files of Marshal
Kliment Voroshilov, who held the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet following Stalin’s death. Although he was evidently not as avid a
practitioner of clientelism as Mikoian, Voroshilov also proved to be a popular recipient of
rehabilitation inquiries. While the majority of Mikoian’s interlocutors depicted relations
between him and their relatives as having been comradely, fraternal ties forged in the
underground, in Voroshilov’s case supplicants tended to approach him as former
commanding officer, bureaucratic superior, or – alternately – as a benefactor of the
proletarian arts.
In December 1954 Antonina Georgievna Vainer apprised Voroshilov of the
“exceptionally” slow progress in the examination of the criminal file of her husband,
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former Red Army Corps Commander Leonid Iakovlevich Vainer.172 Vainer had served
with distinction under Voroshilov in the 14th Army during the Civil War, and after a rapid
ascent through the ranks of the fledgling Red Army was dispatched as a military advisor
to the Mongolian People’s Republic; recalled back to Moscow in August 1937 –
ostensibly to receive the Order of Lenin – he was seized from his train en route, arrested,
and sentenced the following month.
Antonina Vainer first broached the possibility of restoring her husband’s good
name before the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in December 1953 – coinciding with
Beriia’s trial – and in due course the case was turned over to the USSR Chief Military
Procuracy.173 Yet after a meeting the following September with the head of the
investigative division, Antonina Geogrievna began to despair of her husband’s chances
for rehabilitation. The Chief Military Procuracy informed her that under interrogation
Leonid Vainer had “incriminated himself and gave testimony against others, but during
the trial he recanted,” and in this confession, as well as others’ denunciations, the Chief
Military Procuracy found a pretext “to hold back the review of Vainer’s investigative file,
as they consider it proof of his guilt.”174
To dispel the pall that had been cast over Vainer’s reputation Antonina
Georgievna invoked their families’ shared revolutionary heritage and contributions to the
Soviet project: Leonid Iakovlevich’s mother hid Bolsheviks in her home during the First
World War and eventually joined the Party along with her five sons, while Antonina
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Georgievna’s father was a “Baku worker-railway-man” and Party member since 1905,
and she herself “raised two sons in the Soviet ethos,” one of whom “died a heroic death
(pogibshego smert’iu khrabrykh) during the Great Patriotic War.”175 While relatively few
could claim such an extensive Communist pedigree, Antonina Georgievna was attuned to
the overriding importance of emphasizing Voroshilov’s role in Vainer’s professional
“trajectory.”176 She therefore appealed to him first and foremost “as the former
Commander of the 14th Army, who knew Vainer L.Ia. during the fighting of the Civil
War” and personally promoted him to a division leadership, “and as the former USSR
People’s Commissar of Defense, who knew Vainer L.Ia. from his work in subsequent
years during the period of building up the [Red Army’s] defensive capacities.”177
Through these intersections Antonina Vainer sought to assert her husband’s “rightful
place among the names of those who selflessly fought for the freedom and happiness of
the Soviet people,” and thereby placed her faith in Voroshilov’s willingness to defend his
own past.178
N.Z. Pertsovskii’s father, Zakhar Davudovich, was a career Red Army man who
crossed paths with Voroshilov while heading the People’s Commissariat of Defense’s
Central Financial Department. When Pertsovskii fils wrote to Voroshilov in the fall of
1954 on behalf of his father, who disappeared in February 1938, he was sure to mention
his late mother’s recollections of how Voroshilov “personally valued and respected my
father as an honest and diligent worker.”179 Bolstered by this characterization, N.Z.
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Pertsovskii expressed his conviction that his father “was and remained loyal to the
Motherland,” and requested that “the decision in [his] case be reviewed with the goal of
rehabilitation.”180 In her June 1955 appeal, Sof’ia Abramovna Pavlova explained her
decision to “disturb” Voroshilov because “only” he could help her.181 Pavlova’s husband
from 1932 until his arrest in December 1936, Viacheslav Ivanovich Zof, had previously
been head of the USSR’s naval forces, and as such Voroshilov had come to know him
“personally.”182 Though most of Pavlova’s missive was given over to detailing her
personal work history – to distinguish her career from Zof’s – and the litany of hardships
that had befallen her as a wife of an enemy of the people, her insistence that Voroshilov
alone was capable of defending her interests and ameliorating the injustices that had
perpetrated against her family spoke to the expectation that as Zof’s former military
superior, Voroshilov would serve as a character witness on his behalf in the halls of
power.
As much as Voroshilov’s dabbling in the art world may have apparently cost him
in Stalin’s eyes, it eventually made him a significant resource for the relatives of literary
figures who had been subjected to repression.183 In a clear sign that patronage
relationships were not exclusive propositions, and that rehabilitation-seekers were
prepared to seek assistance from any likely corner, Rita Kornblium also addressed herself
to Voroshilov at the same time as her first impassioned overture to Mikoian. Kornblium’s
overture to Voroshilov was denuded of many of the familial details that marked her letter
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to Mikoian and written in a far more impersonal register, reflecting the formal tenor of
relations that had existed between the Kirshons and the Supreme Soviet chairman. In
attempting to persuade Voroshilov of the rectitude of her cause she made explicit
mention of the fact that Isaak Babel’ and Mihkail Kol’tsov’s families were among those
that received rehabilitation decisions from the Procuracy before her, even though she
filed her claim at the same time as them.184 Kornblium closed by imploring Voroshilov
“to once again come to the aid of [her] family,” suggesting that at some point in the past
he had already extended help to the Kirshons in his role as advocate for the art world.185
However, Kornblium’s decision to pursue the matter further with Mikoian rather than
Voroshilov suggests that she was dissatisfied with the response she received – if any –
from the art world’s preeminent defender within the Kremlin.
Patronal Obligations: Mikoian and Voroshilov’s Responses
Mikoian displayed a remarkable degree of consistency in his commitment to
getting decades-old political cases reopened. Usually within days or weeks of receiving a
petition – though on occasion there were gaps of months between a letter’s date of
composition and Mikoian taking action – he would forward a copy to Rudenko with his
commentary attached; drafts of these memos, affixed to the appeals in question, are
preserved in the archives. Each note to Rudenko began with the request that he
“consider” the following missive and “inform [Mikoian] of the results.” The fact that
Mikoian wanted to remain apprised of each case’s progress indicates that his investment
in seeing rehabilitations through to fruition went beyond simply passing the buck. To
184
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underscore his personal involvement, Mikoian often appended an additional sentence or
two listing the subject’s commendable qualities. He thus described having known Artak
Stamboltsian as “an honest and steadfast Bolshevik.”186 During their time together Archil
Mikadze proved himself to be “an honest and good worker,” while Gevork Alikhanov –
Bonner’s stepfather – was “honest and faithful.”187 Suren Akopian warranted special
mention, because Mikoian had known him “since childhood.”188 The underlying message
that emerged in all these assessments was the same: the image of these men as inveterate
foes of Soviet power that had been promulgated during and after the Terror was a
distortion of the truth that Mikoian knew from having spent his formative years with
them. This gave the lie to the notion that Stalinist state violence was justified by its
ability to uncover seemingly loyal cadres’ true, conspiratorial selves, and it fell to
Rudenko and his subordinates within the judiciary to reconstruct the truth of these
individuals, as Mikoian recalled them, from the materials assembled in their criminal case
files.189
Mikoian followed a distinct protocol for those cases that involved former Party
Secretaries or others whose pasts were of a more politically sensitive nature. Rather than
going directly to Rudenko, Mikoian would first make his pitch to the Communist Party’s
Central Committee. In these proposals Mikoian went beyond the rote phrases that
characterized his communiqués to Rudenko, turning instead to more forcefully worded
arguments. Writing to Khrushchev and Malenkov in January 1954 – exactly six months
after Elena Gogoberidze’s initial letter – Mikoian recalled the conditions in which he and
186

GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d.1099, l. 107.
GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1100, l. 148; GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1168, l. 68.
188
GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1100, l. 141.
189
On the purges as a means of revealing supposed enemies’ true selves, see Fitzpatrick, Tear Off the
Masks!, ch. 5, and Halfin, Stalinist Confessions.
187

74
Levan Gogoberidze worked together most closely: “I knew L. Gogoberidze during the
difficult time of illegal work in Baku under the English occupation. He conducted himself
selflessly and exemplarily.”190 While serving in the Baku underground Gogoberidze
proved his bravery when he suffered three nearly fatal bullet wounds fired by a Musavat
assassin, something that, Mikoian implied, shaped Gogoberidze’s future hostility toward
Beriia, who eventually “did away with him.”191 Echoing many petitioners’ appeals to
pathos, Mikoian acknowledged Gogoberidze’s female survivors – his daughter, wife, and
sister – before recommending that the Party “instruct” Rudenko “to carry out a review of
Gogoberidze’s case for his rehabilitation.”192
Shortly thereafter, Mikoian presented Kalmykov’s exoneration as a pressing
imperative, stating that he “consider[ed] it necessary to assign Comrade Rudenko to take
an interest in Kalmykov B.E.’s case and submit his suggestions to the Central
Committee.”193 Unusually, when presenting Natal’ia Chizhova’s entreaty, Mikoian opted
to foreground his connection with her over her more notable husband, Nikolai Gikalo; in
Mikoian’s words Chizhova had shown herself to be “an honest and good worker” in
Rostov-on-Don who not only warranted legal rehabilitation but also reinstatement into
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Party.194 Gikalo had been known to Mikoian “for many years and, it seems to me, that it
would follow to instruct Comrade Rudenko to also review Gikalo N.F.’s case.”195 It is
unclear whether this apparent lack of enthusiasm reflected Mikoian’s low opinion of
Gikalo, but what is most telling is that Mikoian did not allow any reservations he might
have had about Gikalo to stand in the way of his patronal obligations before Chizhova
and her late spouse. Although Mikoian may not have been the only member of Party’s
ruling circle to bring rehabilitation cases before his peers, he was almost certainly the
most prolific in this respect, and the evident pride that he expressed at his untarnished
success rate is a striking indication of the premium that he placed on meeting his
obligations before the survivors of his onetime clients and comrades.196
The continued delays faced by Voroshilov’s onetime adjutants in attaining
rehabilitation are a further indication of the noteworthy efficacy of Mikoian’s energetic
advocacy. Like Mikoian, Voroshilov succinctly annotated the letters he received with
instructions for Rudenko, and occasionally included personal assessments of the figures
in question. Writing to Rudenko in early December 1954, Voroshilov requested that
orders be given to expedite the investigation into Vainer, whom he “knew well”; this
might have reminded Voroshilov that he had yet to weigh in on Pertsovskii’s case, as a
little over a week later he dispassionately requested that Rudenko “consider” N.Z.
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Pertsovskii’s appeal.197 Voroshilov reserved his most effusive endorsement for Zof,
asking the Procurator General to both examine the case and “inform of [his] decision,”
because Voroshilov “knew Zof V.I. very well and always believed in him.”198 From
receipt of Voroshilov’s instructions it took anywhere between an additional five to ten
months for the judiciary to hand down their decisions, during which time the families in
question remained perpetually in limbo. Such wait times were by no means unheard of
during the first decade of the rehabilitation process, but as the following chapter
demonstrates, once Mikoian made clear his personal investment in a case, it often wound
its way through the justice system at a considerably faster clip.199
Conclusion
In response to a question regarding why Anastas Mikoian took such an interest in
her welfare upon her return to Moscow in 1954, Lana Gogoberidze attributed this
“special affection (osobuiu teplotu)” to Mikoian’s guilt over his inability to protect her
father in 1937.200 While Mikoian may indeed have felt morally culpable for the
annihilation of so many of his friends and colleagues at the hands of the state they helped
to build, his involvement in posthumous rehabilitation does not seem to have been born
primarily out of pangs of conscience. Rather, the mediating role that Mikoian played
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between the families of the wrongfully repressed and various branches of the Soviet
bureaucracy reflected his status as the last man standing of a once-powerful network of
Transcaucasian Bolsheviks that made its outsized influence felt far beyond the confines
of the Soviet Union’s southern periphery. The experience of underground agitation
inculcated in Mikoian and his fellow revolutionaries a sense of mutual responsibility and
deeply held loyalty that remained with them as they forged separate paths within the
fledgling socialist state; these bonds were broken only by the physical annihilation of
most of this cohort’s members during the Great Terror, which cast asunder all existing
guarantees of reciprocal protection and aide. Following such a pronounced rupture, the
families of Ordzhonikidze and Mikoian’s close associates could not be sure that the latter
would be open to their entreaties, or recognize them as belonging to his extending
network. Yet when they approached him with appeals for help with rehabilitation that
invoked his responsibilities to those who served alongside him but whom he was
ultimately unable to protect, Mikoian consistently and vigorously extended his patronage,
showing concerted interest in his former comrades’ absolution. Though these rekindled
relationships did not serve to recreate the pre-Terror status quo ante, they did prove to be
remarkably resilient, and Mikoian remained engaged with many of those who contacted
him in the early 1950s over the coming decades, helping to see to their welfare and other
needs. One family in particular, the Gogoberidzes, proved extraordinarily adept at
leveraging Mikoian’s involvement not only to secure rehabilitations, but also induce the
Procuracy to inaugurate a search for one of the Terror’s missing millions that occupied
months and stretched from Vladivostok to Estonia; the following chapter explores their
efforts to uncover what actually became of Levan Gogoberidze.
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Chapter Two – Resurrecting Levan Davydovich: Truth, Justice, and Gulag
Rumors
Many died in the camps and prisons, but the news of their
deaths might take years or decades to reach their families
and friends. The sentence had little or no predictive value.
The gulag did not provide reality checks for either hope or
mourning. In an indefinitely large part of the Soviet experience,
death could not be recognized as death, and survival could not
be relied upon as life. The state, the source of the repressions,
was also the only source of information. This is a condition
of uncertain loss, in which the beloved person disappears for
reasons that nobody understands; in which she may be alive
and might possibly return; in which no information about the
loss is available or trustworthy.201
In the short story “Aleksandr Gogoberidze” from the semi-fictional Kolyma Tales,
Varlam Shalamov recounts his time studying under the titular camp medical assistant,
depicted as a benevolent Georgian of elephantine proportions whose lessons in
pharmacology offered a lifeline to his fellow prisoners. Shalamov details his
acquaintance with this paragon of decency within the Gulag through the latter’s
ignominious death in the Iagodnoe settlement several hundred kilometers outside
Magadan, only noting the ostensible reason for his imprisonment in the story’s closing
sentences: “Such was the fate of Aleksandr Gogoberidze, who perished only because he
was Levan Gogoberidze’s brother.”202 Poignant as this coda may be, it strains credulity in
a crucial respect: though Levan Gogoberidze had several sisters, he was – according to
information from his family – his parents’ only son. Intriguingly, Shalamov’s account
shares its setting with one of several locales where Levan Gogoberidze himself was
supposedly sighted in the fifteen years after he was arrested, according to reports that
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filtered back to his wife, daughter, and sisters. While it is today apparent that the selfproclaimed Gogoberidze in the Iagodnoe settlement was an impostor – or at the very least
not who others took him to be – amidst the confusion and uncertainty of the first postStalin years Levan Gogoberidze’s survivors tenaciously clung to the prospect that
through some twist of fate he had escaped capital punishment and survived the Stalin
years in an outpost of the Soviet camp system.
On January 27, 1954, Elena Gogoberidze, having already reestablished contact
with Mikoian, approached Procurator General Rudenko with the startling revelation that
her brother Levan had been seen alive in the Gulag as recently as 1952. Were he to be
located and extricated from captivity, Elena Davydovna suggested, he might be able to
shed valuable light on Beriia’s early history of perfidy.203 Despite his own misgivings
about the reliability of this information, Rudenko surprisingly gave his assent to
Gogoberidze’s proposal, launching a search several months later that – if the records of
the USSR General Procuracy are any indication – was unprecedented and unrepeated in
annals of Soviet rehabilitation.204 Little did Elena Davydovna know that the leads she
would bring to the Procuracy’s attention over the next two years were little more than
fantasies, and her hope to reunite Levan with his wife, the pioneering filmmaker Nutsa
Varfolomeevna Gogoberidze, and daughter, Lana, was chimeric, as he had been executed
in Rostov-on-Don in March 1937.205 Drawing primarily upon the voluminous Procuracy
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file that collected the documents assembled for Levan Gogoberidze’s posthumous
rehabilitation – among the very first in the Soviet Union’s history – as well as the
materials generated by the fruitless investigation into his possible whereabouts, this
chapter applies a microhistorical lens to the vicissitudes of the party-state’s earliest
attempts to get to the truth behind the destruction of Old Bolshevik cadres. [William
Chase has argued – regarding Béla Kun’s fall during the Terror – that “[m]icrohistory
offers a potent method that enables us to identify and track the twists and turns in
people’s lives that may have contributed to their becoming victims of the Stalinist mass
repression.”206] As this chapter demonstrates, the microhistorical perspective can be
equally illuminating with regard to how certain individuals were given priority in
attaining legal absolution, and what their families expected would result from this
process.207
In terms of its timing, the personages involved, and the intense interest that the
Procuracy and the Party took in various aspects of the case, Levan Gogoberidze’s
rehabilitation was exceptional. His family had privileged access to Mikoian, which seems
to have afforded them a remarkable degree of leverage with the judiciary, and the
circumstances of his arrest in late 1936 fit neatly within the anti-Beriia narrative being
promulgated at the moment. However, for all its remarkability, Gogoberidze’s case
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speaks to many of the issues that would come to define posthumous rehabilitation as it
went from a process that applied to no more than 500 individuals in 1954 – the year that
charges were dismissed against Gogoberidze – to one that two years later nearly 30,000
people went through.208 For former members of the Soviet elite, posthumous
rehabilitation was an essentially restorative process, one that promised to repair the
reputations, social standing, and – eventually – material condition of families that had
been unceremoniously banished from the halls of power and influence by accusations of
disloyalty. Khrushchev and his contingent within the Communist Party, seeking to
legitimize their preeminence by taking the organs of state security to task, cherry-picked
figures from the past whose laudable commitment to Soviet power and ignominious
demise could be held up as emblematic of Beriia’s acrimony toward true guardians of the
Revolution.
Amidst mistrust, duplicity, and under the weight of decades of unpunished crimes,
posthumous rehabilitation offered the Party, Soviet judiciary, and the survivors of the
repressed an opportunity to collaborate in formulating new, politically expedient accounts
of the rise of Soviet power and its betrayal at the hands of opportunistic infiltrators within
state security. Thus, posthumous rehabilitation was not only an opportunity to exonerate
those who had been murdered and vilified during the Terror: it was also a generative
process that helped to build the pedestals upon which the reconceived Party history
would rest.209 However, as the Gogoberidze inquiry so aptly reveals, by embracing
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revised narratives that were themselves often short on truth, the Soviet authorities risked
giving credence to rumors spawned in the Gulag that filtered back to the populace via the
multitudes of prisoners amnestied in 1953, and would find that in the wake of years of
state-mandated deception, it was far more difficult to disseminate a painful reality than a
reassuring falsehood.
An Execution Foretold?: The Rise and Fall of the “Pushkin of the Revolution”210
Though he never ascended to the heights of the all-Union Soviet bureaucracy,
Levan Gogoberidze had a storied political career that garnered him admirers and
adversaries among the Caucasian Bolshevik elite. Born in 1896, Gogoberidze earned his
revolutionary bona fides in 1915 by propagandizing to fellow conscripts in the Tsarist
Army, for which he served a term in a penal battalion. Upon being transferred to an
infirmary near Trabzon, he met Prokofii “Alesha” Dzhaparidze – later one of the
immortalized 26 Commissars of the Baku Commune – whom he credited with his “Party
education and ‘literacy.’”211 Gogoberidze was admitted to the Bolshevik Party in
February 1916 thanks to Dzhaparidze’s endorsement, and he went on to play a variety of
roles in the struggle to establish Soviet power in Baku and Tbilisi. By February 1918 he
had been elected to the Presidium of the Baku Soviet, and later that year he was assigned
to captain one of the ships involved in the failed attempt to evacuate the 26 Commissars
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to Astrakhan following the collapse of the Baku Commune.212 It was in the aftermath of
this early setback for Soviet power in the Caucasus that Levan Gogoberidze had his first
brush with both mortality and infamy.
On September 6, 1919 – almost a year to the date of the 26 Commissars’ mass
execution – Gogoberidze was sitting at the New Light Café in Baku with two of his Azeri
comrades from the city’s Bolshevik underground, when they were approached by Hajibäk
Seidbäkov, a supporter – and according to some, an agent – of the ruling pan-Islamist
Musavat Party. While accounts vary wildly as to what exactly transpired, all agree that
Seidbäkov eventually produced a pistol and opened fire on the three seated
Communists.213 The two Azeris were killed instantly; Gogoberidze, shot multiple times
and left for hours on the floor of the crime scene to bleed and be taunted by the local
authorities (the city’s governor-general is purported to have said “So Gogoberidze, your
crimes have finally caught up with you!” upon arriving at the café), barely survived the
incident.214 Although the attempted killing did not derail Gogoberidze’s revolutionary
career in the Caucasus – he was ultimately made chairman of the Baku revkom in 1920,
and then held the same post in Tbilisi from 1922-1924 – this violent encounter with the
Musavat loomed large in his mind as he rose through the ranks of the Communist Party,
and perhaps even afforded him additional revolutionary credibility, as well as in the
memories of his family members as they sought his exoneration.
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Following the death of his Bolshevik patron, Dzhaparidze, Gogoberidze found a
new ally through his work in Tbilisi in the form of Vissarion “Beso” Lominadze, himself
a close associate of Sergo Ordzhonikidze; their fortunes would be closely linked through
the remainder of both of their lives. From 1926 to 1930 Gogoberidze held the position of
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, and when
Lominadze replaced Aleksandr Krinitskii as the First Secretary of the Transcaucasian
Party Committee (Zakkraikom) in April 1930 he brought on Gogoberidze to fill one of
the positions vacated by Krinitskii’s men. However, in a rapid reversal of fortune,
Lominadze, Gogoberidze, and the rest of their clique were forced from power before the
year was out after the former spoke out against the forced collectivization policies
introduced in the Caucasus.215 Both Lominadze and Gogoberidze were exiled to the
People’s Commissariat for Supplies – Lominadze to the scientific research division and
Gogoberidze to the animal husbandry department.216 Most likely stung by being so
brusquely sidelined, Gogoberidze began to engage in intrigues against the cadre that had
supplanted him and his comrades in the Transcaucasian krai. Using his position as a
veteran of the internecine struggle in Azerbaijan to inveigh against the region’s new
leadership, Gogoberidze focused his ire on the ascendant Lavrentii Beriia, whom he
alleged had hidden his service in the Musavat counterintelligence from the Party.
According to Elena Gogoberidze, in 1933 Levan approached Ordzhonikidze, supposedly
with proof of Beriia’s counterrevolutionary activities. Although there is no published
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record of what this evidence constituted, Beriia’s attempt to nip this rumormongering in
the bud was preserved in Ordzhonikidze’s personal archive.
Beriia wrote to Ordzhonikidze in early March 1933 to complain that Gogoberidze
– who at the time was “resting in Sukhumi,” likely due to health problems that would
plague him over the next several years – was “disseminating vile things about me and the
new Transcaucasian leadership in general. In particular, regarding my past work in the
Musavat counterintelligence, he maintains that the Party supposedly did not know and
does not know about it.”217 These accusations, which reached Beriia through Nestor
Lakoba and others, ran directly counter to his own account of his acknowledged service
with the Musavat. Beriia reminded Ordzhonikidze that “you know well that I was sent to
the Musavat counterintelligence by the Party and that this question was examined by the
CC of the ACP(b) in 1920 in the presence of yourself, Coms. Stasova, Kaminskii, Mirza
Davud Guseinov, Narimanov, Sarkis, Rukhulla Akhundov, Buniatzade and others.”218 He
further claimed to have sent Ordzhonikidze in 1925 “an official abstract of the decision of
the CC of the AKP(b)” by which “I was completely rehabilitated, i.e. the fact of my work
in the counterintelligence with the Party’s knowledge was confirmed by Coms. Mirza
Davud Guseinov, Kasum Izmailov and others’ statements.”219 Though this
correspondence attests to the personal enmity that existed between Gogoberidze and
Beriia, it was not this animus that ultimately cost the former his life.
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Beso Lominadze’s outbursts against forced collectivization in Georgia came back
to haunt him in the flurry of repressions against oppositionists within the Party unleashed
by Sergei Kirov’s murder. Notified of his impending arrest in January 1935, Lominadze
chose to commit suicide rather than face a show trial; from that point, it was only a matter
of time until the networks of Party cadres linked to Lomanidze were themselves purged.
In October 1936 Stalin issued a directive to then-NKVD head Nikolai Ezhov on rounding
up Lomanidze’s former circle. The first head on the chopping block was that of Stepan
Vardanian,
currently the secretary of the Taganrog city committee. He is undoubtedly
a secret Trotskyite, or at least he is a patron and protector of Trotskyites.
He should be arrested. L. Gogoberidze – secretary of one of the factory
party committees in the Azov-Black Sea territory – should also be
arrested. If Lominadze was a secret enemy of the party, then Gogoberidze
is also a secret enemy of the party, since he was as close as could be with
Lominadze. He should be arrested.220
At the time, Levon Gogoberidze had been working as the Party Secretary at the Rostov
agricultural machinery factory (Rostsel’mash) for about a year, but it was in Sochi –
where he was probably seeking treatment for the same ailments that took him to Sukhumi
in 1933 – that he was arrested on October 22, 1936 by the Azov-Black Sea krai
UNKVD.221 For much of the next two months officers from the regional branch of state
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security questioned Gogoberidze, and induced him to confess that he had been working
against the Party, and Beriia specifically, with Lominadze since he was stripped of his
leadership role in Georgia.222 Likely based on these admissions, in mid-December he was
transferred to the custody of the Transcaucasian NKVD in Tbilisi, and thereby placed
under Beriia’s control.
Between December 22, 1936 and February 2, 1937 Beriia’s chief enforcer within
the Transcaucasian NKVD, Sergei Arsen’evich Goglidze, personally interrogated
Gogoberidze ten times; during these sessions Gogoberidze attempted to walk back his
earlier statements, attributing them to his “nervous condition” after being arrested, but
was assailed with a new host of charges, including accusations from his coworkers in the
Azov-Black Sea krai – who had been taken into custody since Gogoberidze’s fall – that
he had partaken in Trotskyite activities.223 Gogoberidze managed to smuggle two notes to
his wife from captivity in Tbilisi, both of which bespeak the profound despair that
marked his final months. He dismissed the charges against him of attempting to organize
an attempt on Stalin’s life as “false, absurd, monstrous and ridiculous” in the first note,
but acknowledged fatalistically that “it’s all over… [my] salvation: to die as quickly as
possible”; after brief mention of a message intended for Sergo Ordzhonikidze the second
note bemoaned the fact that “practically every day I give testimony, but all that, my dear,
is now merely for the archive … All of my testimony means nothing against the
testimony of 5-7 scoundrels.”224 Soon the ranks of these “scoundrels” would swell to
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include some of Gogoberidze’s closest confederates from his years in the revolutionary
underground.
The weeks leading up to Gogoberidze’s conviction saw the advent of a concerted
campaign to denounce him and those arrested simultaneously with him as inveterate
enemies of the Party working to subvert Soviet power from within. The task of
disavowing and excoriating Gogoberidze fell most notably to one of his Baku comrades,
Boris Sheboldaev, who until that January had served as the First Secretary of the AzovBlack Sea krai Party Organization. On January 6, he was called before a meeting of the
Azov-Black Sea Territorial committee to answer for the supposed perfidy that had
transpired on his watch. Sheboldaev admitted to having known “Gogoberidze when I was
in the underground in Baku in 1918”:
As for Vardanian, I didn’t know him at all. Gogoberidze arrived here in
1934 to serve in the region. He came to Yeisk, to the territorial committee,
and I–we–gave him the opportunity to carry on his activities […] There is
no doubt that, had we exercised Bolshevik vigilance, had we checked on
our people, we could have exposed them much, much earlier […]
Proceeding from trust, from credulity, we essentially covered up their
activities and helped carry them out. And this was reflected in our
decisions. There were many such incorrect decisions: the decision
concerning Ovchinnikov, the decision concerning the car accident
involving Gogoberidze, who killed someone because he feared him, the
decision concerning Limarev in Shakhty, who criticized Liubarsky–these
and a host of many other decisions about which, no doubt, you will be
hearing, all of this, comrades, speaks of gross, totally unacceptable errors
which I, as a leader, had committed and which, objectively speaking, have
slowed down the unmasking of those enemies whom we, in effect, by
virtue of our authority, shielded from the [party] organization and the
Central Committee of our party.225
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Having engaged in what J. Arch Getty and Vladimir Naumov term a “a ritualized
affirmation of the new dominant line” via “apologetic performance,” Sheboldaev was
able to spare himself – for a short while – from serious punishment, though two months
later he was again required to debase himself before the assembled Party elite at the
Central Committee’s plenum. Under the withering scrutiny of Stalin, Beriia, and other
potentates, when pressed about his relationship with Gogoberidze and other supposed
Trotskyites in his midst Sheboldaev said that he was aware only that Gogoberidze “was
connected with Lominadze, I knew that they had a personal connection.”226 Questioned
as to the nature of this connection, Sheboldaev replied evasively: “I am saying that I
knew Gogoberidze from the underground”; Stalin inquired if this was “from Baku (po
Baku),” which Sheboldaev confirmed, continuing, “It must be said, at the time he was a
quite good (neplokhoi) member of our organization.”227
Sheboldaev pleaded ignorance in the face of Beriia’s accusation that he had
sheltered both Gogoberidze and Vardanian despite their past expulsions and links to
traitors like Lomanidze, and insisted that his oversights were due to “blindness, this
gullibility, which led to us not even subjecting these people to scrutiny, we did not
monitor (ne kontrolirovali) them, because we trusted them.”228 As Gerald M. Easter
notes, Anastas Mikoian, Sheboldaev and Gogoberidze’s onetime cohort from
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revolutionary Baku, watched these proceedings “in silence.”229 His denunciation of the
Azov-Black Sea “conspirators” complete, Sheboldaev was briefly allowed to resume his
Party career before his own arrest and execution in June 1937, while Gogoberidze –
stripped of his revolutionary credentials – was drawn interminably closer toward his
demise and erasure from the annals of Soviet history.
On March 21, 1937 Gogoberidze’s wife, Nina (Nutsa) Varfolomeevna, attended a
meeting of Rostov-area Party organizations at which the previous week’s executions of
Glebov-Avilov, Vardanian, and others were announced. She noted “that L. Gogoberidze
was not on this list, and when it was read out at the meeting at Rostsel’mash one of the
attendees posed the question – And Gogoberidze? – to which the speaker answered: Gogoberidze is connected with the Georgian functionaries, and the investigation into the
case has not been completed.”230 Little did Nutsa (and perhaps even the Party spokesman)
know that Gogoberidze had been returned to Rostov the previous month and that very
day was brought before a visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court
of the USSR, overseen by Deputy Chairman Ivan Osipovich Matulevich.231 The Military
Collegium’s proceedings were carried out behind closed doors, and consisted of little
more than reading excerpts from the accused’s testimony before the sentence – death, in
most cases – was handed down. There was no right of appeal, and sentences were carried
out immediately.232 Levan Davydovich’s hearing and sentencing appear to have followed
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this template exactly: he plead guilty, asked no quarter, and at 4 pm, within hours of
Matulevich passing judgment on Gogoberidze, NKVD Commandant Genkin shot him in
the presence of Deputy Procurator Pruss, there to provide the state-sanctioned murder
with a further veneer of legality.233
Nutsa subsequently traveled to Moscow, where she “secured a meeting” with a
Military Procurator named Azarin to clarify Levan’s legal status.234 Having “told Azarin
that I was prepared for the possibility that Gogoberidze might have been shot and asked
only that they tell me the truth” during their first appointment, Nutsa was unequivocally
informed several days later “that Gogoberidze had not been shot,” and was eventually
given the name of an investigator, Shalavin, to whom “Gogoberidze’s case had
[ostensibly] been transferred for further inquiry.”235 After several months without any
developments, Shalavin finally notified her via postcard at the end of July – in keeping
with established protocol – that “L Gogoberidze had been sentenced to 10 years in the
remote camps without the right of correspondence.”236 Once provided with this
misinformation, Nutsa had precious few remaining days of freedom herself; by the year’s
end she was arrested as the wife of an enemy of the people, and in January 1938 she
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received an eight-year term in a “corrective labor camp.”237 Thus the Gogoberidze family
was shattered and cast to the wind, with Levan executed and his reputation as an
“honorable” Bolshevik slandered, Nutsa exiled to the far reaches of the Gulag, and their
daughter Lana effectively left an orphan. It would be nearly twenty years before this once
powerful and privileged clan knew some semblance of normalcy, though their efforts to
restore that which had been lost demanded the direct sanction of the ruling elites and
exacted a grievous, unanticipated toll of their own.
Hope Against Documents: Persuading the Procuracy
Within days of the Presidium authorizing the Procuracy to assume control over
Levan Davydovich’s investigation Elena Davydovna contacted Rudenko and laid out her
conviction that her brother had survived his spell in Beriia’s custody.238 As with her
entreaty to Mikoian, Elena Davydovna foregrounded the importance of having a private
audience with Rudenko, opening her appeal “with a request to receive me in person for a
few minutes in relation to the case of my brother, the former Secretary of the CC of
Georgia Levan Davydovich Gogoberidze.”239 She claimed that all the information she
had provided to Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Mikoian regarding “Levan Gogoberidze’s
sharp confrontations with Beriia […] proved to be correct and Gogoberidze was fully
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rehabilitated.”240 It therefore stood to reason that Levan Davydovich’s “fate is naturally
of interest not only to our family,” but also to leading circles within the Party and
government; she pointed to Mikoian’s phone call to Rudenko following Lana
Gogoberidze’s January 4 visit as a prime example of how the case had grabbed the
attention of the Party’s ruling clique.241 Yet Elena Gogoberidze did not write to Rudenko
to convince him of the importance of clearing Levan’s name, as Mikoian’s call had likely
already driven this point home. Rather, she proffered a much more provocative claim that
pushed the Procurator General’s nascent investigation in previously unforeseen
directions.
Elena Gogoberidze introduced her conviction that Levan Davydovich had
survived the Stalin years with the assertion that the “[o]ne thing I know for certain” was
that “contrary to the certificate provided by the MVD leadership and investigative organs,
my brother L. D. Gogoberidze was still alive in 1952.”242 Giving no indication of her
source for this startling statement, Elena once again closed her appeal with an entreaty to
meet with Rudenko beyond the prying eyes of state security: “I beg you, Roman
Andreevich, allow me to visit: I have some information and considerations that I am not
comfortable including in a petition.”243 Rudenko eventually assented to this meeting on
February 3, and although there is no record of what exactly transpired during their
audience, two memos written by Elena Gogoberidze provide some indication of what was
discussed, and what went unsaid that day.
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In a single typed page titled “MATERIAL on LEVAN DAVYDOVICH
GOGOBERIDZE,” Elena Davydovna laid out the most trenchant points that she wished
to raise with Rudenko. She highlighted the 10-year sentence supposedly handed down by
the Military Collegium in spring 1937 and the fact that Levan “left Rostov on warrant
No.., according to the spravka I received in the summer of 1937 at the Moscow
Procuracy” as official substantiation for her theory, though these meager clues by no
means served as the crux of her argument.244 More recently, Liusia Petrosian – one of the
sisters of Stalin’s notorious (and by most accounts deranged) accomplice Kamo Petrosian
– briefly returned to Tbilisi following her release from prison in 1945 or 1946 and while
there reported to Elena Davydovna that she “saw L. GOGOBERIDZE in 1942 in
Magadan.”245 Elena Davydovna characterized Petrosian’s account as “absolutely
reliable,” given that “she knew L. Gogoberidze well.”246 Additionally, an unnamed (atthe-time) former zek “who had returned from the remote camps reported [in January
1954] that he ‘saw Levan Gogoberidze in 1952 in the Iagodnoe settlement (700-800 km
from Magadan), from which L. Gogoberidze was /already in the capacity of a “perpetual
settler” without the right of correspondence/ transferred to Pevek, Chukotka, Dal’stroi,
the Main Administration (Glavnoe upravlenie) in Magdan [sic].”247 It remains unclear
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how much of this information Elena Davydovna was able to impart to Rudenko during
their conversation, and – more importantly – how it was received, though her letter
written to Rudenko immediately afterward addresses several issues that she was unable to
raise in person.
Elena Davydovna hoped that her visit had “managed to raise some doubts for
[Rudenko] regarding the execution of L. D. Gogoberidze’s sentence in 1937,” but
acknowledged that “[n]aturally,” being “agitated by this conversation,” she had
“overlooked the following information” that she deemed critical to her brother’s case.248
Having been in Rostov while Levan Davydovich was in custody, Elena Davydovna –
much like her sister-in-law – interacted with workers from Rostsel’mash who “were
extremely (even openly) agitated over his fate and repeatedly questioned the Azov-Black
Sea leadership at rallies and meetings about Gogoberidze’s ‘case.’” When they demanded
news of Gogoberidze at the meeting during which Sheboldaev’s execution was
announced, they were apparently told that his file had been “submitted for further
inquiry.”249 Elena Davydovna saw this inconsistency in the timeline of Levan’s
prosecution as indicative of the possibility that he had somehow escaped death, a position
further supported – in her eyes – by details within documents from the Procuracy and
MVD that contradicted the sequence of events Rudenko presented.
The spravka that Elena Davydovna received from the Procuracy in 1937 –
referred to in her initial list from the conversation with the Procurator General – stated
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that Levan Davydovich had been transferred from Rostov in “either July or August
1937,” thereby suggesting that he was alive well past the date of his sentencing.250
Likewise, a spravka the MVD provided Elena Davydovna early in her search made “no
mention of an execution” in reference to Levan Davydovich. Rather, the spravka in its
entirety consisted of “the following: ‘L. D. Gogoberidze, year and place of birth, arrested
in Azov-Black Sea in 1937 (instead of 1936), sentenced to 10 years – nothing more is
known about him.’” When Elena Davydovna pressed about the possibility of her brother
having been executed, MVD officials told her “categorically” that they had “no such
information.”251
These discrepancies, compounded by rumors and testimonies circulating among
Gulag returnees from the Caucasus and Rostov, led the surviving Gogoberidzes to “have
no doubt […] that L. D. Gogoberidze at that time [1937] was saved from death by a
fluke, and that later, perhaps precisely this sentence saved him from Beriia’s hands.”252
Although Elena Davydovna was credulous of the MVD’s assertion that it had no
indication of Levan’s fate after he was supposedly dispatched to an unspecified camp, the
mistrust that she harbored for the central institutions of the Terror, as previously

250

GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3304, l. 6ob. Elena Davydovna regretted that she could not remember the exact
date specified in the spravka.
251
Ibid.
252
Ibid. Although this sort of “fluke” seems far-fetched, A. Sadovskii, the onetime commandant of the
Moscow NKVD’s Economic Department, recalled that during the height of the Terror at the Butovo firing
range, one of the busiest execution sites, “People who were sentenced only to prison terms were
occasionally shot in error, and vice versa […] in the 1950s a person registered as having been shot suddenly
reappeared and sent in a petition for rehabilitation written in his own hand. This means of course that in the
years 1937-8 someone else must have been shot in his name, either intentionally or in error.” That said,
Sadovskii was referring to production-line killing that took place at Butovo, rather than the more careful
protocol that was probably observed in Rostov when dealing with a Party notable. Miriam Dobson cites a
letter from an Ossetian man living in the Komi ASSR who for two decades lived under an assumed
Georgian identity to escape Beriia’s grasp, and only revealed himself to the authorities upon the
announcement of Beriia’s deposal. Sadovskii, quoted in Karl Schlögel, Moscow 1937, trans. Rodney
Livingstone (Polity Press: Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA, 2012), 483; Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold
Summer, 34.

97
articulated in her letter to Mikoian from July 1953, remained a leading concern. She
acknowledged the possibility that “as family members, despair dictates our suspicions –
but can one rule out the possibility of resistance by such a family to inquiries from the
depths of the very apparat of the MVD or GULAG?”253 The organs of state security were
still viewed as a potential den of fabricators and their enablers, and Elena Davydovna
questioned whether it could “be absolutely ruled out that people from Beriia’s structures
still remain [within the MVD], whose interests are by no means served (kotorym otniud’
ne na ruku) by such a resurrection of the dead, especially of those like Levan
Gogoberidze?”254 This sentence, suffused with religious symbolism, gave voice to the
leading paradox of the new post-Beriia order: how could those who owed their very
careers to a proclaimed enemy of the people be entrusted to delve into his past misdeeds?
In Elena Davydovna’s eyes, Beriia’s history of criminality had already touched her
family well before Levan’s 1936 arrest.
Though she dismissed this closing observation as “already irrelevant” to the
investigation, as Beriia had been dead for over a month, Elena Davydovna drew attention
to “the fact that the Musavatists already put three bullets in Levan in 1919 (the Baku
underground barely nursed him back to health). It is clear that this attempt could not have
been carried out (ne oboshlos’) without Beriia.”255 Elena Davydovna thus depicted Levan
Davydovich’s 1936 arrest as the final blow in a concerted campaign by Beriia against her
brother that stretched back to the Civil War. Thanks to Mikoian’s patronage and the
sanction provided by the Presidium, Elena Davydovna’s arguments merited serious
consideration, and it therefore fell to Rudenko and his subordinates at the Procuracy to
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arrange this constellation of contradictory claims and hearsay into a politically useful and
legally viable narrative of the early Terror.
The Aims and Parameters of Gogoberidze’s Rehabilitation
In Rudenko’s February 6, 1954 report to the Central Committee recommending
that Levan Gogoberidze be exonerated, the Procurator General evinced a studious
legalism and ingenuity in reframing the case from a story of anti-Stalin terrorism nipped
in the bud to one of a ruthless political vendetta. Though he operated along many of the
same premises that Elena Davydovna had advanced, holding Beriia responsible for Levan
Davydovich’s persecution, he did not share her optimistic assessment of the latter’s
chances of survival. His report to Khrushchev and Malenkov began with the sentence
handed down by the visiting session of the Military Collegium in Rostov-on-Don:
“highest measure of criminal punishment – execution. In the file there is a spravka which
states that GOGOBERIDZE’s sentence was carried out that same day.”256 For the
purposes of Rudenko’s inquiry, Elena Davydovna’s allegations regarding her brother’s
sentence were a nonstarter; Levan Davydovich’s rehabilitation was to be handled
decidedly – and rightfully – as a posthumous one. The procedure for posthumous
rehabilitation did not differ substantively from the rehabilitation of living subjects; in
both its permutations, the imperative of legal rehabilitation was to establish the soundness
of convictions through close scrutiny of available evidence, verdicts, and, if possible,
interviews with directly involved persons. Though the task of posthumous rehabilitation
was somewhat complicated by the fact that the individual under consideration could not
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advocate on his or her own behalf, there is no indication that the Procuracy approached
the practice as somehow outside its typical purview.
As a prelude to dismantling the case against Gogoberidze, Rudenko laid out the
laundry list of charges with which he had been impugned in 1937:
According to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR’s
sentence GOGOBERIDZE was found guilty of being “an active
participant in a counterrevolutionary Trotskyite-Zinovievite organization
that on 1.XII.1934 perpetrated the foul murder of S. M. Kirov and
prepared terrorist acts against the leadership of the VKP(b) and Soviet
government during the period 1934-1936” (l.d. 216). The sentence also
asserts that beginning in 1930 GOGOBERIDZE conducted active
counterrevolutionary activities, and from 1930 he “joined the terrorist
struggle” and took part in preparations for a terrorist act against I. V.
Stalin. Moreover, GOGOBERIDZE stood accused, having entered into a
criminal conspiracy with the terrorist-Trotskyites Vardanian, Livshits, and
others, of recruiting new members for the counterrevolutionary Trotskyite
group, and also, having established ties with the Trotskyite-saboteur
Glebov-Avilov, of helping him conduct sabotage at the Rostsel’mash
factory.257
Rudenko observed that “[n]ot one of these accusations leveled against GOGOBERIDZE
is corroborated by evidence, with the exception of the transcript of the interrogation of
GOGOBERIDZE himself from March 17, 1937”; the transcript was treated as
particularly suspect, as it “gives no indication of by whom or where GOGOBERIDZE’s
interrogation was carried out.”258 This was far, though, from the most egregious example
of legal misconduct to be found in Gogoberidze’s case file.
Over a month after his arrest Gogoberidze was “charged under articles 58-10
(counterrevolutionary agitation) and 58-11 (participation in a counterrevolutionary
organization) of the Penal Code,” neither of which “provide[d] for capital punishment”
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during peacetime.259 This proved to be little impediment to the NKVD: once a confession
had been extracted in which Gogoberidze implicated himself, the Military Collegium
quickly tried and sentenced him to death, rather than waiting for investigators to press
new charges.260 Rudenko emphasized that this slapdash sentence constituted a total
contravention of both the spirit and the letter of Soviet law.261 The case’s shaky legal
footing additionally “[drew] attention to the fact that although GOGOBERIDZE was
charged with participation in a counterrevolutionary organization, he was tried not with a
group of other defendants, but alone.”262 Rudenko’s highlighting of this issue –meant to
further cast Gogoberidze’s persecution as the product of personal antipathy on Beriia’s
part – served to isolate Gogoberidze rehabilitation from its wider political implications: it
did not prompt a review of the cases against those who were implicated, though not
directly charged in Gogoberidze’s case, and Beriia and his accomplices’ systematic
reliance upon torture to extract confessions, which Rudenko invoked as proof of their
malign intent and Gogoberidze’s innocence, did not furnish a pretext for automatically
reopening the investigations that the Transcaucasian NKVD had conducted.263
Rudenko devoted considerable attention to the Georgian NKVD’s preoccupation
with Gogoberidze’s and Beriia’s shared past in Baku, underscoring the presence of
Goglidze at Gogoberidze’s “repeated interrogations” in Tbilisi.264 Goglidze had been
sentenced to capital punishment alongside his patron in December 1953, and Rudenko
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mentioned that prior to their convictions, investigators “established that Beriia and his
accomplices were aware of the fact that GOGOBERIDZE knew about Beriia’s service in
the Musavat counterintelligence and spoke about this with Sergo Ordzhonikidze” through
materials written by NKVD members and – presumably – the copy of Beriia’s letter to
Ordzhonikidze that had been entered into evidence.265 Rudenko failed to emphasize,
though, that the letter also made it clear that Beriia did not seem especially threatened by
these allegations, as the Party already declared the matter closed in 1920. The transcripts
of Gogoberidze’s interrogations from both Tbilisi and Rostov-on-Don revealed that
investigators “were particularly interested in [his] supposedly ‘slanderous’ statements
about Beriia,” from which Rudenko concluded that “Beriia and his accomplices feared
denunciations from GOGOBERIDZE and had an interest in his conviction.”266 While
these materials laid bare the obvious animus that Beriia harbored for Levan Davydovich
– inspired, in no small part, by the latter’s intriguing – they did not address the actual
impetus for his arrest and elimination.
As the memo uncovered by historian Oleg Khlevniuk demonstrates, Beriia was
simply acting upon orders he had received from Ezhov, who in turn had been specifically
directed by Stalin to have Gogoberidze arrested because of his ties to Lomanidze.
Rudenko decidedly downplayed the close relationship between Lomanidze and
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Gogoberidze, as well as the former’s role in his onetime ally’s downfall. He noted that
Gogoberidze “convincingly refuted the charges of counterrevolutionary activity pressed
against him” during the interrogations, “acknowledging only friendly relations with
Lomanidze.”267 Despite its brevity, this passage is extremely telling with regard to the
nascent objectives and assumptions of posthumous rehabilitation. Because the Presidium
had “cleared” only Gogoberidze’s case for review, Rudenko was obliged to insulate
Levan Davydovich from politically suspect individuals; Lominadze and most of those
who rose alongside him remained enemies in the eyes of the Party, and therefore
Gogoberidze’s propinquity to them had to be minimized. Even though Rudenko deemed
the “absence in the file of any sort of other objective evidence” beyond the transcript of
Gogoberidze’s interrogation from shortly before his execution totally insufficient to
convict him of “grave counterrevolutionary crimes,” at no point did he extend this same
scrutiny to other cases mentioned during Gogoberidze’s trial.268
Likewise, the admission that it was “also known that interrogations in the cases of
individuals from whom participants in Beriia’s counterrevolutionary treasonous group
feared denunciations were carried out through strong-arm methods of assault and tortures
prohibited by law” did not immediately occasion the reopening of the cases against
thousands of other individuals who had the misfortune to fall into Beriia’s clutches.269
Indeed, as the previous chapter attests, many families, such as the Kalmykovs, who could
also claim to have been specifically targeted for reprisals by the NKVD chief, were kept
in suspense for months, unsure if their dossiers had even been retrieved from the
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archives. This underscores the extremely limited mandate under which the earliest
posthumous rehabilitations operated; even as the exculpation of specific individuals
revealed yawning fissures in the legalistic edifice that allowed the Bolsheviks to
cannibalize themselves in the 1930s, the Procuracy was not automatically empowered to
scrutinize other related cases. Because Gogoberidze was tried on his own and because of
his established history of antagonism with Beriia, his case provided an ideal opportunity
to coopt the past in the service of the new anti-Beriia Party line.
For all its conclusive findings, Rudenko’s report was without legal force; it was
only within his purview to recommend that the case be dismissed and Gogoberidze
posthumously rehabilitated by way of “a protest before the Military Collegium of the
USSR Supreme Court.”270 However, in practice the Military Collegium appeared to have
had little agency of its own in the rehabilitation process, as its verdicts closely mirrored
materials that the Procuracy submitted, and it rarely– if ever – declined to endorse the
Procuracy’s proposals in this sphere. On March 6, one month after Rudenko issued his
conclusions, his deputy, Lev Nikolaevich Smirnov, presented the Procuracy’s argument
before the Military Collegium.271 The Military Collegium’s ruling, issued that same day,
summarized and reiterated the major points of Rudenko’s report, foregrounding the fact
that the “preliminary investigation and proceedings of Gogoberidze’s case were
conducted with flagrant violations of procedural law”; no explicit mention was made of
the fabricated nature of the charges against Gogoberidze.272 It endorsed the interpretation
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that “Gogoberidze’s arrest and his sentencing for grave crimes was an act of reprisal by
the enemy of the people Beriia and his accomplices because Gogoberidze knew about
Beriia’s service in the Musavat counterintelligence and spoke about this with Sergo
Ordzhonikidze,” thereby lending judicial credence to the narrative originally promulgated
by Elena Gogoberidze and a small cohort of Gulag survivors.273
The ruling actually hewed closer to Elena Davydovna’s account of Levan’s
downfall than Rudenko’s did, in that it included mention of his being “grievously injured
by Musavat counterintelligence” in Baku, which led “Beriia and his accomplices [to
have] grounds […] to fear denunciations from Gogoberidze, which is why they inflicted
reprisals on him,” though like the Procuracy, the Military Collegium unequivocally
identified March 21, 1937 as Gogoberidze’s date of death. Given these “newly disclosed
circumstances” and “the absence of a corpus delicti” the Military Collegium annulled
Levan Gogoberidze’s death sentence and closed the case against him.274 Though this
legal vindication could not negate Gogoberidze’s physical destruction, it did serve – in
the eyes of Soviet officialdom – to efface the concerted blackening of his reputation that
Stalin oversaw, allowing him to once again be counted among the pioneers of Soviet
power in the Caucasus. Yet by laying ultimate responsibility for Levan Davydovich’s
persecution at the feet of “Beriia and his accomplices” – all of whom by that point were
either dead or awaiting trial – both the Procuracy and the Military Collegium of the
Supreme Court reflected a continued deference to procedural and political concerns, as
well as the reluctance of the post-Stalin ruling elite to confront the full scope of the legal
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falsification and fabrication that allowed so many of their onetime comrades to be
liquidated by the very system that they had striven to create.
Once Levan Davydovich had been fully exculpated the Soviet government was
able to make use of his past actions to discredit newly identified enemies. For example, in
March and April 1954 as part of the case against Mir Dzafar Bagirov, investigators from
the Party Control Committee and Procurator General Rudenko repeatedly brought up
Bagirov’s 1918 arrest in Baku by Gogoberidze, now hailed as a “representative of the
famous Baku commissar Dzhaparidze.”275 Prior to his rehabilitation Levan Davydovich’s
involvement with an established martyr of the revolution like Dzhaparidze would never
have been acknowledged, but upon his being readmitted to the fold this relationship was
avidly exploited as a means of impugning Bagirov’s – and by extension, the late Beriia’s
– commitment to the Soviet project. From that point on, Gogoberidze was repeatedly
mentioned in legal proceedings, Party reports, and the press as a valiant fighter for
Communism felled by Beriia’s machinations. In particular, at times when Moscow
sought to discipline the Georgian Communist Party and its members, Levan
Davydovich’s demise was consistently cited as an example of the human cost of the
failure to practice proper Bolshevik vigilance.276 Yet as the Party began to exploit
Gogoberidze’s memory for its own ends, his survivors continued to struggle with the
stigma of having been “family members of a betrayer of the Motherland.”
Also indicative of the initially limited aims of rehabilitation is the fact that the
onus of initiating Levan Davydovich’s widow’s exoneration fell to Nutsa Gogoberidze
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herself, even though the charges against her consisted only of being the wife of an
“enemy of the people.”277 She wrote to Rudenko on April 7, 1954 – a month following
the Military Collegium’s decision regarding her husband – to request that her conviction
be reviewed, as living in Tbilisi on a former zek’s restricted passport was causing her – as
she put it later to Smirnov – “no small measure (nemalo) of unpleasantness.”278 Over the
next few weeks the Procuracy and Military Collegium quickly went to work, and both
ruled that Nutsa’s sentence constituted “an act of reprisal against a member of the family
of an individual from whom Beriia and his accomplices feared denunciations,” and the
case was vacated by May 5.279 The justice of the Military Collegium who signed off on
the notification order for Nutsa Gogoberidze’s rehabilitation was none other than Ivan
Matulevich, the same man who imposed Levan Davydovich’s death sentence.280 While
the surviving Gogoberidzes may have struggled to dispel the lingering aftereffects of
repression even once Levan Davydovich was officially exculpated, at the same time they
managed to induce the Procuracy to embark upon an altogether different mission: to
prove that Levan Davydovich did not die in Rostov, but instead lived out the height of the
Terror in the (relative) safety of a series of prison camps.
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Dredging the Archipelago: The Search for Specters in the Gulag
Despite all available evidence indicating that Elena Davydovna was mistaken
regarding her brother’s survival, Procurator General Rudenko treated her insistence that
Levan Davydovich did not die in Rostov-on-Don with all attendant seriousness, if not
quite credulity.281 In a letter to Minister of Internal Affairs Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov
written two days after Elena Davydovna’s audience at the Procuracy in February 1954,
Rudenko conceded that it was “evident” from the materials in Gogoberidze’s file that the
Military Collegium condemned him to death and that the sentence had been carried out
almost immediately, which he “announced […] to [Gogoberidze’s] sister.”282 Undeterred
by this stark admission, “E. Gogoberidze maintains that she allegedly has information
from reliable sources that her brother was alive in 1942-43,” citing Liusia Petrosian’s
account that she “supposedly encountered L. Gogoberidze in Magadan.”283 Forwarding a
copy of Elena Davydovna’s “Material on L. D. Gogoberidze,” Rudenko requested that
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Kruglov “give suggestions on the verification of her petition and notify the Procuracy of
the USSR of the results.”284 As the MVD began the process of combing its own files to
ascertain whether there existed any possibility that Levan Davydovich had survived his
captivity, Elena Davydovna was aggressively soliciting the testimony of others who
purportedly saw him alive in the hopes of bolstering her case to the authorities.
The first such witness to come forward – in mid-February – was Teimuraz
Iraklievich Vashklevich, the Tbilisi denizen to whom Elena Davydovna alluded in her
note to Rudenko as having recently returned from the “remote camps.” Vashklevich
confirmed for Rudenko, “[a]t the insistence of the relatives of the relatives of the former
secretary of the TsK of Georgia,” that he “encountered [him] in the summer of 1952 in
the Iagodnoe settlement […] in Kolyma. I was working in the settlement mess hall as a
watchman […] he told me that after the end of his sentence he had to remain in exile and
would soon be leaving for the Pevek settlement.”285 While the Procuracy apparently sat
on this statement for several weeks, Elena Davydovna continued to barrage the
Procurator General and his subordinates with evidence to foster her fact-finding
campaign.
Liusia Petrosian telegrammed Elena Davydovna on February 14 from exile in the
Eniseisk settlement to describe her passing encounter with the individual she recognized
as Levan Davydovich. She claimed to have run into Gogoberidze in summer 1939 at a
“transit point” in Vladivostok from which she was sent to Magadan; she confessed to
being unaware of Levan’s “further movements,” but “suppose[d] [he] went to
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Kolyma.”286 This scanty information prompted Elena Davydovna to write to Rudenko the
following day, this time with almost triumphant conviction: “It has thus been made clear
with absolute certitude that the sentence handed down in L. D. Gogoberidze’s case on 21
March 19X7 [sic] was NOT carried out: in the summer of 1939 my brother was alive and
found in Vladivostok.”287 Elena also invoked Vashklevich’s account as further proof that
Levan was seen alive less than two years prior some 700-800 kilometers from Magadan,
urging Rudenko to corroborate this data with the Main Camps Administration: “The
GULAG can easily verify this upon request, and furthermore, at the very least the
GULAG must have its own lists, its own registries, its own filing system, if the latest
information proves to be not quite accurate.”288 Elena Davydovna’s letter – which up to
that point had maintained a largely impersonal tone – suddenly took a dramatically more
emotional tack, as she lamented, “[i]f only I could communicate with Eniseisk myself,
but otherwise we are completely helpless! (Esli ia mogla snestis’ s Eniseiskom sama, to
dal’she ved’ my sovershenno bespomoshchny!)”289 On behalf of the entire Gogoberidze
clan, Elena Davydovna “implore[d]” the Procurator General “to say nothing of Levan’s
terrible fate, take into consideration the fact that our family endured these 17-18 years
having lost a father, husband and only brother! – And help us with your power and your
authority.”290 This expression of unchecked pathos marked a distinct shift in the grounds
that Levan Davydovich’s relatives employed to justify the continued search for his
possible whereabouts. While Elena Davydovna initially emphasized the pragmatic value
of retrieving Levan Davydovich from exile, as her hopes for a swift resolution to this
286
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mystery proved fleeting both she and her sister-in-law came to rely on a combination of
irreverent effrontery and sentiment in order to ensure the authorities’ continued vigilance,
even in the face of overwhelming evidence that disputed their claims, reflecting their
determination to keep the investigation going by any means necessary.
Within days of Liusia Petrosian’s inflammatory telegram reaching Elena
Gogoberidze, Rudenko received confirmation from the First Special Department of the
MVD that the Gogoberidze family’s hopes were entirely misplaced; the First Special
Department’s archive held a copy of Matulevich’s verdict from March 21, 1937, as well
as a certificate verifying the execution of the sentence. Both the verdict and the certificate
pertained to “a single individual – GOGOBERIDZE L. D.”291 The chief of the First
Special Department additionally insisted that there existed “no information to suggest
that GOGOBERIDZE Levon [sic] Davydovich is supposedly located in exile in
Department “P” [for special settlers] of the MVD of the USSR.”292 There is no indication
in the Procuracy’s file as to when, how, or even whether Rudenko confronted Elena
Davydovna with this material, but based on her responses to similar discouragement, in
all likelihood whatever Rudenko might have told her would have done little to shake her
convictions. Bolstered by Petrosian and Vashklevich’s respective reports, Elena
Davydovna could not be persuaded by mere documents alone that Levan had died an
ignominious death in Rostov-on-Don. This is unsurprising in light of the emotional
turmoil to which the Gogoberidze family had been subjected since Levan’s arrest; to
abandon their faith after such a prospect materialized would have been unbearable. What
is more remarkable, however, is that rather than curtailing its inquiries once Levan
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Davydovich’s execution had been established, the Procuracy continued in its attempts to
untangle the mystery of Levan Davydovich’s location, devoting considerable time and
manpower to this tenacious quandary at a point when its resources were already stretched
razor-thin by the influx of complaints and inquiries to its various departments.293 The
continued allocation of state resources to what increasingly appeared to be a wild goose
chase can be best accounted for through Mikoian’s repeated exertion of his influence on
the Gogoberidze’s behalf.
Frustrated by the Procurator General and MVD’s apparent lack of zeal in pursuing
her brother’s case, in late February Elena Davydovna proposed to Mikoian “a very
simple, easy, and quick way to ascertain, finally, Levan’s fate: you might make
arrangements for Liusia Arkad’evna Petrosian to be summoned to Moscow from
Eniseisk, where she is living in a settlement after completing her camp term.”294 Elena
maintained that “[t]alking with [Petrosian] will be sufficient to cause all doubts
concerning the execution of the sentence in 1937 to fall away, and then the MVD will be
able, finally, to begin real inquiries for L. D. Gogoberidze in the camps, colonies, and so
on.”295 She closed by “beg[ging]” Mikoian to inform her if this scheme was “feasible”;
while it is again unclear if this missive elicited a direct response, by early March, when
Mikoian instructed Rudenko with a memo designated “SPECIAL SUPERVISION” to
“familiarize” himself with Petrosian’s file, the latter had already had his subordinates
take steps to shed light on the situation.296
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Smirnov’s first action as the lead investigator into Levan Gogoberidze’s purported
survival in the Gulag was to instruct the Military Procurator of the Transcaucasian
Military District and the Procurator of the Krasnoiarsk krai to bring in Vashklevich and
Petrosian, respectively, for questioning. Vashklevich was to be confronted with a copy of
the statement he sent to the Procurator General, and then interrogated regarding the
circumstances under which he encountered Gogoberidze, whether he was “sure that the
person with whom he supposedly spoke in the Iagodnoe settlement was in actuality
Gogoberidze,” his level of familiarity with Gogoberidze, and – most pointedly – “[w]ho
requested that Vashklevich affirm that he supposedly encountered Gogoberidze at
Kolyma.”297 Smirnov acknowledged in his orders that the MVD possessed a copy of
Gogoberidze’s death certificate, but his “relatives insist that in actuality he was not shot”
thanks in part to Vashklevich, and although “Vashklevich’s statement contradicts an
official certificate, it needs to be verified” through a “close interrogation.”298 Likewise,
the Krasnoiarsk Procurator was told to establish “where precisely in 1939” Petrosian
“supposedly” saw Gogoberidze, “under what conditions did this encounter take place,
and is Petrosian not mistaken in asserting that the man who she encountered in 1939 was
indeed Gogoberidze,” and – again – at whose request she “confirm[ed]” this meeting.299
Both regional procurators were urged to do their “utmost (maksimal’no)” to “expedite the
execution of this order,” and before the month was out the transcripts of both
interrogations were on Smirnov’s desk in Moscow.300
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Because Vashklevich had no interactions with Gogoberidze prior to his
imprisonment he could not say definitely whether the individual with whom he spoke
was indeed the former Party Secretary of Georgia. In response to the Military
Procurator’s queries, Vashklevich described a Georgian, “by appearance was roughly 4850 years old, the hair on his head was entirely grey, his face was large, his forehead broad
and prominent, his eyes were blue…lean”; this man “supposedly called himself
Gogoberidze Levan Davydovich and reported that he had served out his sentence and was
due to leave soon for settlement in the Chain-Chukotskoe administration of Dal’stroi.”301
Based on their handful of exchanges, Vashklevich had no reason to doubt the veracity of
this “Gogoberidze’s” account, and upon his return to Tbilisi he contacted the latter’s
surviving sisters. Vashklevich’s lack of a personal history with Gogoberidze did not
necessarily cast his testimony into doubt, but he had no basis upon which to judge
whether his interlocutor was indeed who he purported to be. This was far less of an issue
for Liusia Petrosian, though, as she repeatedly emphasized her close, longstanding ties
with the man she insisted she saw through a fence at the Vladivostok transit prison in
1939.
During her interrogation in Krasnoiarsk, Petrosian reported that she and
Gogoberidze first became acquainted “in 1921 in Tbilisi after I was freed from prison in
Batumi, where I was held by order of the Menshevik authorities, apparently as a
hostage.”302 From that point through 1929 she came to know him “very well,” seeing him
“repeatedly while working at the Georgia Sovnarkom, at friends’ and comrades’
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apartments, meetings, conferences, in the street, theaters, the cinema, etc. In general we
were comrades and knew each other very well.”303 This close familiarity with
Gogoberidze – coupled with her own family’s close ties to the halls of power – afforded
Petrosian’s statements an authoritative quality, and also allowed her to redirect the thrust
of the interrogation toward her own experience of wrongful imprisonment and unrealized
exoneration. When asked about the circumstances of her encounter with Levan
Davydovich in 1939, Liusia Petrosian first insisted on relating the story of how she came
to pass through Vladivostok in the first place: in September 1937 she was sentenced to a
ten-year prison term, the first two years of which were spent in solitary confinement in
Iaroslavl’. Having taken “violently ill” and become “seriously swollen,” she was
transferred to Kolyma, and the first leg of her journey brought her to Vladivostok’s
transit prison via sealed freight car. Petrosian claimed that she spent no more than two to
three days in Vladivostok, and while taking a “stroll” in the prison yard one of these days
“someone called out to [her] from the fence that separated the men’s zone from the
women’s.”304 Having been “called […] by name,” Petrosian “came close to the fence,”
and there “saw Gogoberidze Levon Davidovich [sic] through a slit.”305 Liusia Petrosian
was able to recount this unlikely reunion in some detail almost 15 years later.
Petrosian told the Transcaucasian Military Procurator that she immediately
recognized Levan Davydovich, “called him by name, and he responded.”306 Although
Gogoberidze’s “appearance was poor, thin, pallid,” Petrosian noted that he retained his
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“cheerful” humor, and “smiling he tried to joke about my appearance.”307 When she
inquired after his own well-being, “Gogoberidze answered in Georgian: ‘so far, I’m still
alive.’”308 Based on Petrosian’s interrogation this was the total extent of their exchange,
as a warning shouted from a guard tower curtailed their conversation and drove both
away from the dividing fence. Despite the fleeting nature of their meeting, Petrosian was
unequivocal regarding the accuracy of her recollections. When challenged that she might
have been mistaken about the identity of her partner in conversation Petrosian bristled,
and “categorically maintain[ed] that it was indeed Gogoberidze,” as she “knew him very
well” and therefore “could not have been mistaken.”309 At least one of the other female
convicts who had been transferred from Iaroslavl’ alongside Petrosian, Zina Rinberg, was
said to have been familiar with Levan Davydovich from Taganrog, and apparently saw
the two of them speaking together.310 Petrosian was also pointedly asked about who
induced her to come forward after so much time having passed. She explained that upon
returning to Tbilisi from the camps in 1947 she met with one of Levan Davydovich’s
sisters and described what she had experienced in Vladivostok; it was not until February
1954, amidst the anti-Beriia tide, that she received Elena Davydovna’s telegram
requesting that she attest to having seen Levan.311 When Petrosian’s interrogation
transcript arrived in Moscow it apparently elicited far more questions than it answered,
and instead of resolving the question of Levan Davydovich’s fate it prompted its own
series of side investigations.
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While Nutsa Gogoberidze’s rehabilitation wound its way through the Soviet
judicial system the Procuracy traced multiple leads in the quest to disentangle the
contradictions between the MVD’s official records and Liusia Petrosian’s eyewitness
testimony. An essential element of this effort involved corroborating Petrosian’s claims
by cross-examining the women she identified as having been with her in Vladivostok,
Zina Rinberg and Babulia Gvakhariia-Chachibaia. In order to track them down Smirnov
turned to the Primorskii krai Procurator F. D. Kononenko. Forwarding him a copy of
Petrosian’s interrogation, Smirnov assigned the regional procurator to “to take urgent and
thorough measures to verify the information contained” therein regarding Gogoberidze’s
fate.312 Smirnov deemed it particularly “essential to obtain background information on
[the two women] referred to in the interrogation transcript, to ascertain where they were
sent and, in the event that they are located in Primorskii krai, to interrogate them, having
clarified whether they encountered Levan Gogoberidze with Petrosian at the Vladivostok
transit prison”; were they no longer found in or around Vladivostok Kononenko was
instructed to inform Smirnov via special telegram of where they were ultimately sent.313
Independent of locating Rinberg and Gvakhariia-Chachibaia, Kononenko was to establish
whether Gogoberidze was registered among the detainees who passed through
Vladivostok in summer 1939, whether it was possible at the time for male and female
prisoners to establish contact, and where Gogoberidze was sent if he was indeed in transit
through Vladivostok.314 Smirnov made his own skepticism regarding Levan
Davydovich’s prospects for survival evident, citing the MVD’s death certificate, but he
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explained that “in relation” to Gogoberidze’s rehabilitation it was “necessary to
thoroughly verify Petrosian’s information.”315 Despite Smirnov’s orders, his inquiries
ground to a halt in Vladivostok thanks to a paucity of available information.
At the end of April the chief of MVD Prison Number 1 in Vladivostok, a Major
Volkov, wrote to Kononenko’s assistant, Deputy Procurator Nesterov, to inform him that
“in view of the absence of registration information it is not possible to establish whether
GOGOBERIDZE Levan Davydovich, GVAKHARIIA-CHACHIBAIA Babul’ and
RINBERG Zina passed through the prison.”316 Volkov was able to confirm, however,
that in 1939 it was technically possible for male and female inmates to speak to one
another, “as the exercise yards were separated by single-board fences and there were slits
in the fences through which the prisoners could observe each other and exchange words
(men and women). In 1952 the exercise yards were re-divided with two boards and the
possibility for discussions was eliminated.”317 What little credence the fact that Petrosian
and Levan Davydovich’s exchange was technically feasible leant to the former’s account
was undone by the unavailability of any sort of documentation that attested to
Gogoberidze’s, or even Petrosian’s presence in Vladivostok. Kononenko explained in his
brief report to Smirnov, which included Volkov’s memorandum, that prior to 1940 the
registration of prisoners in transit through Vladivostok was carried out in logbooks
separate from those used for the general population; according to the prison personnel’s
“assertions,” these registries were destroyed sometime between 1941 and 1945.318 Yet
even in the face of this investigative dead end Smirnov was not prepared – or perhaps not
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empowered – to close the Gogoberidze case. Written in the margins of Kononenko’s
dispatch in Smirnov’s hand was the instruction to “[w]ait for a response from Kruglov”;
while Smirnov pursued the Vladivostok leads, Rudenko had updated MVD head Kruglov
on the most recent developments in the Gogoberidze inquest and requested that he direct
“a careful additional verification” of Petrosian and Vashklevich’s testimonies.319
When this review was completed in mid-June, it too revealed very little in the
way of actionable evidence: Kruglov reaffirmed the details of Levan Davydovich’s
execution in Rostov-on-Don, and noted that upon repeat interrogation Petrosian “did not
provide any further information” about him.320 Kruglov’s findings also closed off at least
one avenue of exploration, as he announced that Zinadia Markovna Rinberg, Petrosian’s
“Zina,” had died the previous April in Sevvostlag while serving out her sentence;
presumably the MVD was unable to determine what became of GvakhariiaChachibaia.321 Without any additional materials or witnesses to draw upon, and with no
clear resolution to the case in sight, the Procuracy curtailed the hunt for traces of Levan
Davydovich; the Gogoberidze women, however, would not be dissuaded from their
chosen course of action, nor would they allow the Soviet authorities to abandon their
commitments unchallenged.
Before her own rehabilitation was completed Nutsa Gogoberidze wrote to
Smirnov to persuade him to remain vigilant in tracking down Levan Davydovich.
Acknowledging “how important [Smirnov’s] moral conviction that it has real
significance is to the search for Levan Davydovich Gogoberidze,” Nutsa confessed to
having “considered coming to Moscow and personally sharing […] the facts that confirm
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that the sentence in Gogoberidze’s case of March 21, 1937 was not carried out,” but she
was prevented from doing so by “illness and domestic conditions” and was therefore
“compelled to confine [her]self to a letter.”322 After relating the conflicting reports that
she received regarding Levan Davydovich’s sentence (treated above), Nutsa justified her
persistence by setting herself apart from “the category of people who prefer either
consciously or unconsciously to engage in self-deception and are deluded by illusions”;
that being said, she insisted that there could be “no doubt that neither in March nor in
April 1937 was L. Gogoberidze executed.”323 She conceded that she was unsure of “what
his fate was afterwards,” but in her eyes the issue of Levan’s possible survival to the
present day was largely tertiary.324 Her major concern was the apparent inability of the
combined efforts of the Procuracy and Soviet state security to locate any trace of Levan
Davydovich post-1937, and she defiantly pointed out that “even if he is not among the
living today, it is not possible for a person to vanish, such that it is impossible even to
ascertain where, when and under what circumstances he passed away,” a significant
overestimation on her part of the state’s ability to monitor the fate of everyone it took into
custody during the Terror.325 This challenge marked the return of a far more
confrontational tenor to the interactions between the Gogoberidze family and the state
authorities. Long gone were the appeals predicated on Levan Davydovich’s utility to the
Party’s revisionist history; rather, the matter at hand was one of the state’s obligations to
a family that it had repeatedly wronged, and the insufficient care with which the
government had handled their dossier.
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In late July 1954 Smirnov received a letter from Elena Davydovna, this time via
Lana Gogoberidze, requesting an additional meeting and announcing the unlikely
discovery of yet another Gogoberidze family friend who crossed paths with Levan
Davydovich during his time in exile. Elena Davydovna managed to track down Gerasim
Iasonovich Amashukeli to the Estonian village of Kohtla-Järve, and after speaking with
him in person she decided to forward his information to the Procuracy. According to
Elena Davydovna, Amashukeli “knew my brother since their school days (so shkol’noi
skam’i),” and wrote to his own family about encountering Levan around Vorkuta in
1940.326 Elena Davydovna explicitly refused to provide Smirnov with any further
information gleaned from her interview with Amashukeli, demanding that he “be
officially interrogated, as was done in the other cases,” though she could seemingly not
resist mentioning two details that “especially struck” her.327 Firstly, Smirnov had
apparently told Elena Davydovna in the past that – in his words – Levan Davydovich’s
name “turned up” in the region of Vorkuta, which she took to be a portentous
coincidence; secondly, Elena Davydovna claimed that Pavel Petrovich Postyshev, the
former Secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine, was in the same camp as her
brother in Vorkuta, and might provide confirmation of Levan’s “stay in these places”
were he still alive.328 While Elena Davynovna was confident that this latter point would
afford her further credibility, in retrospect it underscored the false nature of the hopes that
animated her relentless searching.
Although Postyshev was arrested a year and a half after Gogoberidze, like his
fellow Party secretary he was subjected to extended imprisonment before being tried and
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executed in February 1939.329 Given that Postyshev’s entire time in captivity was most
likely divided between Kuibyshev, where he was arrested, and Moscow, where he was
shot, it is highly unlikely that he ever passed through the gates of one of the far northern
camps in the vicinity of Vorkuta. Postyshev was not the only example of a supposedly
dead Party official being spotted in the Gulag that Elena Davydovna marshaled to
substantiate her convictions. In an April 1955 letter to Mikoian – written after the
Procuracy had closed its investigation into Gogoberidze’s location – she brought up “the
incredible story of Misha Kakhiani” – one of Levan Davydovich’s predecessors as head
of the Georgian Party – which had become the talk of Tbilisi.330 As with her brother, a
death sentence had been handed down against Kakhiani, and there existed confirmation
of its implementation, but the Georgian capital was inundated with scuttlebutt to the
effect that he was “alive and [had] been found,” leaving the surviving Gogoberidzes
“stunned (potriaseny) by this analogy.”331 While Gogoberidze and Kakhiani did share
similar fates, neither involved a premortem stint in labor camps, a fact that did little to
dampen the Soviet populace’s apparent enthusiasm for accounts of the improbable
survival of prominent figures in Stalin’s penal system.332
Elena Davydovna’s invocations of Postyshev and Kakhiani suggest that the
various Gogoberidze sightings across the expanse of the Gulag were not as anomalous as
they might initially have seemed; rather, the “appearance” of various dead Party notables
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to friends, acquaintances, and admirers may have helped them to make sense of the
calamitous events that had befallen them, in that they provided a familiar and sympathetic
figure with whom they could “share” their experiences.333 While confined to the Gulag
archipelago those who experienced these supposed sightings circulated their stories
within a closed world that offered little to no access to outside information, which
allowed such rumors to crystallize and proliferate. Yet the mass return of zeks from the
“zone” brought these whispered tales to the attention of the larger Soviet populace, which
served to further muddy the already opaque waters of public knowledge about the Terror,
fostered by decades of official misinformation.334 The Procuracy and other investigative
organs were thereby forced to wade into a situation that pitted flawed, and perhaps even
fabricated recollections against their own imperfect knowledge of the largely untold,
devastating extent of Stalin’s repressions.
Regardless of whether Smirnov was at the time aware of Postyshev’s or later
Kakhiani’s demise, it is evident from the manner in which this new evidence was handled
that he was not eager to pursue any new leads in Levan Davydovich’s disappearance, and
Elena Davydovna was indignant in anticipation of this dismissiveness, which so starkly
diverged from the attentive treatment she had received early in the year. Assuming a tone
that both castigated and cajoled the Procurator General’s assistant, she echoed Nutsa’s
333
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incredulity at the authorities’ inability to pinpoint Levan Davydovich’s whereabouts: “As
before, and now, it remains unclear to me: is it really possible for a person to so
thoroughly disappear without a trace that the mighty state apparat cannot uncover a trace
of him, even if he is not alive!”335 This bold sendoff reflected the inflated vision of the
Soviet government’s capacity to pinpoint individuals that Elena Davydovna held, and
marked an unofficial close to the most active period of the hunt for Levan Gogoberidze,
and it would be another five months before his family would once again reach out to the
Procuracy.
By the time Lana Gogoberidze delivered Elena Davydovna’s penultimate letter to
Smirnov at the end of December 1954 almost all of the momentum that drove the
investigation in March and April had dissipated: over the preceding months the flurry of
communications between various state bodies relating to the Gogoberidzes’ cases had
ground to a halt, and the Procuracy’s attentions diverted to Liusia Petrosian’s (failed)
appeal for rehabilitation.336 With no further information from Rudenko, Smirnov, or other
state representatives forthcoming, and developments on her own end mounting, Elena
Davydovna attempted to resuscitate her brother’s moribund case, informing Smirnov that
she had learned through one of Kamo’s other sisters that Liusia Petrosian would be
traveling to Moscow in December, and would therefore be available for questioning.
Regardless of what Smirnov might have thought of Petrosian’s testimony, in light of the
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failure to locate Levan Davydovich Elena Davydovna “implore[d] (Ochen’, ochen’ Vas
proshu)” him, “pursuant to the promise you gave, that you speak to her personally.”337
Although there is no indication that Smirnov entertained this entreaty, he was
apparently reminded of Amashukeli’s existence by Elena Davydovna’s request for
confirmation that the latter’s information had been checked, and he eventually did order
the Estonian Procuracy to follow up with him.338 Skeptical of Smirnov’s continued
commitment to chasing down leads on her behalf, Elena Davydovna admitted that she
herself had begun to walk the “‘interrogator’s’ path,” and planned to visit Kakhetiia and
Central Asia in order to vet at least two purported witnesses.339 Apparently conscious of
how her unflagging determination must have appeared to a legal veteran like Smirnov,
Elena Davydovna signed off with a plaintive appeal for understanding devoid of the
brashness and daring that distinguished her prior missives, and that seemingly conceded
the strong likelihood that Levan Davydovich was no longer among the living:
Lev Nikolaevich, do not condemn us for our persistence. We – L.
D.’s entire family – are all deeply convinced that my brother escaped
execution in 1937, but beyond that? Further, if he is not alive, it is
extremely important for us to know where, when, and why he died.
In the past you have personally devoted so much truly human
attention to this case, help us see it through to the end. I want to hope that
the Procuracy will continue its inquiries until it receives exact and
irrefutable information about L. D.’s death in one of the remote camps.340
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Although it is impossible to be certain without outside confirmation from the
Gogoberidze family itself, it is highly unlikely that Elena Davydovna’s impassioned
entreaty elicited any response from Smirnov. This underscores a fundamental
discrepancy in the objectives of the Gogoberidze family versus those of the Procuracy
and its representatives.
In the eyes of Smirnov and his subordinates, the search for Levan Davydovich
was complete when it became evident that the conflicting, and in many instances
unreliable accounts of those who “encountered” him at various camps could not be
verified through official documentation. Only the MVD had been able to produce
conclusive evidence of what exactly befell Levan Gogoberidze following his arrest, and
though his relatives rejected the possibility of execution in March 1937 out of hand, it
remained the most feasible explanation for the Georgian Party Secretary’s nearly twentyyear absence, and without any further grounds for prolonging the investigation Smirnov
chose to close the case. Given their deep emotional investment in the hunt for traces of
Levan Davydovich, the Gogoberidzes could not accept such an abrupt and grim
conclusion to this affair. Elena Davydovna articulated the family’s dissatisfaction with
the inquiry’s denouement in her final letter to Smirnov, sent in May 1956 and inserted
into the Procuracy’s file without receiving page numbers. Requesting that Smirnov
“make one more effort” and check the claims of the noted tenor Nikolai Konstantinovich
Pechkovskii, who purportedly saw Levan Davydovich while on tour at a camp near
Vorkuta, Elena Davydovna admitted that she and the rest of the family had “almost no
hope that L.D. is alive, but it is extremely important for us to know when, where, and
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under what circumstances he perished.”341 She fervently believed that “[i]t would be all
the easier for us to know that L.D. was not killed on 21/III at 4:20 in the morning [sic],
but lived until some year, not losing hope, and died his death among normal, unfortunate
people like him”; until Smirnov provided her with information to that effect, Elena
Davydovna would continue the futile quest for signs of her brother among Stalin’s
exiles.342 Smirnov, no longer inclined to indulge the Gogoberidzes and their theories,
dismissively scrawled across the top of the letter: “The question of the execution of
Levan Gogoberidze’s sentence has been thoroughly checked. There is no basis to believe
reports that he is alive.”343 It was in this manner that the Procuracy put an end to a case
that illustrated the perils of attempting to pin down the truth through the fractured
accounts of Gulag returnees, and the Gogoberidze women, their hopes all but dashed
against the brutal reality of Stalin’s extermination of the Old Bolsheviks, were forced to
concede that even the mighty Soviet state could not raise the dead.
Conclusion
Posthumous rehabilitation in the post-Stalin Soviet Union was a process that
compelled the families and friends of the “unlawfully repressed” to closely engage with a
judiciary and state security apparatus that were themselves deeply implicated in the
abuses of the Terror. As the Gogoberidzes’ case trenchantly demonstrates, the most
effective avenue for achieving meaningful redress was through patronage networks
341
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forged in the crucible of revolution and civil war that had lain dormant for decades, but
even such ties could only initiate a legal review; the substantive work of rehabilitation
was handled by the Procuracy, in concert with the MVD and the Military Collegium of
the Supreme Court. As a legal procedure underpinned with distinctly political aims,
rehabilitation – in its earliest years – invited the families of the disappeared to collaborate
with the Party-state in fashioning accounts of the recent past that implicated approved
targets, but often left the actual architects of the Terror unmentioned.
At the same time as the post-Stalin judiciary was assembling its own selective
history of the first decades of Soviet power in the form of internally circulated
rehabilitation materials, as well as the reports it submitted to the Central Committee and
courts, it had to confront the legacy of systematic misinformation sown by its
predecessors in the form of variegated and contradictory reports emerging from the Gulag
on what actually became of many “enemies of the people.” These two trends converged
around Levan Gogoberidze’s utterly remarkable case, for as his sister and wife endorsed
and helped to substantiate the anti-Beriia interpretation of Levan’s downfall, they pressed
the Soviet authorities on his whereabouts and were able to spur an investigation that,
though ultimately fruitless, revealed the intense staying power of Gulag rumors in a
society starved for news of its former leading figures. Regardless of the tenor or
frustrations of their interactions, the Gogoberidzes were deeply engaged with, and utterly
reliant upon, representatives of the Procuracy to see through the redemption of Levan
Davydovich’s reputation and, as they hoped, his person. For its part, the Soviet
government would continue to grapple over the following decade with the manner in
which it handled inquiries into the fates of those supposedly sentenced to “10 years
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without the right of correspondence” – though never again would it allocate so many men
and so much time to tracking down a single individual. In subsequent years the
authorities would expand the mandate of posthumous rehabilitation, allowing cases of
even greater political sensitivity to be reopened and further raising the stakes of the
disclosures that were made.

129

Chapter Three – “No Statute of Limitations on the Restoration of a Good
Name”: The Shaping Role of the Judiciary
The firmness of a verdict that is final and binding
serves the common good. The review of verdicts that
are res judicata would turn “all Moscow justice
upside down” and would give birth to a “bona fide
revolution among those who have been tried.”344
On June 23, 1955, USSR Procurator General Roman Rudenko addressed the AllUnion Meeting of Leading Procuracy Workers in Moscow. Before his assembled
subordinates, Rudenko articulated his vision of the Procuracy’s place within the Soviet
Union’s new political landscape. Though prosecutions for counterrevolutionary crimes
had fallen markedly over the previous two years – a trend that Rudenko attributed to the
“moral-political unity of the Soviet people” and the dismantling of Beriia’s network
within the state security organs – the Procuracy’s activities in that sphere showed no sign
of abating.345 As compared to 1952 levels, Rudenko reported, the number of requests for
criminal case reviews addressed to the central Procuracy apparat had increased 45-fold;
for regional offices, this figure was as high as 50-times.346 This surge in appeals
demanded “political maturity and special attention” from the engaged functionaries, who
were liable to make “errors.”347 The main pitfall faced by reviewers of sensitive cases
involved the credulity of “ so-called ‘confessions’ (tak nazyvaemykh ‘priznatel’nykh’
pokazanii) from prisoners” and “denunciations of these individuals” issued by others “in
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the absence of objective evidence of guilt.”348 Such liabilities had been avoided in
previously reexamined cases including the Leningrad Affair and that of Aleksandr
Kosarev through “a thorough and objective review of the evidence of guilt, carried out at
the behest of the Central Committee,” which resulted in the full rehabilitation of the
wrongfully convicted.349
The nature of the system Rudenko described, in which the Procuracy professed
itself to be engaged in “objective” work while under the watchful eye and mandate of the
Party’s highest body, has not escaped outside observers, who have often depicted the
Procuracy, and the judiciary writ large, as entirely subordinate to the Communist Party.
While the juridical aspect of rehabilitation was certainly embedded in – and in many
instances subservient to – the political demands of the post-Stalin power struggle, it was
primarily representatives of the Procuracy and courts – as well as some state bodies like
the KGB and Supreme Soviet – whose work determined the way rehabilitation took
shape over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s. It was these officials’ attempts to
extract useable narratives of a redemptive past from the mire of forced confessions and
overlapping denunciations generated during the purges that defined the substantive work
of posthumous rehabilitation. In attempting to efface the Terror’s elimination of
successive cadres of Party faithful, rehabilitation came to operate as a process that, much
like the Terror itself, was self-reinforcing; just as one individual’s forced confession
could be employed to implicate dozens of others, each rehabilitee could potentially be
cited in support of other former comrades’ innocence. This logic created chains or webs
of rehabilitation, wherein individuals who were tied together by past experiences or
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affiliations were exonerated in rapid sequence. Yet rehabilitation remained, at its core, a
fundamentally individual-focused endeavor, and even as the ranks of potential
rehabilitees swelled, the prospect of mass legal rehabilitation for those charged with
counterrevolutionary crimes was never given serious consideration, lest an actual enemy
of the people inadvertently be reprieved.
Although the previous chapters attest to the fact that the Soviet Union was by no
means a Rechtsstaat, and that the wheels of justice often turned based on the imprimatur
of influential Party figures, legal reformism was a crowning objective of the Khrushchev
period. While the notion of “socialist legality” was publicly championed during the last
months of Beriia’s tenure in office, it was most fully embraced as an operating principle
in the months and years following his deposal. This attempt to bind the conduct of both
individuals and state bodies to the law clearly favored certain institutions, and came at a
profound cost to others.350 The organs of state security saw their purview diminish
markedly, as they were no longer afforded a free hand in matters of criminal justice and
penal policy. As Jeffrey Hardy observes, though the legal reformism of the 1950s and
1960s never resolved “the fundamental tension between the rule of law and the extralegal
nature of the Communist Party, this campaign resulted in a host of new legal codes, a
better-educated corps of judges and lawyers, renewed academic study into the nature of
crime and punishment,” and, critically, increased procuratorial oversight in many
segments of Soviet society.351 Though Hardy focuses primarily on the role of procurators
within the Gulag system, he aptly notes that the power and prestige of the General
Procuracy rose in proportion to the institutional decline of both the All-Union Ministry of
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Justice, which was abolished in 1956, and the All-Union MVD, which was dissolved in
1960.352 This new constellation of legal power afforded the Procuracy and courts a
greater degree of authority than they had previously known under Soviet socialism, and
among their key responsibilities was to bring legal order to a system of state violence that
overwhelmingly had operated extrajudicially.353
Bringing the Terror under Judicial Scrutiny
Much of the Soviet public first became acquainted with the concept of
rehabilitation through the quashing of the investigation into the “doctor-saboteurs” that
made the front page of Pravda on April 6, 1953.354 Yet this widely-discussed disclosure,
as well as the more clandestine, state security-directed reversals enacted between late
March and June 1953 that comprised what Gennadii Kostyrchenko has termed “Beriia’s
micro-rehabilitation,” differed considerably from the procedures adopted following
Beriia’s ouster, in that Beriia’s primary intent appears to have been ingratiating himself
with other members of the collective leadership and garnering favor with institutions like
the armed forces through acts of remission.355 The first such revision was accomplished
within weeks of Stalin’s death, when Beriia arranged for the release of Molotov’s ex-
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wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, whose Party membership was restored immediately
thereafter.356 The Doctors’ Plot was particularly straightforward for Beriia to unravel, as
the accused parties had yet to be formally convicted on any charges, and therefore it was
only a matter of the Presidium endorsing the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ (MVD)
recommendation that the case be closed and everyone involved exonerated.357 Having
nipped Stalin’s final exercise in terror in the bud, Beriia turned his attention to his own
imprisoned clients and consolidating influence in critical sectors.
In rapid sequence, between late March and early April, Beriia secured the release
of his allies detained as part of the antisemitic “anti-cosmopolitan” campaign, as well as
all those implicated in the Mingrelian Affair, which specifically targeted many of his
Georgian subordinates.358 The following month saw Mikhail Moiseevich Kaganovich,
Lazar’s younger brother, cleared of the accusation of membership in a Rightist-Trotskyite
organization that precipitated his 1941 suicide, in another move designed to curry favor
with a more senior figure in the Presidium. As with the Doctor’s Plot, by dint of the fact
that no sentence had been passed on Mikhail Kaganovich, his rehabilitation could be
accomplished via MVD fiat, with the Party’s assent.359 More ambitious in this arena –
and consequently of greater concern for the rest of the Presidium – were Beriia’s attempts
to cultivate ties with the military through the selective rehabilitation of recently purged
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officers and figures from the armaments and aviation industries.360 Beriia’s maneuvers –
which appear to have been a source of consternation among the rest of the Presidium, and
may have helped convince them that it was necessary to check his ambitions – kept the
judiciary at arm’s length from the rehabilitation process.361 Although the Military
Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court was involved in officially dismissing the
“aviation affair,” the MVD issued all of the relevant recommendations to the court, and
retained control over the case review process along with the evidence necessary to
complete such processes. Were Beriia to be disarmed, and the larger state security
apparat brought to heel, the MVD’s control over politically sensitive criminal cases
would have to be curtailed, and Beriia’s tactic of selective exoneration turned against
him.362 Khrushchev and his allies settled on the judiciary, and specifically the Procuracy,
as the vehicle for this reordering of the balance of power within the Soviet state.
The man entrusted with overseeing both Beriia’s prosecution and the
revitalization of the Procuracy, Roman Rudenko, had proven himself a capable jurist and
someone amenable to placing himself at the disposal of the Party, and Khrushchev
specifically. Khrushchev first encountered Rudenko as the procurator of the Lugansk
region while he was the Party secretary of Ukraine. At some point during the late-1930s
Procurator General Andrei Vyshinskii approached Khrushchev about the possibility of
transferring Rudenko to Moscow to serve as his deputy; Khrushchev, wanting to keep
Rudenko within his sphere, demurred, mentioning that a great deal of kompromat had
360

Naumov and Sigachev, eds., Lavrentii Beriia, 41-42 52-55, 59-61. Beriia laid responsibility for the
“aviation affair” at the feet of Abakumov and his deputies, presaging the very tactics that would be
employed against him in the following months.
361
On the rationale of Beriia’s opponents, see Joseph Torigian, “Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion:
Elite Power Struggles and the Fate of Three Revolutions” (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2016), 51-54.
362
Matthew E. Lenoe, The Kirov Murder and Soviet History (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 2010), 555.

135
been collected on the Lugansk procurator, and that it might appear improper for him to
assume such an influential post. Vyshinskii relented, and Rudenko was eventually
promoted to chief procurator of the Ukrainian SSR “with the qualification that since
evidence had been given against him, it had to be looked into.”363 Khrushchev thus had
control over Rudenko in two key respects: he had knowledge of black marks on
Rudenko’s record, but could also claim credit for having saved Rudenko from the meat
grinder of Moscow politics during the Terror. These factors – compounded by Rudenko’s
star turn as the Soviet delegation’s lead prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials – made him an
ideal replacement for Stalin’s last Procurator General, Grigorii Nikolaevich Safonov, who
was perceived as incapable of standing up to Beriia.364 Under Rudenko’s leadership the
Procuracy would go on to assert its prerogatives with renewed vigor, and assume direct
responsibility for overseeing the review of counterrevolutionary cases that had previously
been in the hands of state security.365
The key development that unleashed the torrent of rehabilitations and placed the
USSR Procuracy and Supreme Court at the center of this process was the Supreme Soviet
Presidium’s September 1, 1953 decree “On the Abolition of the Special Board of the
USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.” This proclamation dissolved the extrajudicial body
that since 1934 had sentenced nearly 450,000 Soviet citizens to various terms in prison
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camps, special settlements, and – in the case of some 10,000 individuals – death.366
Going forward, all criminal cases were to be “considered only by judicial organs,” and
the Procurator General and Minister of Internal Affairs were to report to the Central
Committee Presidium on any “important investigative cases in advance” of rendering
decisions.367 In addition to keeping the Party’s highest body closely apprised of major
criminal decisions, the decree established the protocol by which previous decisions of the
Special Board and related bodies would be reviewed beyond the MVD’s purview. All
complaints and petitions relating to verdicts rendered by the OGPU Collegium, NKVD
troikas, and the Special Board were henceforth to be handled by the All-Union
Procuracy, which would then submit its protests to the Supreme Court; the MVD was
relegated to a consultative role, providing the Procuracy “with preliminary
conclusion[s].”368 This provision bore major implications for the course of the
rehabilitation process, as NKVD troikas were responsible for most of the sentences
handed down during the height of the repressions of 1937 and 1938.369 Summary,
extrajudicial rulings that had previously been the secret police’s exclusive province were
opened to scrutiny, and the Procuracy would be among the main points of contact
between Soviet citizens demanding the reexamination of politically sensitive cases and a
state that had hidden its citizens’ fates with impunity for decades.
Procuracy offices were quickly inundated with appeals and petitions, and found
themselves shorthanded. The Department for Special Cases, reporting to Rudenko in
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April 1954, noted that between June 1953 and March 1954 it had received nearly 36,000
letters of complaint, a figure that its barebones staff of 17 functionaries and six assistants
(referentov) dispatched from other departments could not even begin to effectively
process. In order to handle the influx, the Department for Special Cases would require at
least twice as many permanent employees and temporary assistants.370 Yet additional
manpower was not forthcoming, and in April and May of that year over 7,000 more
petitions arrived per month, leading to a backlog of nearly 5,000 cases.371 As D. E. Salin
made clear in his report from March of the following year, the situation had only
worsened with time: even though the Department for Special Cases managed to
recommend more than 5,000 counterrevolutionary cases for rehabilitation over the
previous three months, and had examined some 13,000 altogether over the past seven,
there were still 10,000 files on hand awaiting review, and over 30,000 complaints that
had yet to be addressed.372 Yet as the Procuracy’s workers clamored for more support, the
government slashed its rolls in the name of cutting costs, placing the remaining staff
under even greater strain.373 As Marc Elie notes, between 1956 and 1957 the Procuracy
and Supreme Court introduced no fewer than three proposals designed to substantively
expedite the rehabilitation process by streamlining review procedures and transferring
unheard cases to specially formed commissions or local courts; the Central Committee
declined to entertain any of these suggestions, and the backlog of petitions and files
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continued to grow apace.374 This refusal on the part of the Party to take decisions that
would simplify and rationalize matters relating to rehabilitation found its analogue in the
government’s handling of death notifications for the families of executed persons, a
critical issue that underscored the regime’s inability to fully free itself from Stalinist
methods of misinformation.
The Duty to Deceive: Official Death Dates and the Toll of Stalinist Repression
The myth of “ten years without the right of correspondence” indelibly marked
Soviet citizens expectations for repressed relatives’ return from the Gulag.375 As
cognizant as they might have been of mass executions during the Terror, many expected
that it was only a matter of time before they were reunited with their loved ones. When
confronted with hundreds of thousands of relatives fearing the worst for their disappeared
loved ones, the post-Stalin Soviet leadership was forced to somehow account for the
absence of persons supposedly serving sentences in the Gulag archipelago without
unveiling the full destructive extent of the purges.376 In seeking to avoid exposing the
repressions’ true toll, the judiciary and state security organs ultimately engendered a
credibility gap in the eyes of the survivors of the repressed, rehabilitated and
unrehabilitated alike. Rather than countering past lies with accurate information, they
opted to promulgate new, often-contradictory deceptions, and as these falsehoods
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compounded they revealed the Soviet government’s struggle to manage its own narrative
of the 1930s and 1940s.
The difficulties authorities faced in sustaining the “ten years without the right of
correspondence” ruse were manifest even as Stalin’s purges began to wind down. During
the spring of 1939 Margarita Aleksandrovna Smol’ianinova, the second wife of Lenin’s
former personal secretary and member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Nikolai
Petrovich Gorbunov, addressed the Procuracy to demand her husband’s release over a
year after he had been taken into custody.377 Smol’ianinova herself had been held in
Butyrka prison for eight months without charges, and though she still trusted that her
husband was alive – due to the NKVD’s assurances – an exchange she had while under
interrogation gave her pause. Smol’ianinova was brought before an investigator – after
six months of neglectful imprisonment – who attempted to cajole her into signing a
denunciation of Gorbunov, insisting that she would never see her husband again: “Why
would I never see my husband (Pochemu nikogda ne vstrechus’ s muzhem)? Had he
really (neuzheli) died or been shot and the NKVD falsely informed me that he had been
sentenced and was in the far camps? Whom to believe?”378 Smol’ianinova repeated this
same query the following December, indicating that her solicitation had gone
unanswered, but only received final confirmation of Gorbunov’s status in 1946. She was
then told he had expired from heart failure in October 1944, though she had been
informed the previous year that he was still serving out his sentence; her local registry
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office (organy zapisi aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia, or ZAGS) refused to provide any
indication of where he had died.379
During the waning years of Stalin’s reign Soviet state security acknowledged that
previous decades’ duplicities were generating significant concerns among the citizenry.
In a memorandum to the Politburo dated October 30, 1951, MGB chairman Semen
Denisovich Ignat’ev outlined the practical challenges that had resulted from the policy of
concealing the Terror’s grim extent, and proposed stopgap measures to satisfy citizens’
curiosity and help see to their material needs. As Ignat’ev observed, by 1951 more than
ten years had elapsed since most of the relevant death sentences had been handed down,
and the rote answers delivered by MGB functionaries could no longer “satisfy the
relatives of the condemned, all the more so because many of them cannot resolve their
legal issues, such as, for example, the registration of a new marriage, claiming
inheritance, establishing custody, and others, without a death certificate for the
condemned.”380 Stymied in their attempts to perform these important tasks, relatives of
the disappeared began “approaching central Party and government organs, and Party and
government leaders, with numerous complaints persistently seeking (dobivaias’) the
receipt of a comprehensive answer about the fate of the condemned,” which in turn had to
go unanswered, as the authorities in question were not permitted to provide them with
answers, assuming that they knew what had become of the individuals in question.381
To ameliorate this situation and dispel the pressure exerted on Party and state
representatives, Ignat’ev deemed it “advisable to amend” the existing protocol in a
number of key regards. Under his proposed schema, immediate relatives of the repressed
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– including parents, spouses, and children – were to be informed “orally” that their loved
one had “died in detention”; to “maintain strict secrecy (strogoi konspiratsii) in this
work” all aspects were to be handled in-house at the MGB, including the drafting of
death certificates at the central apparat and their dissemination in various localities.382
The one exception to this arrangement related to cases that had been heard by the
Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, which would be held responsible for
managing the fallout from its past sessions.383 Although Ignat’ev’s recommendations
were not adopted at the time, most were replicated in subsequent plans introduced
following the vozhd’s death, at which point the number of those seeking information
about missing intimates swelled dramatically.
A more modest proposal for handling questions related to death sentences was put
to Malenkov by Minister of Justice Konstantin Petrovich Gorshenin, Procurator General
Grigorii Nikolaevich Safonov, and Supreme Court Chairman Volin in May 1953.
Reacting to a wave of petitions regarding Soviet citizens executed within the USSR as
well as foreigners in the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, the three
jurists noted that under existing convention these entreaties went “without answer.”384
Though no sweeping suggestions were made vis-à-vis the protocol for transmitting
notifications, the panel did endorse orally informing relations of death sentences, but only
after the Supreme Soviet certified the verdicts and all appeals had been exhausted.385 As
with Ignat’ev’s memorandum, there is no indication that this joint approach found
meaningful consideration among Party higher-ups. A year later, following the shakeup in
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the judiciary occasioned by Beriia’s deposal, acting Chief Military Procurator Evgenii
Ivanovich Varskoi contacted Rudenko with a schema for addressing inquiries about the
fate of people who vanished in past decades, which had begun to pile up.386 Pointing to
the fact that the answers supplicants received depended entirely on the organ to which
they addressed themselves – the KGB continued to maintain that missing persons were
located in “special camps,” while the Military Collegium indicated that they died serving
out their sentences, but provided their actual execution dates – and because these
inventions were accepted “as truth (za istinu),” Varskoi urged the Procurator General to
weigh in on the situation.387
For his own part, Varskoi floated dividing responsibility for replying to such
queries between the KGB for all sentences handed down extrajudicially, and the USSR
Supreme Court for those imposed by the justice system. Although his description of the
status quo implied that Varskoi took exception to the systematic deception currently in
practice, his pitch kept one of its key provisions intact: for individuals convicted from
1950 onward, survivors were to be informed of the actual circumstances of death,
whereas anyone executed prior to May 1947 – when the USSR briefly abolished capital
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punishment – would still be reported as having died in a camp or prison.388 Varskoi’s
pressing concern for the truth apparently extended only to families of the recently
deceased, and made no provision for resolving the uproar that would inevitably arise
among people who had been told for years that their relatives were isolated – but alive –
in the far reaches of the Soviet Union. There is no indication that Rudenko pursued
Varskoi’s bid any further, and the piecemeal approach that had been in place since the
1930s continued to predominate as the rehabilitation process began to gather steam.
From the moment of Isaak Babel’s arrest in May 1939, his second wife, Antonina
Pirozhkova, worked assiduously to determine his whereabouts and condition. Despite the
fact that Babel’ was put to death in January 1940, beginning in 1944 through the early
1950s Pirozhkova received “annual” reassurances from the state security information
office at 24 Kuznetskii most that Babel’ was alive and confined to one of the “far
camps.”389 In August 1952 a certain Zavadskii, who presented himself as a former zek,
approached Pirozhkova with a letter from “Middle Kolyma” that included the sentence,
“How disappointed Babel’ will be after leaving the hospital, that he missed an
opportunity to send a message home,” which appeared to confirm the authorities’ claims
that Babel’ was still among the living.390 Likewise, Boris Efimov, the famed caricaturist
and brother of the purged journalist Mikhail Kol’tsov, maintained that rumors of the
latter’s survival reached him during the 1940s through anonymous phone calls, one of
which included a supposed sighting in the area of Nizhnii Tagil that he attempted to trace

388

GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3286, l. 266-267.
Antonina Pirozhkova, Ia pytaius’ vosstanovit’ cherty: o Babele – i ne tol’ko o nem: vospominaniia, ed.
A. Malaev-Babel’ (Moskva: AST, 2013), 419.
390
Ibid., 423.
389

144
while on a lecture tour of the Urals.391 However, in both cases the hopes of the parties
involved, fostered by seemingly deliberate inventions on the part of the Soviet
government, proved illusory.
Upon Babel’s posthumous rehabilitation in December 1954 Pirozhkova was
summoned to the Military Collegium to receive his spravka. The document listed the date
of Babel’s conviction – January 26, 1940 – but it neither specified the sentence, nor
provided any further details as to his status. Pirozhkova inquired about Babel’s fate, and
the bureaucrat who had handed her the certificate “took a pen and in the margin of a
newspaper lying on the table wrote: ‘Died March 17, 1941 of heart failure’ – and gave it
to me to read. And then he tore this entry out of the newspaper and ripped it up, having
said that I will receive a death certificate from my district ZAGS.”392 Pirozhkova
struggled to reconcile this blunt admission of Babel’s death – the date and cause of which
were fabricated – with the previous decade’s repeated guarantees of his survival. She
contacted Cheptsov and Serov at the Military Collegium and KGB, respectively, to
express her incredulity and seek clarification:
This sequence of responses from year to year attesting that Babel’ is still
alive totally rules out the credibility of the report made to me on
December 23 of this year on Babel’ I.E.’s death in 1941.
In addition, in summer 1952 a man freed from a camp in Middle
Kolyma found me and informed me that Babel’ is alive and healthy.
Thus for me there is absolutely no doubt that through summer
1952 Babel’ was alive and the report of his death in 1941 is erroneous.
I ask you to take all the measures contingent upon you to search
for Babel’ Isaak Emmanuilovich and, having informed me of where he is
staying, allow me to follow after him (vyekhat’ za nim).393

391

M. B. Efimov, On byl “slishkom prytok”…: zhizn’ i kazn’ Mikhaila Kol’tsova (Moskva:
“Khudozhestvennaia literatura,” 2013), 478-479. Many thanks to Steve Norris for bringing this aspect of
the Efimov-Kol’tsov family saga to my attention.
392
Pirozhkova, Ia pytaius’ vosstanovit’ cherty, 422.
393
Ibid., 423-424.

145
These missives went unanswered, and it was not until Pirozhkova took a call from
Kliment Voroshilov’s receptionist urging her on behalf of the Supreme Soviet chairman
to “believe in Babel’s death,” that she visited her local ZAGS branch to collect his death
certificate; “Were he alive,” the receptionist noted, “he would have been home long
ago.”394
Mikhail Kol’tsov was posthumously rehabilitated at the same time as Babel’ –
somewhat fittingly, as they had been shot mere days apart in January and February 1940
– and Boris Efimov received explanations of his brother’s demise that were as perplexing
as those Pirozhkova described. Likely due to his high profile, Efimov managed to secure
a meeting with Cheptsov after getting word of Kol’tsov’s vindication, at which point he
was told that his brother had been dead since 1939 – a rare instance in which fabricated
death date predated the actual one.395 Efimov, balking at this admission given all the
indications he had to the contrary, was urged to return to the Military Collegium after a
month to allow its officials time to verify all the relevant details. During the second
encounter Efimov was again assured that Kol’tsov had died in 1939, and he again
demurred. Finally, two days after this exchange Efimov was summoned back to the same
office at the Military Collegium and furnished with a death certificate listing 1942 as the
year of Kol’tsov’s death. As Efimov’s son recounts, at the time the cartoonist recognized
the revision as yet another “pack of lies (vran’e).”396
The extended Babel’ and Kol’tsov-Efimov families were far from the only ones to
confront contradictory reports about their relatives’ untimely passing. Survivors of the
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“wrongfully repressed,” desperate for any scrap of information, appealed to a host of
state and Party bodies in the course of their inquiries. As there was little if any
coordination among these entities with regard to falsifying vital statistics, petitioners
received myriad responses from different institutions. Rita Kornblium sent a letter in late
1954 to the head of the Soviet Writers’ Union Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Fadeev
complaining that the KGB had previously notified her verbally of Vladimir Kirshon’s
death on July 28, 1948, but despite her repeated entreaties refused to authorize the
issuance of a death certificate for him.397 Unbeknownst to Kornblium, the KGB had
already changed course in the matter; apparently unaware of the initial date that
Kornblium had been provided by word-of-mouth, as early as August 1954 the KGB
pinned Kirshon’s death date at July 27, 1942, and that November Cheptsov authorized
ZAGS to release a death certificate featuring the new date and listing pneumonia as the
cause of death.398
Even those at the top of the party-state leadership looked askance at some of the
falsehoods that proliferated during this period. In his October 1954 letter to Voroshilov,
Zakhar Pertsovskii’s son related that his father had purportedly passed away in 1943, but
the KGB had yet to indicate the circumstances or location. A reader – either Voroshilov
himself or a member of his staff – annotated the year “1943” with a large question mark
in blue pencil as a clear expression of his skepticism.399 The regularity with which such
statements crossed the desks of the elite convinced them that a more permanent, less
haphazard mechanism for notifying relatives of the repressed was in order, though an
enduring solution eluded the Soviet authorities for years to come.
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As chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Voroshilov was personally
responsible for overseeing the body that reviewed decisions on capital punishment, to
which most Soviet citizens directed their complaints and concerns. In late October 1954
the head of the Supreme Soviet’s letters department notified Voroshilov of the new
reality his staff faced: every day they received between 10 and 15 letters from individuals
whose husbands, fathers, and sons had been taken away in 1937 and 1938. Many
remained trapped in a legal limbo of sorts: the missing men were in most instances the
official owners of the homes in which their families resided, and without proof of death
the survivors were powerless to sell or otherwise dispose of this property.400 Others
complained of their inability to obtain official recognition for longstanding relationships.
One man wrote of how “as a Communist and father of five children” he could “no longer
stand to look at himself because of [his] juridical helplessness,” resulting from the fact
that his common-law wife of 12 years’ was still technically married to her first husband,
arrested in 1937, and all of their children bore the latter’s family name.401 The bulk of the
16 representative letters forwarded to Voroshilov, though, centered on the authors’
frustration at the KGB’s refusal to release any information regarding prisoners’
whereabouts. Upon receipt, the Supreme Soviet’s letters department dutifully relayed
these petitions to the KGB for follow-up, where they joined a growing mass of
unresolved supplications.402 The examples brought before him evidently moved
Voroshilov to charge the ministers of Internal Affairs and Justice, along with the
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Procurator General and the chairmen of the KGB and Supreme Court with devising a
solution.403
The following month Kruglov, Gorshenin, Rudenko, Volin, and Serov responded
to Voroshilov and submitted their report on the existing procedure for handling inquiries
about executed individuals. Largely echoing Ignat’ev’s dispatch of over three years prior,
the assembled judicial and state security representatives noted the insufficiency of the
“ten years without the right of correspondence” reply, given citizens’ need to resolve
property and legal matters, but considered it “inadvisable to inform petitioners about their
relatives’ actual punishment, as they were previously issued spravki on the latter being
sentenced to 10 years of incarceration.”404 Their proposal mirrored the substantive points
of Ignat’ev’s recommendations, including giving oral death notices only to immediate
relatives “as a general rule,” the role of ZAGS in cases involving outstanding rights and
estate issues, and the reaffirmation of state security’s control over the issuance of death
certificates. Verdicts issued by state security organs were to remain within the KGB’s
purview, while those originating with the police were referred to the MVD, save cases
heard by the Military Collegium.405 Despite the apparent consensus among the various
bodies involved in compiling this report, the Supreme Soviet failed to adopt its
suggestions, and nearly another year would elapse before the question was settled.
The August 24, 1955 order from KGB head Serov to his regional subordinates
that dictated the official line for handling questions about executed persons diverged little
from the 1951 and 1954 iterations, although by this juncture the Soviet judiciary had been
removed from the decision-making process. In an ostensible effort to rein in the
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miscommunication and inconsistencies that had plagued earlier reporting, Serov asserted
the KGB’s preeminence over all critical aspects of communication with relatives of those
sentenced to capital punishment, except for individuals convicted by the Military
Collegium. Any disclosures were to be made at the discretion of local KGB branches, and
in areas without a KGB presence the police were obligated to solicit the KGB’s written
sanction before proceeding.406 This is not to suggest, however, that Serov’s instructions
were without innovation. For the first time, KGB officers were furnished with explicit
parameters for fabricating death details: dates communicated to ZAGS were to fall within
ten years of the individual’s actual sentencing, and “provisional” causes of death were
likewise to be included in materials sent to ZAGS.407
Furthermore, Serov specified that the “deaths of those sentenced to capital
punishment will be registered according to the same procedure if they have subsequently
been rehabilitated.”408 This indicated that although the posthumously rehabilitated were
officially blameless in the eyes of the regime, this status did not confer upon their
relatives any more right to the truth – or some approximation thereof – than those who
were still viewed as “family members of betrayers of the Motherland.” Finally, Serov
mandated that the dates and causes of death concocted by KGB functionaries be passed
on to the MVD’s First Special Department, which was responsible for recordkeeping, to
ensure that they were preserved in a state repository and could be referenced for later
use.409
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As definitive as Serov’s directive was, its erratic execution ultimately stoked
further confusion and mistrust of the central authorities on the part of its target
population. Agnessa Mironovna-Korol’, the onetime wife of notorious chekist Sergei
Mironov, remembered the experience of claiming her husband’s death certificate at
ZAGS with unveiled bitterness:
After my rehabilitation in 1958, I needed a document verifying Mirosha’s
death. I was told to go to the regional ZAGS. The young girl at the
reception asks, “What is this about? Has someone been born into the
family?”
“No,” I said, “I need a death certificate.”
She gave me a form to fill out. These were the questions: surname,
name, patronymic, date of birth, date of death, cause of death.
“But,” I said, “I don’t know when and why he died.”
She was astonished. “How could you not know?”
Another employee, somewhat older, quiet, said pointedly, “Katya,
this one…” And he pulled a list.
“Ah.” Katya guessed. She looks down the list and finds what she’s
looking for. I see that she writes the date of death. She writes it down, and
I already know that she is writing “February 22, 1940.” Where it asks for
the cause of death, she leaves it blank.
Then she asks for fifty kopeks.
The older employee takes the document from her and writes at the
top “no charge.”
“Oh, I see. They’re paying me fifty kopeks for my murdered
husband. He didn’t die, he was shot.”
Speechless, they averted their eyes.410
When the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR “informed the relatives
of Borovskii E. S., sentenced to capital punishment, that he died May 7, 1938 in
detention” its credibility was undercut by the fact that Izvestiia had already reported
Borovskii’s execution on July 24, 1934. The Party’s separate procedure for adjudicating
posthumous readmissions into its ranks also proved problematic in this regard, as Party
410
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Control Committee workers announced death sentences without compunction, contrary to
the Military Collegium. In the case of one K. F. Litvinenko, the Military Collegium
insisted that he had died in prison in March 1939, but the Karaganda Party obkom
informed his wife of her husband’s execution nearly a year prior in April 1938.411
These embarrassing contradictory moments were highlighted in a unique mid1959 memorandum from Cheptsov’s replacement as Chairman of the Military Collegium,
Viktor Valer’ianovich Borisoglebskii, to Supreme Court Chairman Aleksandr Fedorovich
Gorkin. Writing with remarkable candor, Borisoglebskii enumerated the failings of the
death notification process in place since Stalin’s death and the liabilities it held for the
legitimacy of the Soviet judiciary as well as state institutions at large. Though the
Military Collegium maintained independence from the KGB in these matters, it largely
adhered to the same protocol, which Borisoglebskii denounced as “inherently flawed
(porochnyi)” in that it caused a great deal of “bewilderment among individuals who
address themselves to us, engenders in them distrust of state organs, and in particular of
the USSR Supreme Court, and misinforms a number of state organs, as giving fictitious
dates of death to relatives, we are obliged to give the same information to these
organs.”412 The existing practice eroded public trust and the state’s own ability to control
information, necessitating “an immediate change in the current situation.”413
In many instances the party-state’s organs did not have to work at cross-purposes
for Soviet citizens to “raise their eyebrows” at the discrepancies in accounts promulgated
by the judiciary. Petitioners found it particularly difficult to swallow the notion that all of
the arrested men and women from one locality or enterprise happened to die within a year
411
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or two of their arrest, as articulated by R. M. Itkova, who wrote in search of her husband
M. I. Iktov: “100 people were arrested from the stanitsa and all ended up in the
grave…did they all really (neuzheli) die [of natural causes]?”414 In other trials only some
of the defendants were sentenced to death, and those who survived captivity returned
home to recount what had actually become of their friends, neighbors, and coworkers.
Such confounding accounts were additionally complicated by the fact that – despite
Serov’s instructions – many death dates devised by local state security representatives
were never transmitted to the MVD’s records division, which led the Military Collegium
to invent new dates distinct from the ones relatives had already received.415
The government’s insistence that executed persons had died while serving their
sentences in camps gave rise to a host of persistent complications in the realm of property
rights. In keeping with the established pension regime, some relatives of the
posthumously rehabilitated attempted to calculate the state’s financial obligations to them
based on the time their loved ones purportedly served out in the Far North, while others
insisted that they be granted permission to travel to the camps in order to claim the
savings that their relatives must have accumulated while incarcerated. The “arbitrary
dates of death” that officials selected also spawned what Borisoglebskii described as “a
whole range of material misunderstandings” that precluded individuals from obtaining
what they were rightfully owed.416 The wife of one S. I. Sverdlov remarried after her
husband’s actual death in April 1938, but before the September 1943 date that the
Military Collegium fraudulently registered: “As a result she was denied compensation for
their confiscated property and the receipt of two-months’ salary” that was her due as the
414
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survivor of a posthumously exonerated person.417 Galled as Borisoglebskii was by this
situation, he appeared to be equally or even more concerned by the disservice that the
death notification policy had done to posterity. He recalled that institutions such as
Glavlit, the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin, and the Museum of the Revolution had
approached the Military Collegium
with lists of individuals who in the past rendered great service to the
people, with the request to report whether they had been rehabilitated and
what were their fates. We are obliged to provide the same fictitious date of
death that we gave the condemned’s relatives, and this date appears in
official documents, journals, and autobiographies that are published in our
press.418
As a result of this practice falsified biographical details had been disseminated about
Georgii Lomov-Oppokov, Osip Piatnitskii, Iakov Iakovlev, and Aleksandr Egorov,
among other luminaries.419
Borisoglebskii reported that the Military Collegium’s protocol had recently
“changed slightly,” insofar as citizens were now notified of their relatives’ actual death
date rather than one made from whole cloth, but this generated its own set of problems, as
it was impossible to “coherently explain” the coincidence between people’s sentencing
and their death dates “without revealing the truth (istiny),” which was that there was
usually little to no delay between a death sentence’s passage and its implementation.420
To help resolve this issue, Borisoglebskii endorsed a proposal forwarded by the RSFSR
Ministry of Justice, which entailed orally informing surviving relatives of individuals’
executions, but issuing them death certificates on which the column for “cause of death”
417
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was struck through with a dash.421 Although the extent to which such ongoing
evasiveness about the fate of the repressed satisfied citizens’ curiosity is unclear, the
KGB apparently opted to emulate it when state security decided to revise its own
procedure for notifying next of kin.
By early 1963 the KGB’s new chairman, Vladimir Efimovich Semichastnyi, had
come to acknowledge that the protocol on the books since 1955 was entirely divorced
from realities in the Soviet Union. Framing the 1955 policy in a decidedly benevolent
light, Semichastnyi suggested that it had been established due to the state’s concern that
“notification of the repressed’s actual fate could adversely affect their families’
standing,” and the belief that such revelations could have been picked up “by certain
hostile elements to the detriment of the Soviet state’s interests.”422 Thanks to the work of
the Central Committee “in exposing the illegalities that were authorized during the period
of Stalin’s personality cult,” Soviet citizens had become “aware of mass violations of
socialist legality”; therefore, the rationale for the 1955 order had been rendered
“irrelevant.”423 In light of these factors, Semichastnyi deemed it appropriate to afford
cases within the KGB’s remit – concerning individuals sentenced by extra-judicial bodies
like NKVD troikas – the same consideration as those sentenced by the Military
Collegium and other courts by allowing relatives to be made aware of their deaths,
though not registering this information with ZAGS. However Semichastnyi’s proposal
bore an important caveat: it was intended to apply exclusively to those whose inquiries
were left unanswered under the 1955 protocol. Given that as of 1963 approximately half
of the people extra-judicially sentenced to death had already been posthumously
421
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rehabilitated, and with each passing year the number of new inquiries declined,
Semichastnyi realized that this new, ostensibly more humane approach would only
encompass a relatively small percentage of the families affected by the purges.424
Although they were portrayed as correctives to the harsh measures adopted in the
aftermath of Stalin’s death, neither Borisoglebskii nor Semichastnyi’s schemes addressed
one of the lingering aftereffects of the Soviet government’s deceptions, that being
suspicion of the system that had become engrained in citizens like Pirozhkova, Efimov,
Kornblium, and Itkova, among hundreds of thousands of others. The ways in which the
party-state mismanaged inquiries into the status of the disappeared reveal that, for all
their ambitions to control the dissemination of information about the Bolshevik
experiment’s formative years, the judiciary and other Soviet state bodies were illequipped to coordinate such a concerted undertaking; ultimately hamstrung by the
obligation to conceal the extent of Stalinist state-sanctioned killing, the institutions
involved in formulating death notification policies signaled the Soviet regime’s
unwillingness to reckon fully with the recent past to those who had fervently awaited
answers for the better part of two decades.425
Dethroning the “Queen of Evidence”: Confessions and Chains of Rehabilitation
Procurator General Andrei Vyshinskii, who oversaw the Moscow show trials and
provided much of the Terror with a legal gloss, is notorious for having described
confessions as the “queen of evidence (tsaritsa dokazatel’stv),” a principle that held sway
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for the remainder of the Stalin years.426 The imperative to extract confessions from
prisoners defined the work of the NKVD’s investigative units, and judicial bodies, such
as the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, imposed tens of thousands of death
sentences predicated solely on individuals’ putative admissions, without a since piece of
material evidence. Rudenko made his disdain for this order of affairs clear to Khrushchev
even before his address to the assembly of Procuracy workers. Khrushchev asked
Rudenko of his opinion of the accusations against “Bukharin, Rykov, Syrtsov,
Lominadze, Krestinsky, and many other people who were well known to the Central
Committee […] To what extent was that all well founded?”427 Rudenko replied that
according to “ordinary legal standards there had been no evidence for condemning these
people. Everything was based solely on their personal confessions obtained through
physical and moral torture. Confessions could not serve as the basis for condemning
anyone.”428 While this was a striking condemnation of the Stalinist legal system, what is
perhaps most telling is that of the figures Khrushchev specifically mentioned, only two –
Syrtsov and Krestinskii – were legally rehabilitated during his tenure, in 1957 and 1963,
respectively. Thus, even though the Procurator General was aware that all of the verdicts
against major Party figures from the Great Terror were legally unsound, he allowed them
to stand unchallenged. This is extremely informative when considering the interplay
between judicial norms and political concerns at work in posthumous rehabilitation, for
as the Procuracy dismantled case after case predicated exclusively on forced confessions,
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it did so in accordance with the political demands – such as tarring Beriia’s reputation, or
redeeming Khrushchev’s erstwhile colleagues – and prohibitions of the moment.429
In the opening months of posthumous rehabilitation procurators faced the
imperative to link the subjects of their investigations to the newly minted public enemy
number one, Beriia.430 This task was fairly straightforward in instances where Beriia’s
interactions with the individuals in question were documented, or in which he oversaw
arrests and prosecutions, as was the case with two of the very first individuals to receive
posthumous rehabilitation, Sergo Ordzhonikidze’s older brother Papuliia (also known as
Pavel) and his wife Nina Davydovna. Papuliia’s arrest was widely seen as a retaliatory
move by Beriia against his former mentor, and Rudenko challenged him on the subject
during questionings in August and November 1953.431 In early November Rudenko
introduced protests before the Supreme Court on behalf of Papuliia and Nina
Ordzhonikidze, and over the following weeks both of their convictions were vacated. In
January 1954 – after Beriia’s execution – Rudenko circulated notifications to the couple’s
three daughters and one son informing them of their parents’ exonerations.432 In sharp
contradistinction to the terse spravki that almost all relatives of posthumous rehabilitees
429
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would receive in later years, Rudenko provided the Ordzhonikidze children with a clear
indication of the rationale for and broader significance of their parents’ exoneration.
Rudenko explicated that Papuliia and his wife had been “fully posthumously rehabilitated
of the charges slanderously brought against them by the enemies of the people Beriia,
Kobulov, and Goglidze,” as a part of the “betrayer of the Motherland and agent of foreign
intelligence” Beriia’s campaign against their uncle.433
However, judiciary functionaries were also evidently encouraged to lay cases at
the feet of Beriia and his cohorts in which the latter played no demonstrable role. This
approach was on full display in the Procuracy’s approach to Nikolai Gorbunov’s
exculpation, completed in March 1954. The precedence that Gorbunov’s case was
granted was likely due in no small part to his service during the first three years of Soviet
power as Lenin’s personal secretary; with the Party’s renewed emphasis on “Leninist
norms” such a direct connection to the Bolshevik founder may have afforded Gorbunov
particular consideration. At the moment of his arrest in February 1938 Gorbunov was
permanent secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which purportedly was host to a
“National Center” run by German intelligence. Accused of espionage and terrorism,
Gorbunov and his fellow chemist Petr Ivanovich Dubov received death sentences in
September 1938, while their two co-defendants were given labor camp terms of 15 and
20 years.434
Major General of Justice N. Khokhlov’s report to the Military Collegium from
March 12, 1954 foregrounded many points that would become staples of later
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rehabilitation materials: Gorbunov’s arrest “by enemies of the people” had been carried
out “without a procurator’s sanction,” and the ensuing investigation was “conducted with
gross violations of [procedural] norms,” such as the omission of the initial transcripts of
Gorbunov’s interrogations and his reactions to the charges pressed against him from the
case file.435 Aside from Gorbunov’s own pretrial testimony – which he retracted in court
– and statements from other arrestees, the Procuracy could not uncover any “objective
information” supporting the existence of a “National Center” within the Academy of
Sciences or ties to German spies.436 Khokhlov contended that materials from the file of
Gorbunov’s surviving codefendant Pavel Alekseevich Chekin made it “evident that
knowingly false testimony on the fabricated case of the Russian illegal national-fascist
organization (the “national center”) that supposedly existed within the USSR Academy of
Sciences was collected at the order of the now unmasked enemies of the people Beriia
and Kobulov” through “forbidden investigative methods.”437 Claiming that these
constituted the “genuine reasons (istinnykh prichinakh)” that Gorbunov and his
colleagues perjured themselves, Khokhlov successfully pressed the Military Collegium to
rescind its verdict from September 1938.438
However, the causality Khokhlov outlined before the court was itself dubious, if
not entirely impossible. Beriia was only summoned to Moscow to serve as Ezhov’s
deputy – and eventual replacement – at the NKVD in late August 1938; Kobulov, one of
his most trusted associates, remained in Georgia until the middle of the following month,
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when he assumed control of the NKVD’s secret-political department.439 It therefore is
doubtful that Beriia or his proxies would have taken any interest in Gorbunov’s case, as
he had already been imprisoned for some six months prior to Beriia’s arrival in the
capital, and was condemned within weeks of the latter’s appointment to the central
security apparat. Yet by invoking the disgraced secret police chief Khokhlov and his
fellow procurators situated Gorbunov’s persecution within the narrative that at the time
held the most currency for the Party leadership. This point was driven home by the fact
that, in his brief summary of the “National Center” members’ rehabilitation prepared for
Khrushchev, Rudenko went so far as to allege that the entire case had been fabricated at
Beriia and Kobulov’s impetus, decisively dismissing chronology in the interest of
implicating the new authorities’ foremost public enemy.440
Aleksandr Kosarev’s rehabilitation report – one of the earliest submitted to the
Central Committee Presidium for approval, on August 4, 1954 – is indicative of the
material the Procuracy avidly seized upon as the anti-Beriia furor reached its apex. As
early as 1934 Kosarev had aired reservations about Beriia’s leadership style in the
Caucasus before a “narrow circle of Komsomol and Party workers,” which made their
way back to Beriia and caused Kosarev considerable concern.441 Even more worrying,
though, was when Beriia challenged Kosarev regarding the content of the toast delivered
in Bagirov’s presence referenced by Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva. While giving evidence
against Bagirov, Naneishvili-Kosareva recalled that at a political meeting Kosarev
“encountered Beriia, who in an accusatory tone began to demand why my husband did
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not consider him, Beriia, a true Party leader […] Beriia explained that he had the whole
story from Bagirov (emu vse izvestno so slov Bagirova).”442
In Rudenko’s retelling, Beriia went to great lengths in order to avenge himself on
Kosarev. The procurator general noted with clear approbation that upon his first
interrogation and during in-person confrontations with other prisoners Kosarev
“categorically denied” the “treasonous” and “treacherous” actions that had been imputed
to him, conceding only that he had erred in recruiting some members of the Komsomol
leadership. When apprised of this resistance, Beriia ordered NKVD Investigative Section
Deputy Chief Lev Leonidovich Shvartsman – whose testimony from July 1954 provided
the basis for much of Rudenko’s reconstruction of Kosarev’s time in prison – to “employ
measures of physical coercion against Kosarev and extract a confession from him.”
Kosarev was worked over “savagely” until, as Shvartsman attested, “having grasped the
hopelessness (bezvykhodnost’) of his situation, [he] agreed to testify about his hostile
work,” which supposedly included preparations for “open, armed struggle against Soviet
power.”443 At Beriia’s insistence this confession was then grafted onto the transcript of
the earlier interrogation in which Kosarev maintained his innocence, and the resulting
document was circulated widely within the NKVD so that, as Beriia allegedly told
Shvartsman, the “echelons” could see “the process of Kosarev’s active incrimination.”444
Kosarev ultimately confessed to the charges against him before the Military
Collegium, and his death sentence was carried out on February 23, 1939. That Kosarev
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failed to denounce “the false confession (samoogovore), beatings, and tortures can only
be explained,” Rudenko concluded, “by the fact that Beriia and Shvartsman resorted to
deception, that is they promised to spare Kosarev’s life if he confirmed his fictitious
testimony in court.”445 Rudenko presented this uncorroborated contention, alongside the
evidence from Kosarev’s dossier, and the reprisals against Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva
and Elena Kosareva – both of whom had already been cleared of all charges against them
– as confirmation of Beriia’s determination to “[do] away with Kosarev as a person who
was inconvenient and dangerous to him (s neugodnym i opasnym dlia nego
chelovekom).”446
Beriia’s involvement in individuals’ prosecution, or even the mere mention of his
name in relation to the charges pressed, was in many instances taken as proof positive of
innocence. Ruben Gusakovich Rubenov (born Mkrtchian) served in a variety of Party
positions throughout the 1930s, including as Bagirov’s direct predecessor within
Azerbaijan’s Central Committee; his arrest in September 1937 and execution that
November were put down to his affiliation with Lomanidze’s alleged Trotskyite terrorist
group. Yet Baranov’s October 1954 ex post facto briefing to Khrushchev on the case –
which was reopened at the latter’s behest after he received a petition from Rubenov’s
daughter – made only fleeting reference to Rubenov’s supposed allegiance to Lominadze.
Instead, it dealt in bulk with a pair of written declarations Rubenov wrote within a week
or so of being taken into custody, in which he admitted to belonging to a group of former
445
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Transcaucasian leaders who “spoke openly about Beriia’s ties to the Musavat secret
police” and “through various avenues, including by using their close relations with Sergo
Orzhonikidze, sought to remove Beriia from the leadership of Transcaucasia and
Georgia.”447 Although it is not entirely clear whether Baranov intended to endorse the
existence of such a plot, his tight focus on this aspect of Rubenov’s file – and relative
disinterest in other particulars thereof – is strongly indicative of the exculpatory
significance with which past resistance to Beriia – either actual or alleged – was imbued.
Not only was resistance to Beriia taken as evidence of individual rectitude, it further
obviated the need to substantively engage other charges with which the posthumously
rehabilitated had been impugned.
Baranov recommended that Levan Gogoberidze’s immediate predecessor as Party
Secretary of Georgia, Mikhail Kakhiani – who finished his career at the Party Control
Commission – be rehabilitated in March 1955. As a Georgian Party leader whose tenure
predated Beriia’s rise, and who maintained a continuous relationship with Sergo
Ordzhonikidze, Kakhiani conformed perfectly to the profile the Procuracy had drawn
over the previous year of those Beriia found “disagreeable to him (neugodnymi emu).”448
While under questioning conducted by Beriia and members of his retinue from the
Georgian NKVD, Kakhiani divulged that he had disseminated “counterrevolutionary
calumnies” about Beriia and conspired alongside Mamiia Orakhelashvili to perpetrate an
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act of terrorism against his person.449 Yet by dint of the fact that the Supreme Court had
officially recognized Orakhelashvili as innocent of all the charges leveled against him,
Baranov was able to discount this aspect of Kakhiani’s confession out of hand. He
observed that the Procuracy’s scrutiny of “analogous cases” to Kakhiani’s – including
those of Orakhelashvili, Gogoberidze, and Papuliia Orzhonikidze – had revealed “that
Beriia, in doing away with individuals tied to S. Ordzhonikidze, falsified criminal cases
against them and, while eliciting false testimony from arrestees, was executing
(rasstrelival) people who were known to be innocent.”450 Kakhiani’s rehabilitation report
thus gave expression to the emerging self-reinforcing logic of the Procuracy’s work: as
more and more individuals’ cases were deemed eligible for judicial review the Procuracy
acquired a growing stable of individuals whose example could be invoked to provide
justification for subsequent exculpations. This pool of already-rehabilitated Old
Bolsheivks provided investigators with a new, ever-expanding avenue through which to
reassess past miscarriages of justice.
Despite the anti-Beriia wave that animated much of the Procuracy’s early
rehabilitation work, there were notable instances in which Beriia’s involvement in
prosecutions went largely unexploited. Writing to Malenkov and Khrushchev in January
1954, Sergei Kas’ian’s widow Sof’ia Aleksandrovna was sure to note in her opening
sentence that the Soviet media had brought to her attention the “vile atrocities of the
archenemy of the people, the betrayer of the Motherland Beriia and his accomplices.”451
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Having provided an exhaustive summary of Kas’ian’s revolutionary bona fides dating
back to 1905, Sof’ia Aleksandrovna explained that it was precisely Beriia who dragged
her husband before the Georgian Party Collegium in July 1936 and engineered his
expulsion for Trotskyism. Kas’ian stood accused of translating the “Platform of the 83” –
the same document for which Liusia Petrosian was imprisoned – into Armenian, although
no copy was produced as evidence.452 After over a year of fruitless protests to both the
local Party apparat and the center, Kas’ian was informed on September 15, 1937 of his
readmission to the Party and instructed to report the following morning at 10 am to
collect his Party card; the Georgian NKVD appeared at the Kas’ian family apartment at 5
am.453 Sof’ia Aleksandrovna concluded that this action – which directly contravened the
spirit of the Party Control Commission’s ruling – could only been orchestrated personally
by Beriia.454
By the time the judiciary got around to hearing Kas’ian’s case it had begun to
gradually shift away from explanations for the Terror predicated on personal enmity, and
for all of Sof’ia Kas’ian’s insistence that her husband was undone by Beriia’s
machinations, the late secret police chief’s name surprisingly appeared only twice in the
Procuracy’s protest before the USSR Supreme Court’s Judicial Collegium of February
28, 1955. Beriia was mentioned solely in reference to the alleged objectives of Kas’ian’s
counterrevolutionary organization, which sought to separate Armenia from the USSR and
plotted a terrorist attack against the then-face of Soviet power in Transcaucasia.455 No
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allusion was made to Beriia’s supposed role in Kas’ian’s removal from the Party, or the
suspicious timing of the latter’s arrest. The vast majority of Deputy Procurator General
Salin’s text instead concerned itself with the web of contradictory accounts that Kas’ian
and his accused cohorts generated while in detention. Four other Caucasian Old
Bolsheviks – A. Kh. Khumarian, A. S. Kakhoian, A. S. Minasian, and A. I. Melikian –
were supposed to have joined Kas’ian in his endeavor to undermine Bolshevik rule.456
Yet when the Procuracy’s investigators compared the timelines that each man presented
for the initial formation and expansion of their circle glaring inconsistencies began to
emerge: Khumarian maintained that no one actively recruited him into the organization,
at the head of which stood Kas’ian, but Kas’ian was on the record as having said that
Khumarian inducted him. Kakhoian first suggested that Minasian had turned him to
Trotskyism as early as 1928, but later averred that it was not until a 1935 meeting at
Kas’ian’s apartment that their seditious company took shape.457 [Such lack of consensus
on the very circumstances under which the group was formed sparked questions within
the Procuracy over whether it existed at all, and disqualified all of the cited testimony as
proof of Kas’ian’s criminality.458
Even though it was never raised during the Georgian NKVD’s investigation of
Kas’ian, the Procuracy’s Department for Special Cases also weighed in on the issue of
the purported translation of the “Platform of the 83” into Armenian that cost him his
Party membership. An investigator from the Georgian Party Collegium acknowledged
that he never saw a version of the disputed document among the materials presented
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Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 196-203.
456
For Kakhoian’s children’s dealings with Mikoian see Chapter One.
457
GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, ll. 27-28.
458
GARF f. 8131, op. 31, d. 46019, l. 28.

167
against Kas’ian. Likewise, the republican MVDs of both Georgia and Armenia possessed
no “compromising materials” on Kas’ian, and the Armenian archives offered no
indication that any such translation existed in their holdings. Salin therefore found it
impossible to establish – authorship notwithstanding – whether an Armenian text of the
“Platform of the 83” had in actuality ever been produced.459 Given the paucity of credible
evidence against Kas’ian, Salin called for the ruling of the NKVD troika against him to
be expunged, and, as he reported to Mikoian, the USSR Supreme Court endorsed his
conclusions in late March 1955.460 The following summer Melikian, Khumarian, and
Kakhoian were in turn cleared of all charges against them; Kas’ian’s exoneration was
duly invoked in each of their files, marking one of the earliest instances of “chain”
rehabilitation, whereby the exoneration of one member of a fictitious
counterrevolutionary circle served as a wedge by which the Procuracy and Supreme
Court could “break open” the associated cases.461
At first glance Aleksandr Svanidze’s case appeared to fit neatly into the dominant
anti-Beriia narrative, but it took on a decidedly different hue when placed in the
judiciary’s hands. Prompted by Bogdan Kobulov’s admission under interrogation that he
had a “personal interest in the fate” of the Svanidze family, and Dzhonrid Svanidze’s
protestations about his father’s innocence – likely forwarded by Mikoian – the Procuracy
approached the Svanidze dossier in December 1955 with little to no outward concern for
the delicate issues of Beriia and Stalin’s personal culpability that the case raised.
Rudenko’s report dating December 21 to the Plenum of the Supreme Court – which, as
the body that both rescinded and reinstated Svanidze’s capital punishment in 1941, was
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authorized to clear his record – acknowledged the issue of the multiple judgments against
Svanidze, yet no effort was made to extrapolate that this was somehow indicative of the
case’s compromised nature.462 Instead, as with other posthumous rehabilitations, the
Procurator General honed in on the testimony that Svanidze’s peers had been induced to
give against him, as well as the offences to which Svanidze himself had confessed.
Rudenko’s task was complicated by the fact that while under interrogation
Svanidze acknowledged having worked on behalf of German intelligence, belonging to a
Rightist organization, and wrecking. The Procurator General therefore emphasized
Svanidze’s repeated denials as the initial investigation against him progressed. When
pressed by his jailers, Svanidze attributed his false statements to “being overcome by
weakness, a ‘mental blackout (zatemnenie mozgov),’ that only cleared up after some
time”; once Svanidze regained his senses “he was shocked that he could tell so many
falsehoods about himself.”463 As Kosarev and others’ rehabilitations attest, the Procuracy
did not shy away from recognizing instances of chekist brutality, but with no concrete
evidence to that effect Rudenko allowed Svanidze’s words to stand as an indication of the
coercion to which he was most likely subjected. Rudenko cast further doubt on the
veracity of Svanidze’s admission of guilt by noting that in the interrogation transcripts of
those he named as his Rightist co-conspirators – including Avel’ Enukidze, and Grigorii
Sokol’nikov – “one does not come across Svanidze (po pokazaniiam etikh lits SVANIDZE
ne prokhodit).”464 In the absence of independent corroboration, Rudenko dismissed
462
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Svanidze’s disputed testimony outright, but he still had to contend with the declarations
the latter’s contemporaries made under questioning.
In the years immediately preceding and following Svanidze’s disappearance from
the Government House many of his Transcaucasian revolutionary peers also found
themselves in state custody and under heavy pressure to implicate the onetime Gosbank
deputy chairman. Among those coerced into pointing fingers at Svanidze were Mariia
Orakhelashvili (Mamiia’s wife), Shalva Eliava, Shamshe Lezhava, and Levan
Gogoberidze. Rudenko operated within the self-reinforcing logic of rehabilitation to
discredit each of these (involuntary) accusers in turn. Given that the Military Collegium
had already cleared Mariia Orakhelashvili of any wrongdoing, the knowledge she
claimed to have had of Svanidze’s counterrevolutionary activities was immediately
rendered suspect: what could an innocent woman know of such nefarious deeds?
Lezhava’s statements were likewise gainsaid by the mention of Mamiia Orakhelashvili
among “Svanidze’s accomplices in anti-Soviet work,” because all the charges against
Mamiia had previously been dismissed, and thus there could not have been any
conspiracy in which he had a hand.465
Eliava’s supposed statements were rendered suspect by their implausible timing.
The Georgian NKVD conducted its final interrogation of Eliava on July 17, 1937, nearly
five months prior to Svanidze’s arrest, and according to Rudenko, the latter did not figure
at all in Eliava’s last round of testimony. On December 3 of that year an NKVD troika
handed down a death sentence against Eliava, which, in keeping with standing protocol,
was carried out almost immediately. Yet the Eliava transcript that found its way into
465
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Svanidze’s file –certified by Bogdan Kobulov – was dated December 4, suggesting that
the statements therein had been made postmortem.466 Though Rudenko could not
similarly question the veracity of Gogoberidze’s disclosures, the fact that they were
“imprecise and contradictory” and that Gogoberidze had disavowed them before the
Military Collegium was taken as a clear indication that neither he nor Svanidze had been
involved in any demonstrable wrongdoing. After establishing the speciousness of the
charges against Svanidze of financial dereliction and Georgian nationalism, Rudenko
pushed for all three of the Supreme Court’s rulings against Svanidze to be suppressed.467
Strikingly absent from this précis was any intimation of personal animus on
Beriia’s part as a factor in Svanidze’s ultimate fate; despite Khrushchev’s eventual
embrace of the narrative that Beriia turned Stalin against Svanidze, the Procuracy and
Supreme Court made little effort to implicate the state security leader in Svainidze’s
untimely death.468 Beriia only appeared twice in Rudenko’s account of Svanidze’s
persecution: it was evidently “at the enemy of the people Beriia’s order” that Svanidze
was executed immediately following the reversal of his commutation, and he was
mentioned as the target of an assassination plot into which Eliava purportedly enlisted
Svanidze.469 In its January 19, 1956 ruling, the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court –
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chaired by Cheptsov – reiterated Rudenko’s findings nearly verbatim.470 Such stinting use
of Beriia as justification for Svanidze’s exculpation stood as a far cry from previous
efforts that liberally invoked his name as a means of demonstrating select Communists’
innocence. This strongly suggests that as the posthumous rehabilitation process came into
its own, within the judiciary the task of excoriating Beriia for his trespasses against
Soviet legality assumed less urgency in favor of a new operating logic predicated on the
existence of a critical mass of prior exonerations that could be drawn upon to help clear
the names of the as-yet unrehabilitated. This rationale began to manifest itself in a cluster
of rehabilitations of those who had close working and personal ties to First Secretary
Khrushchev.
Khrushchev began his career in Khar’kov – then the seat of the Ukrainian SSR’s
government – working directly under Nikolai Nesterovich Demchenko, the chairman of
the local Central Committee’s organizational department. Recalling his early days in the
Party apparat Khrushchev professed his great respect for Demchenko, who, he was sure
to note, “deserved it.”471 When Demchenko was transferred to the Kiev district
committee Khrushchev followed, and was willing to continue to serve alongside him
“indefinitely,” had Khrushchev not decided to pursue studies at the Industrial Academy
in Moscow.472 Yet after 1929 the two men’s paths diverged dramatically, and while
Khrushchev’s took him to the Kremlin, Demchenko’s ultimately led to an execution
chamber. Convicted on October 29, 1937 of participation in an “anti-Soviet conspiratorial
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center in Ukraine” after a five-minute hearing before the Military Collegium, Demchenko
was shot the following day.473 In his comparatively brief treatment of the materials
against Demchenko from November 10, 1954, Rudenko made much of the fact that
Ul’rikh and his subordinates ploughed forward with proceedings despite the fact that in
court Demchenko recanted the self-incriminatory statements he made under interrogation.
The transcript from the Military Collegium session stated that testimony from Red Army
Commander Iona Emmanuilovich Iakir had been “entered into the record (oglasheny)” –
presumably as a counterweight to Demchenko’s denials – but the Procuracy’s probe
found no copy appended to Demchenko’s file; when investigators subsequently revisited
materials on Iakir they discovered that at no point did he give any testimony relating to
Demchenko.474 Rudenko dismissed the allegations from other Party officials that made
their way into Demchenko’s file with the popular formulation of being “vague and
contradictory,” and thereby cleared the way for the first of Khrushchev’s mentors to be
posthumously vindicated.
An even more pronounced connection to Iakir – and, by extension, Khrushchev –
was on display in the communiqué Rudenko prepared regarding Semen Zakharovich
Korytnyi. Korytnyi was married to Iakir’s sister, Izabella, and had become acquainted
with Khrushchev while living in Kiev; eventually he served as Khrushchev’s subordinate
in Moscow’s Krasnaia Presnaia district. Khrushchev professed to have admired Korytnyi
as “a practical and efficient man, a good organizer, and a good speaker,” and their
camaraderie apparently extended beyond the professional.475 The two men were
neighbors at the storied Government House on ulitsa Serafimovicha, sharing a balcony
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between their apartments, and both had dachas at Ogarevo – the tsarist-era estate – where
their families would socialize. When in the capital, Iakir would join in these gatherings;
shortly before his arrest he and Khrushchev took a long walk together around the grounds
of Ogarevo, an encounter that Khrushchev feared would come back to haunt him.476
Evidently stricken by the implications of his brother-in-law’s detention, Korytnyi
suffered a heart attack, only to be plucked out of his hospital bed by NKVD agents
several months later, the evening after Khrushchev paid him a visit. Dismayed that “an
entirely honorable and irreproachable person” could fall under suspicion, Khrushchev
assured himself that Korytnyi had fallen under Iakir’s pernicious influence, and his trust
had been misplaced.477
Whatever doubts Khrushchev may have harbored regarding Korytnyi’s reliability
apparently did not long survive Stalin’s demise, and he endorsed the findings of
Korytnyi’s case review on December 11, 1954. The document assigned particular
significance to the fact that for the first two months of his captivity the physically
diminished Korytnyi managed to resist exhortations to confess to state crimes, before
succumbing to pressure from Viktor Abakumov. During his hearing before the Military
Collegium held in August 1939 – some two years after he first gave testimony – Korytnyi
disavowed his previous admissions, which provided the Procuracy with a pretext to shunt
them aside without addressing their substance. Despite Korytnyi and Iakir’s familial ties,
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none of the members of the putative “Trotskyite Anti-Soviet Military Organization”
identified Korytnyi as a fellow conspirator.478 Another purported Trotskyite within
Moscow’s Party organization to whom Korytnyi had been tied, Evgeniia Solomonovna
Kogan, had herself been posthumously rehabilitated the previous month, further
contributing to the conclusion that Korytnyi had been “unjustly convicted based on
unverified and falsified materials.”479
Before long, Korytnyi himself was being invoked to substantiate the exculpation
of another one of the figures who followed Khrushchev from Kiev to Moscow, Natan
Veniaminovich Margolin. Margolin had been a protégé of Kaganovich’s in the Ukrainian
underground, and worked alongside Khrushchev in Kiev before both matriculated at the
Industrial Academy in Moscow. While Khrushchev was in charge of Krasnaia Presnaia,
Margolin was entrusted with the Bauman district; knowing Margolin as a “tried and
tested comrade,” Khrushchev could not “accept the idea that [he] was an enemy of the
people.”480 Baranov’s summary of the case against Margolin from late March 1955 noted
that the major grounds for his conviction were his own self-incriminatory statements as
well as “notes appended to [his] file” drawn from Korytnyi and another Moscow Party
leader’s testimony.481 In the face of such a paucity of evidence, the fact of Korytnyi’s
prior rehabilitation helped to expedite the redemption of one of his fellow Muscovite
party secretaries.
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The Procuracy and KGB’s joint report on Grigorii Naumovich Kaminskii – who
at the time of his arrest in June 1937 held the post of USSR People’s Commissar of
Health – spanned the divide between the memoranda foregrounding Beriia’s personal
grudges and ones that drew upon Khrushchev’s network of affiliates from Ukraine and
Moscow. Kaminskii and Beriia had a longstanding acquaintance dating back – like so
many of Beriia’s associations – to Civil War-era Baku, where Kaminskii held multiple
responsible posts.482 Apparently it was Kaminskii who in 1920 first received allegations
of Beriia having served in the Musavat counterintelligence, prompting the special Party
inquiry that ultimately “rehabilitated” Beriia.483 This incident seems to have rankled
Kaminskii, though, and some 17 years later, at the June 1937 Central Committee Plenum,
he directed his ire at the ascendant Transcaucasian Party head. Khrushchev was present
for this oration, and in his memoirs related what this “forthright, sincere person, loyally
devoted to the party, a man of uncompromising truthfulness” stated:
All those speaking here have told everything they know about others. I
would also like to say something, so that it will be known to the party.
When I was sent to Baku in 1920 and worked there as a secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and chairman of
the Baku Soviet, persistent rumors were circulating that Comrade Beria,
who is present here, during the occupation of Baku [by the British]
collaborated with the counterintelligence services of the Musavat and even
that somewhat earlier he had collaborated with British
counterintelligence.484
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In Khrushchev’s telling, this broadside was met with silence among those in attendance,
and he implied that Kaminskii was subsequently taken into custody on the third day of
the plenum in retaliation for having challenged the NKVD leadership.485
Even in the face of the documented animosity between Kaminskii and Beriia – of
which Rudenko was certainly aware, given that he conducted Beriia and Bagirov’s
interrogations – the Procuracy did not seize upon Kaminskii’s case as eagerly as those of
other old Party fighters from the Caucasus. On February 12, 1955 Kaminskii’s daughter
complained to Bulganin that her appeal on behalf of her parents had been languishing at
the Chief Military Procuracy since May 1954 without any apparent progress or
resolution; Bulganin shortly thereafter dashed off an order for Rudenko, Baranov, and
Serov to “promptly present a proposal,” and within four days Baranov and Serov’s
findings were put to the Presidium.486 This tight timeframe may account for the relative
brevity of Kaminskii’s report, as well as the absence of any detail relating to his hostile
interactions with Beriia, but the fact that Baranov and Serov chose to highlight the
glaring contradictions between the various depositions that supposedly incriminated
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Kaminskii shows how much proof for posthumous rehabilitation could be found in
simply reading the evidence that the NKVD cited to make its own cases.
While under interrogation Kaminskii admitted to membership in a “diversionaryterrorist organization,” but when brought before the Military Collegium – which heard
the case, as Baranov and Serov portentously noted, for all of fifteen minutes, including
the pronouncement of the death sentence – he maintained that he did not “feel himself to
be an enemy of the people.”487 Placing considerable stock in Kaminskii’s professed
loyalty to the Soviet cause, the Procuracy and KGB denigrated the evidence against him
as “contradictory and unconfirmed in court.”488 In particular, Kaminskii was alleged to
have been inducted into the Rightist conspiracy by Bukharin himself in 1929, and
thereafter thrown in with Rykov, Aleksandr Petrovich Smirnov, and Daniil Egorovich
Sulimov, the former RSFSR Sovnarkom chairman. Yet state functionaries’ renewed
scrutiny of materials from Bukharin, Rykov, and Smirnov’s investigative files revealed
that none of the three mentioned Kaminskii among their confederates; only Sulimov
claimed knowledge of Kaminskii’s Rightism, but he purportedly learned of it secondhand, via Rykov. This assertion flew in the face of Kaminskii’s pre-trial testimony,
wherein he identified direct orders from Sulimov and Nikolai Antipov as the impetus for
his creation of a “wrecking organization (vreditel’skaia organizatsiia)” within the
People’s Commissariat of Health.489 These inconsistencies were sufficiently glaring – in
the eyes of the Procuracy and KGB – to constitute grounds for the reversal of
Kaminskii’s conviction from February 1938.
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The aftereffects of Kaminskii’s rehabilitation – which the Military Collegium
finalized on March 2, 1955 – manifested themselves with remarkable rapidity. That
month at least two of his putative cohorts, Mark Belen’kii – Mikoian’s onetime deputy –
and Zhosef Isaakovich Meerzon, were deemed deserving of rehabilitation by the
Procuracy.490 In his assessments submitted to the Central Committee, Baranov
foregrounded Kaminskii’s central role in both men’s condemnations: Kaminskii was the
first of several plotters listed with whom Belen’kii acknowledged being “closely
associated,” while Meerzon identified Kaminskii as the party responsible for initiating
him into anti-Soviet activities.491 Yet as Baranov observed, neither Belen’kii nor
Meerzon appeared in the statements extorted from Kaminskii, and due to the latter’s
recent exculpation any allegations of criminality on his part could not anchor charges
against others. With no further “compromising materials” forthcoming, Baranov
motioned to have Belen’kii and Meerzon’s cases dismissed. Another effect of
Kaminskii’s rehabilitation –one that was perhaps of even greater consequence – was its
tentative breaching of the until-that-point impermeable barrier that placed all cases linked
to the Moscow Show Trials beyond the judiciary’s scrutiny.
From Liability to Asset: The Transformation of Nikolai Antipov
Perhaps best known today as one of the figures excised from the photograph that
appears in various iterations on the cover of David King’s study of image manipulation
under Stalin, The Commissar Vanishes, Nikolai Kirillovich Antipov was a leading
Leningrad Bolshevik (and rival of Kirov’s) who held a series of key positions within the
Party and government beginning in 1923; at the time of his arrest in June 1937 he was a
490
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member of the Central Committee, as well as both chairman of the Soviet Control
Commission and deputy chairman of the USSR Sovnarkom. The authorities briefly
mooted trying him alongside Bukharin and Rykov in open court, and though they
ultimately opted to sentence him in camera, references to Antipov as an organizer and
accomplice of the “Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rightists and Trotskyites” proliferated throughout
the draft indictment and transcripts of the Third Moscow Trial.492 As rehabilitation
materials and first-hand accounts indicate, over the thirteen months that Antipov spent in
state custody he denounced dozens of fellow Old Bolsheviks as would-be spies,
saboteurs, and assassins.493 During a jailhouse confrontation with longtime friend and
colleague Vlas Iakovlevich Chubar’ at which Molotov – their former superior – was
present, Antipov produced a litany of seditious utterances that Chubar’ had supposedly
voiced in his presence.494 Chubar’, who had not yet been officially detained, indignantly
assailed Antipov as “such a snake” that Chubar’ had “held to [his] breast,” and a
“provocateur”; though Molotov left the scene unconvinced of the veracity of Antipov’s
allegations, he was certain that neither man could be trusted further.495
Khrushchev also reported that Stalin leveraged Antipov’s volubility as a means of
testing his subordinates. He recalled receiving an urgent summons to join Stalin and
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Molotov for a stroll around the Kremlin, when the vozhd’ suddenly turned to him and
announced – in what Khrushchev characterized as “the kind of joke that could turn your
hair gray” – “Antipov is giving testimony against you.”496 Incredulous, Khrushchev
insisted that this was impossible, because Antipov had nothing on him; he surmised that
Stalin was closely watching for any telltale reaction to the allegation, and, refusing to be
unmanned by this feint, Khrushchev claimed to have withstood Stalin’s “psychological
provocation.”497 Eventually Antipov’s utility as a means of testing other apparatchiks’
loyalty waned, and on July 26, 1938 both Stalin and Molotov signed off on a list of over
130 Party and state notables whose cases were set to be heard before the Military
Collegium under the “first category” – meaning the death penalty – which included
Antipov’s name.498 Two days later sentence was passed and carried out on Antipov, and
as the images King features so aptly demonstrate, he was quickly and thoroughly excised
from the official depictions of the triumphant march to socialism.
Antipov first reemerged in the Procuracy’s December 1954 rehabilitation
proposal for Izrail’ Mikhailovich Kleiner, a onetime chairman of Sovnarkom’s
Procurement Committee whose case was brought to the judiciary’s attention by
Mikoian.499 While under NKVD questioning Kleiner identified Antipov as the head of
the alternate Rightist center from whom he took his marching orders, and although he
eventually insisted in court that he had “worked honestly through the years,” Rudenko’s
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deputy Pavel Vladimirovich Baranov pointed out that Kleiner failed to disassociate
himself from Antipov.500 It was therefore incumbent upon Baranov to demonstrate that
any dealings that might have existed between Antipov and Kleiner did not constitute
“incontrovertible proof” of criminality on the latter’s part.501
Antipov testified during his own interrogation that he had become acquainted
with Kleiner in late 1935 through Rykov, and for the next two years he delegated acts of
sabotage to Kleiner on behalf of the Rightist movement. Baranov cast doubt upon these
statements because no corresponding testimony from Rykov could be located, and they
were contradicted by the conclusions of a “special expert examination (spetsial’noi
ekspertizy)” of Kleiner’s file and other archival documents, though he declined to
indicate how precisely these materials diverged from one another. Most telling, though,
was a select quotation from State Security Major Zinovii Naumovich Glebov-Iufa,
Antipov’s lead interrogator, who described his subject as “the type of prisoner who is
ready to give any testimony in any direction.”502 Baranov thereby predicated his
argument for Kleiner’s innocence on the fundamental unsoundness of Antipov’s
testimony. At no point did he appear to suggest that this should occasion the reopening of
other dossiers in which Antipov was cited as a material witness, and in the year and a half
interval between Kleiner and Antipov’s rehabilitations the operating protocol for
addressing the latter’s appearances in others’ case files remained fairly consistent,
foregrounding Antipov’s unreliability as a witness.
Under NKVD inducement some Party and state officials, such as Kaminskii and
Nikolai Vasil’evich Krylenko, declared that Antipov and his confederate Sulimov had
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inducted them into the Right Opposition, but neither of the supposed ringleaders
confirmed this testimony, making it all the easier for the Procuracy to discount it when
the former Commissars of Health and Justice, respectively, came up for consideration.503
Of those Antipov actually incriminated while in custody, over a dozen had their cases
posthumously dismissed in the three years following Stalin’s death. In each of these
instances, procurators were compelled to find grounds upon which to write off Antipov’s
statements without explicitly suggesting that he was no more an “enemy of the people”
than those currently undergoing rehabilitation, as for the time being his legal standing
remained beyond their mandate. In Nikolai Gikalo’s case, this entailed emphasizing the
questionable timing of Antipov and others’ avowals. Rudenko, writing with Vladimir
Luk’ianov from the Party Control Committee, intimated that Antipov’s words “[did] not
inspire confidence” by virtue of the fact that they were “obtained […] only after Gikalo’s
arrest,” implying that Gikalo’s imprisonment could possibly have prejudiced this
evidence, and because they were contradicted or entirely refuted by other witness
testimony.504 A three-year discrepancy in the dates that Antipov provided for when he
and RSFSR Commissar for Light Industry Konstantin Vasil’evich Ukhanov purportedly
founded their “reserve center” was likewise zeroed in on to give lie to the notion of
Ukhanov’s guilt.505 Chubar’s Rightist-Trotskyite activities were called into question
because Antipov’s “circumstantial” testimony was predicated entirely on allusions to
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other Party figures, who made no reference to Chubar’ in their own confessions.506 The
frequency with which Antipov appeared in the investigative files of his fellow Old
Bolsheviks led the Procuracy to issue serious challenges to his personal integrity in the
interest of redeeming others’ reputations, a tack that its functionaries were obliged to
reverse when they were called upon to find cause for his rehabilitation.507
In Antipov’s case the investigators’ task was simplified considerably by the fact
that nearly twenty of his nominal cohorts in counterrevolutionary activity – including
Ukhanov, Sulimov, Rudzutak, Kaminskii, and Vladimir Ivanovich Polonskii – had been
cleared of all the charges against them. Many of these men had also been listed by Rykov
and Bukharin as participants, alongside Antipov, in their organization; therefore any
attempt to implicate Antipov in Rightism through its leaders’ own words was rendered
immediately suspect, given that they had denounced demonstrably innocent Party
cadres.508
Baranov also took the opportunity to revisit and reframe the statement behind the
damning portrayal of Antipov that surfaced in Kleiner’s earlier rehabilitation. Now
attributing the depiction in question to one of Glebov-Iufa’s fellow chekisty, Baranov
substantively altered its connotation: “The former USSR NKVD operative Tserpento
(convicted), who participated in the investigation of the Right-Trotskyite center case,
under questioning in his own case testified that through illegal investigative methods
Antipov was driven to the point that he was ready to give any sort of testimony in any
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direction.”509 This new perspective on the account that had been circulating since late
1954 was evidently intended to absolve Antipov of responsibility for the fates that had
befallen the Communists he implicated; indeed, it was all the more difficult to argue that
Antipov merited rehabilitation while the image of him as a fabulist continued to hold
currency.510 Yet even in light of this remarkable reversal, the prospect of Antipov’s
exoneration was met with raised eyebrows on the part of some within the Presidium.
Molotov annotated his copy of Antipov’s report with the following admonition:
“It would be a good idea to have more detailed information.”511 Such reservations are
unsurprising coming from one so deeply implicated in Antipov’s repression – having
witnessed his confrontation with Chubar’, authorized his death warrant, and remained an
avowed skeptic of rehabilitation through his final years – though requests from the top for
additional material as issued by Molotov appear to have been vanishingly rare.512
Baranov dutifully acceded to this directive, supplementing his initial, somewhat brief
two-page summary with a more in depth discussion of the factors that supported his
conclusions. As the Deputy Procurator General noted, though Antipov pled guilty to a
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host of offenses during his hearing – including participation in Rightist organizations,
collaboration with Germany and Poland, and having served as an agent provocateur for
the pre-Revolutionary police – the charges filed against him were predicated entirely on
his and others’ testimony, which was “contradictory and refuted by objective
materials.”513 Having studied the archival-investigative files of the Party figures at whom
Antipov pointed fingers, Baranov discovered that all but one of them, Syrtsov – whose
case was under review – had already been rehabilitated. He likewise found no substantive
basis for the allegations of pre-Revolutionary treachery against Antipov beyond the
latter’s own statements, which ran contrary to archival documents that had been “hidden
by the investigative organs.”514 Antipov claimed responsibility for betraying a Party
meeting and underground press in Saint Petersburg while working for the tsarist Okhrana
under the codename “Youngster (Molodoi).” The materials Baranov uncovered suggested
that Antipov had not been implicated in either incident, and the policeman that he
identified as his handler did not have an informant known as “Youngster” on his roster.
Regarding Antipov’s more recent malfeasance, Baranov put aside both Rykov and
Smirnov’s testimony, as the chekisty Tserpento, Tsesarskii, and Zhurbenko all stated that
names had been inserted arbitrarily at investigators’ discretion.515 Evidently persuaded by
these additional facts, Molotov retracted his initial misgivings, and deemed it “advisable
to hear [Antipov’s case] before the Presidium.”516
Antipov’s rehabilitation, which the Military Collegium certified at the end of June
1956, marked a sea change not only in his individual legal standing, but also the
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judiciary’s approach to others who were linked – either directly or indirectly – to the
defendants in the trial of Bukharin, Rykov, and other members of the “Anti-Soviet Bloc
of Rightists and Trotskyites.”517 Suren Konstantinovich Shadunts – a former Party
Secretary in Tajikistan – had been incriminated as a counterrevolutionary by his onetime
Uzbek counterpart Akmal’ Ikramovich Ikramov, who was among those put on display
during the final Moscow show trial. In one of the closing points of his case summary
before the Central Committee, Baranov explained that Ikramov had only heard about
Shadunts’ purported misdeeds second-hand through Antipov, who had since been
rehabilitated. The unarticulated assumption underlying this point was that no honest
Bolshevik, such as Antipov, could have possessed material knowledge of anti-Soviet
plans in the making, and therefore any claims that he passed on such knowledge were
automatically rendered suspect.518 Antipov’s status as a source thereby assumed an
entirely different hue from that of his first invocation in Kleiner’s case, as by virtue of
having been rehabilitated his mention in the case against an individual could be used to
help call the conviction into question.
Although it was most likely Serov’s determination in July 1956 that “the majority
of those convicted” in the Third Moscow Trial – regardless of their actual stance on the
Party line – “merited rehabilitation,” figures like Antipov played a critical role in
providing justifications for accused Oppositionists’ legal redemption. Ikramov was the
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first of those tried alongside Bukharin and Rykov to have his case come up for review.519
In their joint briefing to the Presidium of May 18, 1957, Rudenko and Serov rejected the
self-incriminatory statements that Ikramov made under interrogation and in court as “at
variance with facts.”520 Ikramov testified at various times to the Uzbek NKVD and the
USSR NKVD and Procuracy that he had been initiated into Rightism in 1935 “through
Antipov, from whom he received all instructions on rolling out anti-Soviet activities in
Uzbekistan,” yet as the investigation was wrapping up Ikramov suddenly amended his
account, suggesting that it was Bukharin who inducted him into the conspiracy in 1933,
and that Antipov was responsible for overseeing Ikramov’s subversive schemes. Rudenko
and Serov concluded that this narrative was not feasible, as Antipov’s expiation obviated
the possibility of his involvement in counterrevolutionary endeavors; in the absence of
any other conclusive evidence of wrongdoing on Ikramov’s part, they proposed
expunging his criminal record, thereby marring the façade of the Third Moscow Trial.521
Over the coming months and years more tertiary figures in the “Anti-Soviet Bloc
of Rightists and Trotskyites” were haltingly exonerated, including Belorussian First
Secretary Vasilii Fomich Sharangovich in December 1957, People’s Commissar of
Finance Grigorii Fedorovich Grin’ko and Ikramov’s predecessor in Uzbekistan Isaak
Abramovich Zelenskii in April 1959, and former ambassador to Germany Nikolai
Nikolaevich Krestinskii in July 1963.522 Antipov’s presence in each of these men’s
criminal investigative files – alongside other rehabilitees – was cited as grounds for
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challenging aspects of the widely trumpeted verdict from March 13, 1938, though in none
of the reports was the question of Bukharin, Rykov, or Iagoda’s innocence broached.523
The manner in which the Procuracy handled the issue of Antipov’s testimony and the
question of his innocence at various times is reflective of the balance its functionaries
were obliged to strike between making the case for those already cleared for
rehabilitation and treading upon the still-unassailable myth of a heretical Opposition
committed to undermining Soviet power in the 1930s.
The NKVD as Information Source and Scapegoat
An unacknowledged debt loomed over much of the Procuracy’s work in the
decade following Stalin’s death. Though blackening Beriia’s reputation remained a top
priority throughout the period, the rehabilitation process came to rely extensively on
investigative materials generated during the post-Great Terror “purge of the purgers,”
which Beriia personally oversaw. Charged with reining in the excesses of the
Ezhovshchina upon his ascent at the central NVKD, Beriia rounded up many of the
Terror’s most prolific agents, capitalizing on the opportunity to stack the ranks of the
security apparat with his own loyalists. To imbue this violent changing of the guard with
a legalistic veneer, new NKVD cadres subjected their predecessors to coercive
interrogations over their role in the repressions, then convened secret tribunals that often
resulted in death sentences; most frequently, the accused chekisty were charged with
abuse of office.524 The confessions produced during these sessions later proved
invaluable to Rudenko and his colleagues as they both sought information for the
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purposes of rehabilitation and attempted to ascribe responsibility for the violent excesses
of the past.525 Yet in exploiting this evidence base, Khrushchev-era investigators made no
apparent effort to dispel – or even acknowledge – the tension inherent in predicating their
claims on sources furnished by a professed “enemy of the people,” who employed the
very methods of brute force and torture that the judiciary decried vis-à-vis those who
drove the violence of the Great Terror.526
A relatively small coterie of prolific NKVD interrogators emerged in the
Procuracy reports as bearing particular responsibility for contriving charges against the
party-state’s “outstanding figures.” Glebov-Iufa, who served in the GUGB’s secretpolitical department, was first mentioned to the Central Committee as one of Moscow
obkom Secretary Mikhail Efimovich Mikhailov’s tormentors. Glebov-Iufa and his fellow
chekist Moisei L’vovich Gatov had been entrusted with building the case against
Mikhailov, but found themselves under arrest within mere months of his sentencing in
August 1938.527 Under interrogation by his former collaborators, Glebov-Iufa admitted
“that while seeking testimony from Mikhailov investigators beat him and employed other
illegal investigative methods”; Glebov-Iufa recounted the confrontation between
Mikhailov and one A. A. Levin at Lefortovo, during which Ezhov himself, his deputy and
GUGB head Mikhail Petrovich Frinovskii, and other ranking NKVD officers took turns
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battering Mikhailov.528 Alongside Beriia’s lieutenants Abakumov and Vlodzimirskii,
Glebov-Iufa also helped to formulate the indictment against Margolin, who – according
to Baranov – tried to take his own life to avoid further torture: “In the course of the
investigation illegal investigative methods and force were used on Margolin, because of
which on November 27, 1937 he attempted suicide in his cell by fashioning a noose out
of two handkerchiefs.”529 In light of all three chekisty’s convictions, Margolin’s suicide
attempt – which could easily have been construed as a bid to elude justice – was reframed
as an act on the part of an honest Party worker desperate to preserve his honor in the face
of unremitting brutality.
The tactic of burnishing arrestees’ reputations by censuring their persecutors’
violent conduct and personal origins was on full display in Postyshev and Ukhanov’s
rehabilitations. Both had been placed in the hands of secret-political operatives Grigorii
Nikolaevich Lulov and Petr Iustinovich Tserpento during their imprisonments. Rudenko
devoted much of his defense of Ukhanov to castigating Lulov and Tserpento, who had
been “unmasked as criminals who insinuated themselves into the organs of state security
and were sentenced to execution for a number of crimes including the falsification of
investigative files”; Beriia’s purge had exposed the skeletons within each chekist’s
closet.530 Lulov, the superior officer, was originally from “a socially alien milieu (iz
sotsial’no-chuzhdoi sredy),” sullied by ties to the twin heresies of commerce and Zionism
through his brother, “a major capitalist living in Palestine.” He was further guilty of
opposing the Party line during the 14th Party Congress, and on at least one occasion had
528
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written approvingly to Zinov’ev regarding a speech of his.531 Tserpento owed his entire
career in state security to a politically suspect past, as in 1934 he had been recruited to
inform on fellow members of a supposed Trotskyite cell within Saratov’s pedagogical
institute, and was subsequently promoted to a central NKVD staff position.532 Given the
precariousness of their positions, “Tserpento and Lulov did not shrink from extorting
false testimony regarding specific Party and government leaders” in order to build the
cases their superiors demanded of them, as evinced by their treatment of Postyshev.
Throughout Postyshev’s rehabilitation report Rudenko assiduously offset
references to the former’s “testimony” with quotation marks, an expression of unreserved
skepticism that was not on display in any similar such documents. Rudenko decisively
dismissed Postyshev’s statements as counterfeit based on a report Tserpento submitted to
the NKVD brass following his own arrest, but prior to Postyshev’s sentencing. Tserpento
maintained that at Lulov’s behest he and another NKVD officer doctored the
interrogation transcript “without Postyshev’s participation and without his confession of
guilt. Postyshev first became aware of the contents of ‘his testimony’ when it was given
to him to sign.”533 Similarly, Rudenko made Frinovskii’s written description of his
subordinates’ methods for efficiently extracting confessions a centerpiece of Ukhanov’s
vindication, though he did not specify whether Frinovskii provided this information
freely. Frinovskii – who signed Ukhanov’s arrest warrant – admitted that as part of their
duties “[i]nvestigators beat prisoners uncontrollably and in the shortest time possible
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obtained ‘testimony,’ and knew how to skillfully, colorfully compile transcripts.”534
These interrogations records did not in practice relate verbatim statements made in the
NKVD’s cells, but were instead artfully stitched together from notes taken during
repeated interrogations. The resulting collage would then be forwarded to the chief of the
relevant department for “correction” before making their way to Ezhov or occasionally
Frinovskii’s desks, where they would receive final approval.535 Unsurprisingly, most
prisoners balked at the creations placed before them that supposedly represented their
words, but were dissuaded from taking any moral stands by their wardens and would
become pliant, affix their signatures to the cobbled-together texts, and the names of other
conspirators “suggested themselves (podskazyvalis’ familii).”536 In Frinovskii’s
estimation, it was “very often investigators [who] gave the testimony, not the
suspects.”537 It is telling that although Frinovskii’s statement referred to NKVD
interrogators’ modus operandi across the board, this stark admission was cited only in
reference to Ukhanov’s case, in which Frinovskii had a direct hand.
The judiciary’s practice of rehabilitation also advanced a distinctly retributive
agenda. Beyond their mandate to recommend dismissal of charges against the wrongfully
accused, the Procuracy and courts sought to identify the individuals responsible for
wresting confessions and denunciations out of suspects. In a special codicil to its ruling
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on Kas’ian’s case from March 23, 1955, the Supreme Court Judicial Collegium for
Criminal Cases noted that based on the “case materials it appears that the investigation
[…] was conducted tendentiously (tendentsiozno) and a number of documents appended
to the file were falsified”; Kas’ian’s daughter further attested to having been physically
coerced into defaming her father and signing a pre-prepared interrogation transcript.538
Evidently scandalized that such underhanded methods had been applied against a Party
member since 1905 who had endured repression under the Tsarist authorities, Georgian
Mensheviks, and Armenian Dashnaks, the court deemed it “necessary to conduct a
review and establish who falsified the abovementioned materials, and also identify all the
individuals who had an interest in the biased (neob’’ektivnom) conduct of the
investigation into Kas’ian’s case, and resolve the question of their accountability.”539
Rudenko’s deputy D. E. Salin tasked his Department for Special Cases with tracking
down the responsible parties; in a June 1955 directive the department instructed
Georgia’s procurator to assist in ensuring that the guilty were “brought to justice,” as per
the Judicial Collegium’s special ruling.540 After several months’ delay, the Georgian
Procuracy identified Kas’ian’s tormentor as Gurgen Aivazov, the former chief of the 7th
Section of the Georgian NKVD’s Secret-Political Department.541 Aivazov was already
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beyond the judiciary’s reach, though, as he had fallen in combat during the Great
Patriotic War.542
While Vladimir Kirshon’s rehabilitation was still in progress – in June 1955 – the
Chief Military Procuracy tried to track down a pair of state security officers involved in
his interrogation. Citing “demands that have arisen (voznikshei nadobnosti),”
investigators inquired with the KGB’s personnel department after the current
whereabouts of Aleksandr Spiridonovich Zhurbenko and Vladimir Izrailevich Rusinov,
taking pains not to mention the ultimate subject of their research.543 If the two were no
longer employed within the “organs,” the military procurators wanted to know when and
under what circumstances they had been removed from their posts. The KGB’s reply the
following month made clear that neither man remained on state security’s payroll:
Zhurbenko had been drummed out in December 1938, while Rusinov remained at his
post until late 1950.544 No indication was given of their ultimate fates – which for
Zhurbenko entailed capital punishment in February 1940 – and the Chief Military
Procuracy evidently opted against following up on Rusinov, suggesting that either his
potential testimony was not deemed essential, or there was no further interest in pursuing
charges against him.545
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Although the putative conspiracies for which NKVD officers were repressed
rarely had any connection with their actual offenses against Soviet citizens, the Procuracy
and the Party frequently upheld their sentences as retroactive punishment for the
“violations of socialist legality” that transpired under Stalin. This logic emerged in a
memorandum that Baranov prepared at Mikoian’s request on April 29, 1956, listing
purged 17th Party Congress attendees according to their current legal status. Of the 195
repressed individuals recorded, 123 had already been rehabilitated, 28 awaited final
decisions on already completed investigations, 25 had cases currently under review, and
15 had been defendants at the Moscow show trials and were therefore ineligible – at the
time – for rehabilitation.546 The remaining four men – Vsevolod Appolonovich Balitskii,
Terentii Dmitrievich Deribas, Iakov Saulovich Agranov, and Stanislav Redens – were
identified as having permitted or carried out “mass arrests, falsification of cases, and
other gross violations of legality” while holding senior positions in the NKVD, which
also exempted them from exoneration.547 Despite this insistence on the part of the
Procuracy, within several years two of the four, Redens and Deribas, had been officially
exculpated, further blurring the tenuous distinction between victims and perpetrators that
Baranov and his colleagues attempted to draw. Yet their pariah status, along with that of
their fellow secret policemen, remained a source of contention within the Soviet
government.
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Rudenko overruled his deputy on Deribas’ case just over a year and a half after
Baranov issued his memorandum to Mikoian, and in their report to the Central
Committee, he and Serov sidestepped the issue of Deribas’ culpability in the outrages of
the purges entirely. The duo even went so far as to attribute Deribas’ repression to his
principled stance against the NKVD’s resort to illegal tactics. Only after Deribas
“attempted to obstruct (vosprepiatstvovat’) the baseless arrests and illegal investigative
methods” that had become standard recourse for NKVD officers in the Far Eastern krai
was he removed from his post and arrested.548 Thus in Rudenko and Serov’s depiction
Deribas emerged not only as innocent of the crimes that Baranov had ascribed to him, but
also as a martyr for Soviet state security’s founding values of discipline and vigilance.
Viktorov appears to have internalized this narrative, extolling Deribas in his memoir as
having been among the “genuine, stalwart, principled chekisty” who “[stood] up for
Leninist principles.”549 However, he did not extend this assessment to Deribas’ fellow
secret policeman Redens, whose rehabilitation both he and the Party Control Committee
regarded as a grave error.
In conversation with journalist Evgeniia Al’bats, Viktorov acknowledged his
participation in Redens’ rehabilitation as a “sin” that weighed particularly heavily on his
conscience.550 According to Viktorov, the Chief Military Procuracy received a petition
from the Redens family requesting that his file be reexamined in 1956; familiar with
Redens’ career within the Moscow branch of the NKVD, Viktorov refused it
immediately. Sometime thereafter – Viktorov provided no indication as to when – he
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took delivery of a terse admonition from Khrushchev: “I strongly urge you to sort this out
(Nastoiatel’no proshu razobrat’sia).”551 Khrushchev had signaled his openness to
reassessing Redens’ reputation as early as May 1954, when he suggested at the close of a
speech to the Leningrad Party aktiv that Beriia had masterminded Redens’ downfall
within the Georgian NKVD, and in this instance he did not hesitate to exert direct
influence over the course of justice.552 The military procurator surmised the General
Secretary’s wishes, and in due course grounds were found to recommend Redens’
rehabilitation. In its ruling from November 10, 1961, the Military Collegium
acknowledged Redens’ participation in mass arrests, application of physical force against
detainees, and falsification of investigative materials, any one of which under ordinary
circumstances would have constituted “official misconduct,” but deemed it “inadvisable”
to weigh in on the question of Redens’ liability, and instead went forward with the
controversial vindication.553 In keeping with a pattern identified by historian Edward
Cohn, the Party’s deliberative bodies maintained a hard line in the face of Khrushchev
and the judiciary’s more conciliatory position on Redens, dredging up his extensive
history of misdeeds to substantiate the repeated denial of requests to restore his
membership.554 The Party Control Committee’s (KPK) refusal to allow the ranks of the
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Party to be sullied by a figure as compromised as Redens speaks to its willingness to
defend its prerogatives against intrusion even by the First Secretary, as well as a distinct
tension over the direction that rehabilitation would assume in the aftermath of the 22nd
Party Congress.555
Given the large number of ranking NKVD operatives who to this day remain
unrehabilitated, the judiciary and Party’s handling of Izrail’ Iakovlevich Dagin’s dossier
appears far more typical than that of Deribas or Redens’ files.556 For much of the 1930s
Dagin was one of Ezhov’s most trusted lieutenants; at the time of his arrest in November
1938 he was in charge of the Soviet leadership’s security detail.557 Some 18 years later
his brother addressed himself to Mikhail Suslov at the Central Committee, calling for
Dagin’s conviction to be vacated, and his Party membership restored. Although the Chief
Military Procuracy’s review found nothing to support the accusation of membership in a
Rightist terrorist organization for which Dagin was condemned in January 1940, it did
uncover his extensive involvement in purging the North Caucasus and Ordzhonikidze
krais between 1933 and 1937, which was marked by the widespread use of “illegal
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investigative methods” to induce suspects to “slander themselves and others,” and
thereby saw “innocent people sentenced to execution and other serious punishments.”558
Those targeted included the head of the Ordzhonikidze railroad I. I. Maevskii – whose
case Dagin personally oversaw – and his staff, as well as over 300 Party, industrial, and
agricultural figures shot as conspirators in a putative “Circassian Bourgeois-Nationalist
Organization”; the KPK found that recent investigations had resulted in the overturning
of all of the convictions in the North Caucasus affairs.559 For such “egregious perversions
(grubeishie izvrashcheniia) of Soviet legality” the Chief Military Procuracy allowed the
verdict against Dagin to stand, which marked a wholly different tack than the one
adopted with Redens, who was acknowledged to be politically and morally compromised,
but still found deserving of absolution.560
Conclusion
The Khrushchev years were marked by the reassertion of legal norms that had
either been suppressed by Kremlin fiat or were openly flouted during the period of High
Stalinism. Beyond the disbandment of the MVD Special Board, judges began to sour on
the use of many of the provisions of Article 58 of the criminal code, which concerned
counterrevolutionary crimes, with Cheptsov at the Military Collegium deeming a
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directive on the application of 58-8 against suspected terrorists “outdated.”561 In April
1956 the emergency law of December 1, 1934, which had allowed for the summary
execution of counterrevolutionaries, was repealed, and the 1958 Fundamental Principles
of Criminal Law ruled out confessions as constituting the sole grounds for conviction.562
As the Soviet state sought to eliminate the conditions that facilitated mass terror, the
judiciary – and the Procuracy in particular – did the substantive work of exonerating
those for whom such reforms came too late. Well before the principle was recognized as
law, the Procuracy’s investigations provided incontrovertible proof of the unviability of
relying exclusively upon confessions to secure convictions, and furnished the Party with
material that bolstered Khrushchev and his contemporaries’ drive to bring the organs of
state security to heel.
Through successive, interlinked rehabilitations that reinforced one another the
Procuracy was gradually able to transition from a model of posthumous exoneration that
was predicated on attacking Beriia and his subordinates’ roles in individuals’ repressions
to one that emphasized the prevalence of already-rehabilitated figures within the
investigative file of a person under consideration. While the Procuracy’s functionaries
gradually moved away from predicating individual rehabilitations on Beriia’s malign
influence, as the following chapter reveals throughout the Khrushchev years the former
head of state security was never far from the judiciary’s consciousness, as he and his
subordinates were held exclusively responsible for the destruction of Bolshevism’s best
and brightest. In keeping with their generally hostile and exclusionary attitude toward
561
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secret policemen, and in the interest of shielding the Party from any hint of complicity in
the Terror, the Procuracy and Supreme Court mobilized the posthumously rehabilitated to
force a reckoning with the former headmen of the NKVD.
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Chapter Four – Chastening Chekisty, Redeeming the Party: The Anti-Beriia
Trials of 1955-1956
[…] after the trial of Beria we found ourselves prisoners
of this version that we had created in the interests of
clearing Stalin’s name. It was not God who was to blame
but one of the lower-ranking “saints” who reported to
God. They didn’t report accurately, and therefore God
sent down hailstorms, thunder and lightning, and other
calamities. The people had suffered not because God
wanted that to happen but because “Saint Nicholas,”
“Elijah the Prophet,” Beria, and others had been bad.
We tried to whitewash Stalin, to clean him up. We acted
contrary to the Russian proverb that says: “You can’t
keep washing a black cat till it turns white.”563
In April 1956 Mir Dzhafar Bagirov, the onetime Communist Party satrap of
Azerbaijan, candidate member of the Central Committee’s Presidium, and close
confederate of Lavrentii Beriia, addressed the visiting session of the USSR Supreme
Court’s Military Collegium convened to try him and five subordinates from the republic’s
organs of state security at Baku’s Dzerzhinskii Palace of Culture. Upon hearing the
allegations leveled against his codefendants, Bagirov hyperbolically declared: “I believed
them, I entrusted them with the organs of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
Therefore, the wrong I have done to the people is so great that it is not enough to shoot
me, not enough to hang me, I should be quartered and ripped into pieces.”564 Though
likely intended as a self-preservationist gambit, Bagirov’s outburst failed to stay the hand
of socialist justice, and on May 26 that year, having exhausted all of his appeals for
clemency, he became the final Party secretary to face execution in the USSR.
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The deaths of Bagirov and most of his lieutenants dealt a decisive blow in a
campaign engineered by the post-Stalin Party leadership to root out the remnants of what
Timothy Blauvelt has termed Lavrentii Beriia’s “secret police patronage network,” which
was launched with Beriia’s own ambush-style arrest in June 1953.565 Between the
September 7-19, 1955 show trial in Tbilisi against Avksentii Narikievich Rapava, the
former Georgian Minister of State Control, Nikolai Maksimovich Rukhadze, Georgia’s
Minister for State Security until he was toppled during the Mingrelian Affair, and other
accused lipachi (serial fabricators) from Georgian state security and the Baku
proceedings – which took two weeks beginning April 12 – the Soviet judiciary
prosecuted fourteen of Beriia’s principal clients in open court; all but four were
condemned to die.566 A third trial, held during the interval between the Caucasian public
spectacles and concurrently with the 20th Party Congress in late February 1956, was
convened in camera in Moscow to pass judgment on Boris Veniaminovich Rodos, likely
Soviet state security’s single most notorious interrogator, given the number of highprofile individuals in whose questioning he participated.567 As with most of the Tbilisi
and Baku defendants, Rodos was sentenced to capital punishment.
As previous chapters have demonstrated, at its very inception posthumous
rehabilitation in the Soviet Union was bound up with ascribing responsibility for the mass
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violence that the state had unleashed against its earliest acolytes. From Beriia’s initial
questionings following his arrest, when he was confronted with the names of individuals
who would shortly be returned to posterity, to the judiciary’s efforts to track down
specific operatives involved in fabricating materials against innocents, the NKVD and its
successor agencies were consistently identified as the source of the rot that had perverted
healthy Bolshevik vigilance into self-destructive paranoia. Yet in the first two years
following posthumous rehabilitation’s inauguration, the findings it generated regarding
the organs of state security remained predominantly under wraps, broached only during
high-level Party meetings or discussions within the judiciary. With the decision to hold
proceedings against Beriia’s accomplices, the post-Stalin government exploited an
opportunity to instrumentalize the investigations that had come to occupy so much of the
Procuracy’s energies, and make public certain details about the purges that had been
uncovered over the opening two years of the rehabilitation process.
Though the proceedings against Rukhadze, Rapava, Rodos, and Bagirov remained
well within the vein of earlier prosecutions of secret police perpetrators, in that the
defendants’ convictions were foregone conclusions and they were found guilty of
offences that had been authorized at the highest level, the trials also served as something
of a turning point in the Soviet regime’s relationship to the internal implementation of
violence. By confronting the mass repressions of the recent past through selective
rehabilitations of purged Party members, and deploying the records of their persecution
to excise those within the secret police who had been called to account, the party-state’s
leadership managed to foist responsibility for the Terror onto newly designated “enemies
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of the people.”568 Once these elements had been dealt with, instead of initiating a new
wave of purges, the members of the post-Stalin ruling circle renounced the threat of lethal
force as a means of conducting domestic politics, and instead embraced a form of
collective security, even amidst mutual distrust and suspicion.
Although these trials are largely absent from recent accounts of the Khrushchev
era, beginning in the early 1960s Russia-watchers in the West seized upon the Tbilisi and
Baku actions both because of the implications they bore for Soviet power politics, and the
fact that they occasioned the first widespread mention of posthumously rehabilitated
individuals since Beriia’s prosecution. Though the only materials made available on the
trials consisted of two short press releases, Sovietologists were eager to extract whatever
information they could, and made much of the long-disappeared figures who merited
exposure in connection with the verdicts.569 However, given the widespread impulse to
question the official Soviet account of major developments, some scholars were quick to
discount the received version of events, going so far as to express skepticism over
whether they were open to the public or even held at all.570 This incredulity, compounded
by the paucity of information in circulation regarding the visiting sessions of the Military
Collegium, has led many to disregard these important proceedings.571
Writing about Beriia’s deposal and elimination, historian Mark Kramer contends
that it “marked the last time that violence was used in power struggles in the USSR,”
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eliding the slow-moving purge that targeted Beriia’s clients in his power bases of the
Caucasus and Moscow.572 On the subject of trials against purge perpetrators, Roy
Medvedev has altogether denied their existence, writing that in the aftermath of the 20th
Party Congress “[n]o one was brought to justice – neither the NKVD investigators who
used torture on their victims nor the heads or warders of camps and prisons.”573 Likewise,
Stephen Cohen has broadly generalized about the trajectory and objectives of the antiBeriia campaign: “When Stalin’s other successors put on trial and executed ‘Beria’s
gang’ in 1953, 1954, and 1955, they attempted to obscure any larger implications. The
proceedings were closed, Beria was falsely convicted of treason and espionage, and his
misdeeds were disassociated from Stalin’s remaining heirs.”574 While the assertion that
the trials were intended to divert accountability away from the new ruling clique is indeed
correct, the claim that all were “closed” is belied by the presence of hundreds of carefully
selected spectators in both Tbilisi and Baku. Though the trials fell far short of present-day
notions of judicial independence and openness, as tent poles of the larger campaign to
discredit Beriia, rein in state security, and ultimately eliminate internecine violence as a
means of conducting Soviet politics, they cannot be discounted.
By virtue of the fact that Khrushchev stridently disparaged him in the Secret
Speech, Rodos has been guaranteed a place in Soviet historiography, but few works have
probed his life beyond his brief audience with the Presidium on February 1, 1956 and its
description in “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences.”575 As with many
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matters related to Soviet state security, the best account of Rodos’ career comes courtesy
of Nikita Petrov, who reconstructs the notorious inquisitor’s methods and assignments
largely through evidence assembled for his trial, though he does not delve into the court
case itself.576 Petrov is among the pioneers of the field of perpetrator studies in the Soviet
context, a rapidly developing discipline with which this chapter engages.
Historian Lynne Viola has posited the participation of citizens at all levels of
Soviet society in mass repressions “against mainly innocent people” as the “question of
questions in our effort to fathom the mass violence of the Stalin era.”577 Drawing upon
interrogation transcripts and court materials generated during the trials of NKVD
perpetrators – largely in the Soviet periphery – over the course of Beriia’s “purge of the
purgers” between 1939 and 1942, which was meant to rein in the excesses of the
Ezhovshchina, Viola and her collaborators have attempted to reconstruct the methods and
motivations of state security operatives working far from the Kremlin’s watchful eye.578
Addressing the political calculus behind this round of bloodletting directed against the
group Paul Gregory has termed “Stalin’s Praetorians,” Viola aptly notes that the trials
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were not carried out in the spirit of “justice for the real victims” – meaning the vast
majority of those arrested during the Terror, who were non-Party members – nor did they
represent “a change of heart on the part of Stalin.”579 Rather, they were conceived as a
means of asserting the Party’s status as innocent victim of a state security apparatus run
amok, “ignoring the central role of the leadership of the Party in the Great Terror. The
trials were Stalin’s gift to the Party, serving to relegitimize its authority and its power
following two years of terror.”580
Though the hearings against NKVD officers during the Stalin years were held in
secret and scant details made public, in many respects they were the direct antecedents of
the trials that this chapter explores. By foisting all responsibility for the destruction of
loyal Party and Soviet cadres on Beriia and his band of malefactors, the Khrushchev-era
authorities reaffirmed the Party’s status as the primary target of the Terror’s devastation,
and insulated its leadership – Stalin included – from further scrutiny.581 Within this
equation, the posthumously rehabilitated functioned both as icons of the Party’s righteous
past, and as physical embodiments of the irreparable devastation that Beriia’s attempts to
conceal his transgressions and settle old scores wrought.582
Striking the First Blow: Early Trials and Investigations
When Beriia and his closest lieutenants Goglidze, Kobulov, Vlodzimirskii,
Meshik, Dekanozov, and Merkulov went before a special session of the USSR Supreme
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Court chaired by Marshal Ivan Konev – who, like most of the panel’s members, had no
judicial experience – on December 18, 1953, they faced charges of treason, terrorism, and
counter-revolutionary activities, relating to their chief’s supposed ties to British
intelligence, the purge of the Red Army in the fall of 1941 following the Nazi invasion of
the USSR, and Beriia’s service in Azerbaijan’s pan-Islamic Musavat government during
the Russian Civil War, respectively. These accusations suggested a longstanding pattern
of treachery that supposedly culminated with Beriia’s design to wrest control of the
USSR from the Party and place it in the hands of the security organs. After six days in
session, all the defendants were found guilty and summarily executed.583
In passing judgment on their former collaborators at the Ministries of Internal
Affairs and State Security, the Soviet judicial organs were confronted with a set of
challenges engendered by the new political environment. Having reconsolidated the
MVD and MGB under his purview following Stalin’s death, Beriia embarked on an
ambitious, unilateral program of carceral reform.584 Among these changes was an April 4
ban on the implementation of “any measures of coercion or physical force” against
prisoners.585 While the impetus for this decision is unclear, given Beriia’s extensive,
career-long reliance on torture, it brought the remaining members of the Presidium up
against a stark dilemma in building the case against Beriia and those that followed: would
they revert back to the practices that were widespread under their predecessors by
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extracting confessions under duress, or would they turn to new means of substantiating
the charges they leveled? The question of whether torture was employed during
chekisty’s interrogations in the 1950s is a thorny one that cannot be conclusively resolved
with currently available materials. That said, Viola has discerned certain telltale signs of
torture in interrogation transcripts from Beriia’s purge of the NKVD, such as a sudden
shift to “stilted, sometimes monosyllabic” responses on the defendants’ part; accused
state security operatives also showed little reticence in claiming to have been tortured
when professing their innocence.586 No such caesuras are present in the records of
interrogations from the period under study – though they may well have been doctored
accordingly – and at no point either in open court or in their various appeals for clemency
did the members of Beriia’s coterie claim that their testimony was in any way coerced.587
The more outlandish accusations contrived against Beriia and his cohort –
particularly those relating to his supposed collaboration with British agents to reestablish
capitalism in the Soviet Union, and the sordid focus on Beriia’s sex life – resulted in a
verdict that remains under a pall of doubt to this day.588 Were the cases against Beriia’s
allies to proceed at least semi-transparently, new grounds would have to be found to
substantiate the state’s allegations. The solution that the Party and judiciary devised
would have major ramifications not only for the trajectory of the proceedings themselves,
but also for the Soviet polity’s understanding of its own troubled past.
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Beriia and Bogdan Kobulov were interrogated at length in August and September
1953, respectively, about their dealings with former Georgian Party Secretary Samson
Andreevich Mamuliia, who had been arrested and executed in the fall of 1937. Pressed
about testimony that Mamuliia faced abuse during his imprisonment, Kobulov
prevaricated, first insisting that he knew nothing of such activities, then suddenly
recalling that he and Goglidze once went to speak to Mamuliia and found him “saddled
with a table” across his shoulders, which “obviously the investigators did without
authorization (samovol’nichali).”589 When the newly-promoted Rudenko interrogated
Beriia a month later, his queries were met with matter-of-fact denials, as had been the
case with his questions regarding Papuliia Ordzhonikidze: Beriia claimed not to know
why Mamuliia was arrested, nor could he recall what sort of statements he made to
investigators. He asserted that no specific order was given to beat Mamuliia, though “in
general prisoners were beaten.”590 Beriia was equally stoic when challenged over his
conduct toward Mamiia Orakhelashvili, who Rudenko alleged had been arrested at the
end of 1937 and transferred from Moscow to Tbilisi for the explicit purpose of coercing
him to make defamatory statements against Sergo Ordzhonikidze. Even when confronted
with testimony from Nadaraia, Savitskii, and Goglidze that directly contradicted his
statements, Beriia categorically rejected Rudenko’s allegations.591 Rudenko’s attempt to
make use of the example of Mamuliia and Orakhelashvili was further hampered by the
fact that in the eyes of the Soviet authorities they remained enemies of Soviet power. It
should come as little surprise, then, that these particular charges were not revealed during
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the course of the proceedings against Beriia or his closest lieutenants, but they were
clearly never far from the minds of Rudenko and others at the Procuracy.592
Bagirov’s expulsion from the Communist Party occasioned one of the first
instances in which posthumously rehabilitated figures were mentioned outside of internal
judiciary, Party, or KGB documents. Bagirov remained at liberty following Beriia’s
downfall – though he was removed from the Central Committee and all positions of
influence by July 1953 and transferred to a menial role at the Ministry of Oil Production
– but in March 1954 he was summoned before the Party Control Committee and
castigated for his cozy relationship with Beriia and their joint criminal ventures. The
KPK detailed Bagirov’s feud with Osval’d Ianovich Nodev, the Latvian deputy chief of
the Azerbaijan NKVD who had the temerity to cast aspersions on Beriia’s record as a
secret policeman, and also brought to light Bagirov’s arrest at the hands of Gogoberidze,
who seized him in 1918 after he rampaged through Azerbaijan as part of a “flying
squad.”593 Although neither Nodev nor Gogoberidze were described as having been
posthumously rehabilitated, the fact that they were officially acknowledged as loyal
exponents of Soviet power marked a major shift in the Party’s relationship with
wrongfully executed notables, and demonstrated the value of these individuals’ stories for
the purposes of the anti-Beriia purge.
This is not to suggest, though, that the Soviet judiciary immediately embraced
rehabilitation cases as sources of incriminating evidence. Between the fall of 1954 and
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February 1955 two of Beriia’s trusted adjutants, Bogdan Kobulov’s younger brother,
Amaiak, and Solomon Rafailovich Mil’shtein, were tried for their roles in Beriia’s
organization and put to death. In both instances the bills of indictment made explicit
mention of the chekisty’s participation in beatings intended to extract testimony from
prisoners implicating themselves and others, but few individual targets were mentioned;
Mil’shtein admitted that he knew of Beriia’s conspiring against Gogoberidze, Kakhiani,
and other Georgian politicians, but he took no part in their repression and was accused
only of having helped Beriia to conceal evidence of their mistreatment.594 Lev
Shvartsman, who collaborated closely with Rodos on “special assignments” and claimed
to have purposefully undermined the case against Kosarev, was eventually shot in April
1955; the Military Collegium ruled that Shvartsman had tortured detainees because he
was “in outlook a bourgeois nationalist” who had been “raised in the spirit of
Zionism.”595 This verdict was far more in line with the anti-cosmopolitan campaign of the
closing years of Stalin’s rule – when Shvartsman was first taken into state custody – than
the sort of legalism that Khrushchev-era courts professed. Even as the judiciary exploited
preexisting prejudices to secure Shvartsman’s conviction, it had already initiated a wave
of prosecutions that drew directly upon recent strides that had been made in the campaign
for posthumous rehabilitation.596
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Already in early May 1954 Rudenko and Khrushchev delivered speeches about
the unraveling of the Leningrad Affair to the city’s Party aktiv, depicting its organizer,
Viktor Abakumov, as an intriguer who alongside Beriia fabricated cases against honest
Party workers and openly flouted Stalin’s will.597 During his freewheeling address,
Khrushchev – in trademark style – floated an idea that the audience met enthusiastically:
“Apparently in the near future there will be a trial against Abakumov. I was of the
opinion, we exchanged opinions, I don’t know how feasible it is: maybe Abakumov’s
trial ought be organized here, in Leningrad.”598 Regardless of whether this proposal was
off-the-cuff or reflected preexisting plans, on December 14 that year the Military
Collegium convened a public session to try Abakumov and five of his former associates
from the MGB in the same building where the hearings on the Leningrad Affair had
taken place. Four lawyers were brought in from Moscow to represent the accused, but the
proceedings were not held in a spirit of openness: when Abakumov and his codefendants
attempted to point out Stalin’s initiating role in the Leningrad Affair, Rudenko, acting as
public prosecutor, stripped the men of their right to speak.599 The announcement of the
verdict in Pravda on December 24, 1954 – exactly a year after news of Beriia’s execution
was made public – included mention of Abakumov having run the case against
Leningrad’s Party leadership, and described the affair’s casualties as “fully rehabilitated,”
but provided no names and gave few specifics about the nature of Abakumov’s
offenses.600 Though the Leningrad tribunal proved somewhat tentative in its handling of
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the issue of rehabilitation, the Procuracy at this time was already well into its
preparations for the Tbilisi trial, which would marshal copious evidence relating to the
posthumously rehabilitated and provide survivors with a forum in which to confront their
tormentors in the name of restoring Soviet legality on Beriia’s home turf.
“The Foul Death of a Pack of Scoundrels”: Rapava and Rukhadze in the Dock
Initially – as attested to by communications between the Procuracy and the
Central Committee Presidium – the authorities intended to try Konstantin Savitskii,
Nikita Krimian, Aleksandr Khazan, and Georgii Paramonov as a quartet, without Rapava,
Rukhadze, Tsereteli, or Sardon Nadaria. On May 25, 1954 Rudenko forwarded a draft
indictment against the four Georgian operatives to the Presidium and requested that the
case be put before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. The document dwelled
on the accused’s social backgrounds, but also dealt extensively with Beriia’s antagonism
toward Sergo Ordzhonikidze and his eventual persecution of Orzhonikidze’s intimates,
including Mamuliia and Orakhelashvili, which would ultimately become a major feature
of the Tbilisi show trial.601 Whether the decision to postpone Savitskii, Krimian, Khazan,
and Paramonov’s case and widen its scope originated with the Party or the Procuracy
remains unclear, as does the reasoning behind this move, which carried significant
implications for the proceedings in Tbilisi. One potential dilemma engendered by this
choice was the fact that although Rapava and Rukhadze had both worked under Beriia for
extended periods of time, they made for odd dock-mates, as their struggle for
preeminence within Georgian state security culminated with the former’s arrest at the
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latter’s hands during the Mingrelian Affair. This inconvenient reality caused little to no
concern within the Procuracy’s headquarters, though, and by January 10, 1955 Rudenko
and Serov at the KGB presented the Central Committee with an expanded indictment that
incorporated materials on all eight defendants.
In their introduction to the document, Rudenko and Serov noted for the first time
that the case would be heard “in open court in Tbilisi with the participation of the
prosecution and defense,” rather than a more secretive venue.602 On July 23 Rudenko
provided Vasilii Pavlovich Mzhavanadze, the Party boss of Georgia, with a copy of the
final indictment, and informed him that the case would be heard the following month,
though in reality the proceedings did not open until September.603 It is striking that even
though the judiciary resolved in January to hold the trial in Tbilisi, it was only in July that
the local leadership was fully apprised of the plan; this points to the degree of control that
Moscow maintained over preparations for the case, which may have been geographically
“peripheral,” but resonated deeply within the Kremlin.
The defendants faced charges of having abused their positions in order to abet
Beriia’s nefarious aims under articles 58-1b, 58-8, and 58-11 – treason by service
members, terrorist acts against representatives of Soviet power, and conspiracy – of the
RSFSR penal code (unlike the more commonly applied article 58-10,
counterrevolutionary agitation, the first two statutes carried the death penalty, even in
peacetime).604 As articulated in the press release that announced the trial’s verdict,
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“[while] helping Beriia to hide his criminal past and basely deceiving the Party and state”
Rukhadze, Rapava, and company “used their official positions within the system of the
NKVD, and then the MVD and MGB of the Georgian SSR for hostile ends.”605 The
Tbilisi indictment located the accused’s readiness to serve as Beriia’s willing
executioners in their own past misdeeds and socially alien backgrounds. While still a
youth Rapava purportedly joined the Georgian Socialist-Federalist Revolutionary Party,
which sought to establish an independent, “bourgeois” Georgia under the aegis of Great
Britain, and remained a member between 1917 and 1920.606 Although this information
made its way into Rapava’s personal file, it did not prevent him from rising to the top of
state security of the Georgian SSR. Likewise, Rapava’s wife was a cousin of the
Georgian Menshevik leader Noi Zhordania, and her brother had fled to Turkey and from
there made his way to Paris.607 Savitskii, it was noted, was the son of noble who held the
rank of colonel in the Tsarist Army and was an “organizer of White Guard detachments
for the struggle against Soviet power.”608
Most damning in this regard was Tsereteli’s personal trajectory. Born into the
family of a hereditary prince, he was denounced by the soon-to-be-executed Bogdan
Kobulov as “nearly illiterate,” which apparently did not prevent him from eventually
being promoted to head the NKVD’s infamous Fourth Special Department, responsible
for running the sharashka program of forced research and development within Gulag
camps.609 Having risen to the junior-most officer’s rank in the Imperial Army
(praporshchik), in 1915 Tsereteli was taken prisoner by German forces and subsequently
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enlisted in their “Georgian Legion,” which served on the Turkish front. Upon his return
to Georgia in 1918 Tsereteli supposedly took up arms alongside the Mensheviks, and
found himself on the wrong side of Soviet power after the Bolshevik takeover when he
was arrested for the murder of a policeman.610 Beriia, fully aware of this wrongdoing,
still opted to entrust Tsereteli with some of the most sensitive assignments he could
delegate as GPU chief of the Transcaucasian Federation, and as his fortunes rose so too
did Tsereteli’s. The image that emerged of Beriia’s extended network was of one
predicated on negative trust that saw the complete eradication of competing (and, in the
eyes of the judiciary, loyal Soviet) cadres as the only means of assuring its continued
existence. This, then, furnished the motive for the Tbilisi defendants’ avid participation in
Beriia’s machinations.
The narrative of the Terror that the Procuracy devised for the purposes of the antiBeriia trials distilled the complex factors that led the revolution to devour its own into a
more palatable, familiar chronicle of a Caucasian vendetta that pitted faithful Party cadres
against a criminal clan of bandits, sadists, and “alien elements.” In Tbilisi, the elimination
of the better part of Georgia’s revolutionary elite was attributed to Beriia’s feud with his
former mentor, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, whose family and inner circle served as the locus
around which many of the Procuracy’s most effective arguments coalesced. In the
preamble to the draft indictment against Rapava and Rukhadze, Rudenko and Serov
identified the discrediting of Ordzhonikidze as among “the most important criminal
tasks” for Beriia:
Thus the accused Rapava, Rukhadze, Krimian, Khazan, Savitskii and
Paramonov directly participated in Beriia’s devious struggle (intriganskoi
bor’be) against the prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet
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government Sergo Ordzhonikidze, gathering slanderous materials against
S. Ordzhonikidze, extorting false testimony, to this end subjecting
prisoners to torture, falsifying criminal cases against Ordzhonikidze’s
relatives and friends, and then destroying these individuals under the guise
of repressing counter-revolutionary activities.611
Ordzhonikidze’s family was particularly devastated by the Georgian NKVD. As the court
heard, it was Rapava who opened the case against Sergo’s brother Papuliia and signed his
cousin Dmitrii’s arrest warrant, which was carried out by Khazan. Dmitrii Ordzhonikidze
was subsequently interrogated by both Savitskii and Paramonov; Tsereteli, in his capacity
as head of the local branch of the security police, sat on the troiki convened on August
11, 1937 and July 13, 1938, respectively, that sentenced both Papuliia and Dmitrii to
death.612
Beriia’s animus toward Ordzhonikidze was allegedly so great that even after the
latter’s suicide he “gave his accomplices the task of finding incriminating testimony
relating to” him, which was to be “extorted from prisoners through beatings and
torture.”613 Samson Mamuliia – whom Beriia replaced as Georgian Party Secretary – was
arrested “[o]n Beriia’s direct order,” after which “deliberately (zavedomo) false testimony
about S. Ordzhonikidze was extracted [from him] with the help of criminal methods of
interrogation.”614 As commandant of the Georgian NKVD’s internal prison Nadaraia
witnessed Mamuliia’s torture and recounted the process to investigators:
“During the investigation Mamuliia was severely beaten. I
remember that for 7-8 days he was forced to stand while tied to a weighted
table (ego zastavliali stoiat’ s priviazannym stolom s gruzom). When he
fell they picked him up and again forced him to stand.
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While Mamuliia stood in the investigative office for several days
tied to the table Kobulov and Goglidze visited him almost every day.”615
In addition to extracting slanderous statements against Ordzhonikidze, Savitskii and
Paramonov reportedly induced Mamuliia to denounce persons who had “close relations
with Ordzhonikidze,” eventually leading to former Zakkraikom (Transcaucasian Regional
Committee) head Mamiia Orakhelashvili’s implication as a member of a Rightist
conspiracy in Georgia.616
A former medical assistant at the Georgian NKVD’s internal prison by the name
of Aroian testified to the conditions Mamiia Orakhelashvili endured while in Bogdan
Kobulov and Krimian’s custody. Having treated Orakhelashvili prior to his execution,
Aroian vividly recalled the “gaping bleeding wounds” on his back, which she smeared
with iodine, and the bruises that covered his feet.617 Even confined in his cell
Orakhlashvili was afforded no respite from abuse, as “there was another prisoner in the
cell with [him] who was either insane or feigned insanity. He systematically tormented
Orakhelashvili in the cell, clawed at him, beat him, never gave him a moment’s peace”;
while receiving care for his wounds Orakhelashvili confided his suspicion that his captors
purposefully “planted” the crazed man in his cell.618
Rukhadze, who had just begun his career in state security when Orakhelashvili
was arrested in summer 1937, was serving under Kobulov that fall and recalled:
Kobulov ordered Krimian or Khazan to help me in conducting the
confrontation between the Vardzieli [a former procurator of the GSSR]
and Orakhelashvili. This confrontation was purely formal in nature and
lasted no more than 5-10 minutes, and although at the time Orakhelashvili
named Vardzieli as a participant in an anti-Soviet organization, I
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nonetheless came to the conclusion that Orakhelashvili slandered
Vardzieli as a result of the application of measures of physical force
against him…
There was an interruption during the confrontation, and afterward
Vardzieli was beaten by Khazan, who approached him in the course of the
confrontation. Khazan beat Vardzieli on the heels with a special metallic,
nickel-plated rod with an extended rubber tip. Subsequently
Orakhelashvili and Vardzieli were shot.619
As in Papuliia’s and Dmitrii Ordzhonikidze’s executions, Tsereteli was a member of the
troika that issued Orakhelashvili’s death sentence. The draft indictment pointedly noted
that the USSR Supreme Court had since “fully posthumously rehabilitated”
Orakhelashvili “in the absence of a corpus delicti.”620 Although the preliminary
accusation against Rapava, Rukhadze, and the other representatives of Georgian state
security only singled out a handful of figures as having been rehabilitated, during the
interval between the document’s composition and the actual trial the Procuracy
marshaled additional examples to reinforce its case, and made posthumous rehabilitees’
comrades and relatives centerpieces of its in-court strategy.
A rare firsthand account of the Tbilisi proceedings comes from the memoirs of
Suren Ovanesovich Gazarian, a deputy head of the Georgian NKVD’s economic
department who ran afoul of Beriia in 1937 and spent ten years in various labor camps.
Following his return to Georgia and subsequent rehabilitation, Gazarian was summoned
to serve as a witness for the prosecution.621 Gazarian placed a heavy emphasis on the
degree of public spectacle involved in the hearing; in his retelling, the trial’s venue, the
Railroad Worker’s Club, “was always packed to capacity. If the hall held ten times more
619
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people, even then all those who wanted to would not have been able to get in.” The street
outside the building, Plekhanovskii prospekt, was similarly “thronged with people” for
the duration.622 To gain admission to the gallery spectators required tickets, which were
primarily distributed by factories, enterprises, and agencies in the Georgian capital and
other regions of the republic, although according to Gazarian rehabilitees also received
tickets “on a priority basis.”623 This combination of carefully screened loyalists selected
by their local Party organizations and employers and recently exonerated individuals who
harbored deep resentment toward Beriia and his servitors ensured that the defendants
would be facing an audience suitably hostile for the state’s purposes.
Though the end result of the tribunal was predetermined and the hall stacked with
attendees eager to see the chekisty punished, Gazarian stressed that the hearings
themselves were conducted in strict accordance with Soviet legal precepts. Each of the
eight accused was represented by his own counsel, “[a]s the law demand[ed],” and at the
opening of the first hearing the defendants were asked if they had any objections to the
court’s composition and whether they wished to file any motions.624 Most came forward
with requests for various exculpatory documents to be appended to the case, which would
(rightfully) have shown them to have been cogs in an expansive system of repression
directed from above; based on the trial’s outcome it is evident that if included they did
nothing to mitigate the sentences passed.625
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According to Nikolai Smirnov, in his opening statement before the visiting
session of the Military Collegium under Cheptsov’s chairmanship, Rudenko justified the
charges that the defendants faced under article 58-8 on the grounds that “a significant
portion of the accused’s criminal acts (prestupnykh deianii) represent[ed] terroristic
reprisals against those disagreeable to Beriia and his close accomplices or people who
were dangerous to them, who impeded the implementation of the conspirators’
treasonous plans or were able to expose Beriia’s criminal past.”626 In light of the
mortality rate among this cohort, Rudenko characterized Gazarian’s presence in the
courtroom as “a stroke of luck. One could say that a person emerged from the world
beyond (chelovek iavilsia s togo sveta). But how many people who were expelled from
the Party on [Hazan’s] report (po vashemu dokladu) unfortunately cannot take the witness
stand at this court hearing. Behind Gazarian stand many silent witnesses.”627 After his
time on the stand, Gazarian took the opportunity to deliver a scathing set of closing
remarks, in which he railed against the defendants’ defilement the “church of the
Revolution,” as the Cheka hailed itself, and the insult and pain they caused “to those
noble lives that they ruined. Gone are the glorious revolutionaries Mamiia Orakhelashvili
and Mikhail Kakhiani, Saak Ter-Gabrielian and Agasi Khandzhian, [Usein] Rakhmanov
and Gazanfar Musabekov.”628 Though Gazarian was confident that the “just court will
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sweep away all this vermin, all this strife from the face of the earth,” he regretted that
“the foul death of a pack of scoundrels will not return the many thousands of noble lives
of the best and most needed people.”629
This candid eulogy for Transcaucaisa’s destroyed Party cadres garnered the
attention of many in attendance at the Railroad Workers’ Club. During a recess between
sessions, Gazarian found himself thronged by the wives and children of vanished Old
Bolsheviks. They expressed their appreciation for Gazarian’s acclamation of their
husbands and fathers, many of whom had not been mentioned publicly for nearly two
decades, and implored him for any scrap of information on the off chance that he had
encountered them in prison. Gazarian was struck by how time, physical hardship, and
emotional turmoil had rendered most of these women unrecognizable; only the “dear”
Ketevan Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze, who thanked him for the “kind words about [her]
father,” retained her youthful appearance.630 Some of these women were also called upon
to provide testimony, though the strain of reliving the horrors of the 1930s could prove
too much to bear. Dmitrii Orzhonikidze’s widow Mariia Minaeva Ordzhonikidze, looking
“white, like the moon […] broke down in sobs and left the stand,” unable to finish her
testimony.631 Such moments attest to the Tbilisi trial’s function as a site of intense
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catharsis for survivors of the posthumously rehabilitated. After years of denigration and
oblivion, executed Old Bolsheviks were finally being recognized as loyal adherents of the
Bolshevik project in the Caucasus, and for the first time their relatives were able to
express grief over their loss in a public forum.
As Rudenko and Supreme Court Chairman Volin reported to the Central
Committee at the end of September, the more than six hundred members of Georgia’s
party aktiv, laborers, office workers, and intelligentsia who filled the court venue for
thirteen days reacted with “indignation and anger” to the accounts of the human costs of
Beriia and his “accomplices’” criminality, and subsequently met the announcement of
Rapava, Rukhadze, Tsereteli, Krimian, Khazan, and Savitskii’s death sentences with
“tumultuous applause.”632 By Rudenko and Volin’s finally tally, the Tbilisi defendants
were implicated in the repression of at least 21 Party, state, military, and cultural figures
who had since been rehabilitated.633 Even though the law of December 1, 1934
concerning the immediate implementation of capital punishment in terrorism cases would
still be in effect until April of the following year, the six men who faced execution were
allowed to issue appeals for clemency, which the judiciary vigorously disputed.634 To
refute these pleas for mercy, Rudenko and Volin outlined for Voroshilov – in his capacity
as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet – the supplicants’ roles in the arrest,
torture, and execution of Papuliia and Dmitrii Ordzhonikidze, Orakhelashvili, Kakhiani,
and Gogoberidze, among many others.635 All the sentences were upheld, and by the time
Zaria vostoka – the official Russian-language organ of the Georgian SSR – announced
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the results of the Tbilisi trial on November 22 – over two months after the proceedings’
conclusion – the principle six defendants had already been dead for a week.636 This
bulletin discussed Mamiia Orakhelashvili and his wife Mariia, as well as two other
former Georgian officials, as having been subjected to “terrorist reprisals” on the part of
the defendants, occasioning the first mention of posthumously rehabilitated figures in the
Soviet mass media. The decision to publicize the trial exclusively in the Georgian press
suggests further intent on the part of the authorities to paint the entire affair as a purely
regional phenomenon, though its ramifications would be felt throughout the Union as the
Soviet state continued to seek to assign guilt for the deaths of those it had posthumously
exonerated.637
Questioning the Inquisitor: Boris Rodos and the Secret Speech
For one so practiced in the art of eliciting statements from unwilling subjects,
many of them top Communist Party members, Boris Rodos’ position on February 1, 1956
must have made for a striking, if not poetic reversal: the NKVD’s expert interrogator,
who had been languishing in prison for two and a half years, was called to account for
himself before the Central Committee Presidium. Already in a suspicious mood, Molotov
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opened the unprecedented and utterly unique audience by asking whether Rodos was
behaving himself, alluding to the fact that he had been uncooperative in the past;
Khrushchev, for his part, inquired as to what Rodos knew of the ongoing rehabilitation of
repressed persons, and demanded that he explain how Party luminaries had been
incriminated while in his custody.638 The ensuing exchange would prove to be among the
most consequential of the decade following Stalin’s death, as it marked the first
documented airing of the dictator’s complicity in the destruction of his comrades and
subordinates, thereby providing partial impetus for the monumental disclosures of the
Secret Speech, delivered less than a month later. However, the materials assembled
against Rodos both before and after his closed trial – held concurrently with the 20th Party
Congress – made no allusion to Stalin, and continued to point to Beriia and his closest
aides as the parties ultimately responsible for the Terror, demonstrating that while
judicial proceedings against ranking chekisty remained embedded within the framework
established in June 1953, Khrushchev had far more ambitious plans for information
uncovered through rehabilitation investigations.
Born in 1905 into the family of a tailor in Melitopol’, unlike most of the
defendants in Tbilisi Rodos was too young to have made any suspect allegiances during
the Civil War, though he entered the ranks of state security under a different sort of
cloud. He joined the Komsomol in 1926, only to be expelled four years later and
sentenced to six months’ hard labor for the attempted rape of one of his female coworkers
at a nature preserve.”639 During his incarceration Rodos placed himself at the disposal of
the GPU, and upon his release he began working as an informant in Kherson province.
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From such compromised beginnings Rodos rose steadily through the ranks of the GPU
and its successor organizations, working in Odessa oblast’ for several years before being
transferred to Moscow in 1937.640 Although he was brought to the capital under Ezhov’s
tutelage, when it became apparent that the former’s days were numbered Rodos quickly
sought to commend himself to the ascendant Beriia.
That Rodos and his partner, Anatolii Aleksandrovich Esaulov, were among those
selected to personally question Ezhov was a testament to the regard in which he was held
by his superiors; his subsequent assignments involved, as Amy Knight put it, “cleaning
up loose ends left dangling by Ezhov,” which included investigations against notables
like Chubar’, Kosior, and Postyshev.641 In August 1941 Rodos and his close cohort Lev
Shvartsman were made Vlodzimirskii’s deputies at the NKVD and later MGB’s
investigative unit, where he remained until 1946, when he was transferred to Crimea.642
Accusations of sexual impropriety and moral turpitude continued to stalk Rodos, though
it was not until 1952 – likely in connection with the antisemitic “Abakumov-Shvartsman
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plot” – that he was dismissed from the Crimean MGB.643 At the time of his October 1953
arrest in Kiev, Rodos was responsible for the Simferopol’ telegraph’s anti-aircraft
defenses, a relatively menial position, though his fall up to that point had not been nearly
precipitous as that suffered by many of his fellow secret policemen.644
Despite Rodos’ refusal to cooperate with investigators, the Procuracy had little
trouble collecting evidence against him, thanks to the willingness of many of his former
colleagues – including Shvartsman – to denounce him, and the reams of archival
materials uncovered during rehabilitations.645 By January 5, 1956 the Procuracy had
completed its investigation, gathered sufficient evidence to press charges, and apprised
the Party’s innermost circle of its findings, which centered around the accusation that
Rodos, as a leading accomplice of Beriia’s, “[falsified] investigative cases against honest
Soviet, Party, and military workers, and also against scientific and cultural figures.”646
Among the high-profile individuals Rudenko singled out whom Rodos “brutally beat and
inhumanely tormented,” were Vlas Chubar’, Pavel Postyshev, Aleksandr Kosarev, Betal
Kalmykov, Rukhulla Akhundov, Iakov Smushkevich, Viacheslav Meierkhol’d, and Isaak
Babel’; all told, some 38 individuals who passed through Rodos’ hands had been
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posthumously rehabilitated by January 1956.647 Materials the Procuracy uncovered,
which drew upon interviews with former prisoners and NKVD officers and documents
from cases Rodos helped to fabricate, distinguished him as “as a deeply morally rotten
person, who won ‘glory’ as a torturer and sadist both among prisoners and officials of the
organs of state security.”648 To substantiate this depiction Rudenko compiled a
supplementary report for the Party leadership’s consumption several days later that
included additional details on Rodos’ mistreatment of Chubar’ and Postyshev,
Khrushchev’s predecessors in Ukraine, likely piquing the First Secretary’s curiosity.649
By the time Khrushchev dictated his memoirs, at least ten years after Rodos’
questioning, the inquisitor’s name had slipped his mind, but he was quick to claim credit
for bringing Rodos before the Presidium.650 Khrushchev stated that, having taken an
interest in Chubar’s fate following Stalin’s death, he “asked the Chekists to find the
person who had interrogated Chubar, who had been in charge of the investigation. I was
curious to know exactly what they had accused him of”; at no point, however, does
Chubar’s name appear to have been mentioned during the extraordinary summons. 651
According to the handwritten record of the meeting, Khrushchev demanded that Rodos
explain how Postyshev and Kosior came to be “declared enemies.”652 Although Rodos’
answer was not noted, in Khrushchev’s account of the exchange, as presented in the
647

GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 1-2. Compared to the figure of 20-odd rehabilitees from the Tbilisi
trial, this number is a testament both to Rodos’ grim efficiency as well as the degree to which posthumous
rehabilitations had advanced from the autumn of 1955 to the year’s end.
648
GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, l. 3.
649
GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4575, ll. 38-43.
650
In an early draft of “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” Khrushchev and his staff
rendered Rodos’ name as “Rodes”; see K. Aimermakher et al, eds., Doklad N. S. Khrushcheva o kul’te
lichnosti Stalina na XX s’’ezde KPSS: dokumenty (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2002), 138. Kathleen Smith
suggests that Khrushchev stage-managed the audience with Rodos to “[raise] the heat” on his fellow
Presidium members, though there is no indication in the archival record of who actually proposed bringing
Rodos in to speak to the Party bigwigs; see Smith, Moscow 1956, 37.
651
Khrushchev, Memoirs, vol. 1, 119.
652
Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 1, 308.

231
Secret Speech, he replied that he received his orders directly from the Party – meaning
Stalin – and upon being told the two Ukrainian leaders were enemies, his duty as an
investigator was “to collect facts, to extract admissions, that they were enemies.”653
In response to this candor Khrushchev declared that the “guilty are higher up.
Semi-criminal elements were involved in the conduct of such cases. Stalin is guilty,”
prompting Central Committee secretary Averkii Borisovich Aristov to wonder aloud
whether the assembled Party leadership “possess[ed] the courage to tell the truth?”654
While the ensuing debate failed to resolve what could or would be revealed about Stalin’s
role in initiating and guiding the destruction of much of the Old Bolshevik elite, once
broached the issue would not easily be laid to rest.655 The Presidium was able to agree,
though, that Rodos should not be allowed to issue the kind of allegations he had just
made to a wider audience. That same day it resolved that his case would be heard in a
closed session of the Military Collegium, denying Rodos the opportunity that Rapava and
Rukhadze had – and that Bagirov would have – to publicly defend himself against
charges of having been one of Beriia’s most prolific collaborators.656
While Khrushchev denounced Rodos as a “small person, who even with a primary
education had the mental outlook of a chicken (kurinym krugozorom)” and bemoaned the
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fates of the recently-rehabilitated Kosior, Chubar’, Postyshev, and Kosarev to the afterhours gathering of Soviet delegates of the 20th Party Congress on February 24, 1956,
Rodos was on trial for his life.657 From February 21 to 26 Lev Smirnov – fresh off of the
Gogoberidze investigation – argued the government’s case before a session of the
Military Collegium chaired by Viktor Borisoglebskii. Although neither the bill of
indictment nor any firsthand account of the hearing have been made available to
researchers, witness testimony, Smirnov’s notes, the verdict, as well as documents
relating to Rodos’ request for clemency provide sufficient detail to reconstruct the salient
points of what transpired within the Military Collegium’s building, situated between Red
Square and the Lubianka.
In a memorandum composed prior to the trial, Smirnov outlined Rodos’
enthusiastic participation in the criminal conspiracy at the heart of Soviet state security
that had cost the lives of dozens of valued Bolsheviks whose reputations had since been
redeemed. Rodos’ conduct was said to have been “especially severe and sadistic” during
investigations into “cases that were of the greatest importance to Beriia,” a trait that
earned him Bogdan Kobulov’s admiration.658 Kobulov frequently called upon Rodos to
“correct” interrogation transcripts – spinning fully-formed intrigues from the smallest
shreds of information – and instruct junior NKVD operatives in the art of so-called
“French wrestling,” meaning grappling with prisoners and placing them in various stress
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positions until they confessed.659 The full array of Rodos’ handiwork was on display in
the handling of Kosarev’s case, as described by KGB colonel Anatolii Sergeevich
Kozlov, who was present during multiple questioning sessions.660
As Kosarev’s rehabilitation report maintained, his undoing was a top priority of
Beriia’s, and Rodos’ presence in the interrogation chamber was therefore taken as proof
positive of the trust that the NKVD chief vested in him. When Kozlov first saw the
onetime Komsomol leader he “was laying on the floor upside down (lezhal na polu vniz
golovoi) and wheezing. Makarov held him by the legs, Rodos – by the head, and
Shvartsman beat him with a rubber strap… That time Kosarev did not give evidence,
which I learned about a few days later from Rodos.”661 Kosarev later confided in Kozlov
that immediately after his arrest he was brought before Beriia, Kobulov, and Shvartsman,
and instructed to confess to belonging to a Rightist-Trotskyite organization; were he to
“to recant this during the investigation,” Beriia warned, he would be “dealt with as an
enemy and beaten.”662 Kosarev was then turned over to Shvartsman, who, along with
Rodos and Makarov, proceeded to “soundly beat him, though they failed to elicit a
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confession.663 Another of Rodos’ former comrades further accused him of having
“corrected” the resulting testimony from these ordeals alongside Shvartsman.664 In the
words of the Military Collegium’s verdict, by persecuting Kosarev, Rodos played a
critical role in “realizing Beriia and his accomplices criminal designs,” reinforcing the
notion that the purge of the Komsomol leadership was concocted purely at the whim of
the vindictive secret police chief.665
Chubar’ and Postyshev’s cases were also counted among those “against
prominent Communist Party figures in whose destruction Beriia was interested” that were
entrusted to Rodos.666 While Chubar’ was being held at Lefortovo prison, Rodos “applied
systematic beatings” to him and synthesized the results of 35 separate interrogations into
two typed transcripts, giving the false impression that Chubar’ was only questioned
twice.667 I. V. Ivliev, who Rodos cross-examined during a confrontation alongside
Chubar’ weeks before the latter’s execution in February 1939, described the outward
effects of this prolonged torment: “Upon entering the office, I did not immediately
recognize Chubar’. He completely changed his appearance. Before me sat a thin and pale
man with a haggard face and a drooping stare, and only when I closely considered him
(vnimatel’no k nemu prismotrelsia) did I see that before me sat Chubar’ himself.”668
Rodos officially ordered that Postyshev “be remanded into custody” over a year after his
actual arrest on the grounds that he had been a longtime member of the RightistTrotskyite Center in Ukraine, and an agent of Japanese intelligence since 1920.669
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Smirnov asserted in court – and the verdict reiterated – that at this time Rodos was
cognizant of the fact that Postyshev’s confession was extracted via physical force, as he
was supposedly aware of Tserpento’s admission, cited in Postyshev’s rehabilitation
report, that he and another NKVD agent had written the document entirely themselves.670
In his appeal for clemency addressed to the Supreme Soviet, Rodos prominently
and repeatedly rejected responsibility for Postyshev, Chubar’, and other Party officials’
persecution, reflecting both the centrality of the posthumously rehabilitated to the state’s
case against him and his own recognition of how accounts of their abuse factored into his
death sentence. As strenuously as he refuted the charges pressed against him, Rodos
tellingly diverged from the account he previously gave the Presidium.671 Rather than an
executor of the Party and Stalin’s will, Rodos depicted himself as merely a “blind
instrument” in the hands of the former NKVD leadership.672 The man who, in sullen
defiance of his captors, had articulated what was previously inadmissible and
inadvertently provided Khrushchev with the fodder to begin dethroning Stalin, had
retreated to the relative safety of the dominant line on Beriia as the architect of the Terror
in the vain hope that he could spare himself the fate to which he had consigned dozens of
others. Yet Rodos’ (outward) recognition of the acceptable narrative did nothing to
diminish the severity of his transgressions against loyal Party cadres in the eyes of the
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Supreme Soviet. His plea was rejected, and on April 20 he was shot and subsequently
buried in obscurity at Donskoi Cemetery alongside the remains of Kosarev, Postyshev,
Chubar’, and Babel’.673
“I Demand the Execution of All the Accused, To a Man”: Judgment in Baku
The Baku trial represented the apotheosis of the post-Stalin Communist Party’s
retribution efforts against the organs of state security, and information relating to the
posthumously rehabilitated rested at the heart of the case against Bagirov and his
confederates. Building off of strategies first employed in the Tbilisi and Moscow
tribunals, the Baku indictment undertook to demonstrate that Bagirov – working both on
Beriia’s and his own behalf – misdirected the state’s repressive capacities against
perceived threats not only within Beriia and his fiefdoms of Georgia and Azerbaijan, but
also union-wide. As rehabilitated Old Bolsheviks featured ever more prominently in the
judiciary’s arsenal targeting remnants of Beriia’s network, the Procuracy began to
advocate the exoneration of the onetime Party faithful by explicitly connecting them to
perpetrators’ forthcoming prosecution. Thus Rudenko’s deputy Pavel Baranov opened his
October 4, 1955 recommendation to the Central Committee on behalf of Rukhulla
Akhundov by noting that the charges against the Azeri Party activist and translator had
been unraveled “in the course of investigating the case against Bagirov and others”;
Bagirov was portrayed in the report as having orchestrated of a campaign of personal
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animus against Akhundov that ensnared other Party stalwarts.674 The following month
Baranov and Rudenko similarly endorsed the posthumous rehabilitations of Ali Geidar
Karaev, Levon Mirzoian, Sultan-Medzhid Efendiev, and Usein Rakhmanov, all of whom
would figure heavily in the Baku hearing; some of the excerpted documents Baranov
cited in support of Akhundov and Efendiev eventually reappeared in the Baku
indictment.675 Thereby the judiciary transitioned from re-appropriating materials
unearthed in previously concluded investigations to actively putting forward candidates
for rehabilitation in the interest of bolstering its prosecution of the former Azerbaijani
leader and his secret police retinue.676
Rehabilitation also provided a point of entry for certain members of the Soviet
leadership onto the preparations for Bagirov’s trial. The day after Rodos’ fateful audience
before the Presidium Mikoian received a unique personal briefing from Rudenko, during
which the Procurator General apprised him of developments relating to one of Bagirov’s
foes, Ivan Ivanovich Anashkin, whose rehabilitation Mikoian had thrown his weight
behind. In response to a mid-1955 appeal from Anashkin’s children, Mikoian recalled his
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erstwhile comrade to Rudenko as having been a “good Communist.”677 Rudenko in turn
revealed the calumnies that his subordinates had uncovered, including Anashkin’s arrest
by Iuvelian Sumbatov-Topuridze in October 1937, his decision to confess to
counterrevolutionary crimes after Isai Dovlatov – another Baku Old Bolshevik –
persuaded him that they would be spared, and his ultimate execution that December.
Rudenko was sure to point out that “Bagirov’s accomplice [Timofei] Borshchev” signed
off on Anashkin’s indictment, as well as his wife’s, under which she was sentenced to
eight years of corrective labor.678 Both Anashkin and his wife had been “fully”
rehabilitated by the time of the report, and Rudenko assured Mikoian that the “terroristic
reprisals against Anashkin are described at length in the indictment against Bagirov and
others.”679 Despite this pledge Anashkin’s name appeared only twice in the expansive
document, though the Baku indictment used Bagirov’s own Civil War record as a
window onto his extensive history of anti-Soviet affiliations.
In keeping with his status as Beriia’s closest ally, Bagirov faced a host of
incriminatory accusations regarding his activities during the heady days of the Baku
Commune in the spring and summer of 1918, which cast him into disrepute and tarnished
his self-presentation as an early and faithful adherent of Soviet power. Under
interrogation, Bagirov admitted that along with four compatriots he had joined the
Armenian brigade led by Amazasp, and while a member thereof had been a “passive
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witness to butchery and plunder (rezni i grabazhei).”680 Similarly to Beriia, Bagirov
maintained that he did not volunteer for the unit, but was instead “dispatched to this
detachment by the Old Bolshevik Naneishvili […] as a Communist to see to it that there
were fewer atrocities.681 However, investigators in the 1950s established that Bagirov
was not a Party member at the time, “and therefore could not have been sent to the
Amazasp detachment in the capacity of a representative of the Party organization.”682 As
mentioned during Bagirov’s 1954 hearing before the KPK, he and his four associates
were arrested and imprisoned by none other than Levan Gogoberidze; why and how they
were released remained unclear, but Bagirov allegedly admitted his “mistake” to
Gogoberidze, and in July was freed by a “company of Russians (rota iz russkikh).”683
Such an early run-in with an individual who would figure so heavily into the
government’s efforts to discredit Beriia and his entourage stood out as a particularly
black mark on Bagirov’s record, speaking not only to his counterrevolutionary affiliations
and actions, but also to his vested interest in ensuring that individuals like Gogoberidze
were prevented from disseminating what they knew of his Civil War-era activities. In this
way, Bagirov perfectly fit the profile for membership in Beriia’s negative trust
conspiracy: bound to his patron by past indiscretions and offences, Bagirov was
subsequently invested with responsibility for compiling and destroying materials that
incriminated Beriia, as well as individuals who could attest to the inconvenient details of
his and others’ biographies.
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Over 90 pages of the 300-page Baku indictment were dedicated to the issue of the
defendants’ persecution of innocent Party and government figures.684 In the section given
over to illustrating the “criminal ties of the accused Bagirov with Beriia,” the
revolutionary old guard in Baku – including Mikoian’s friends Anashkin and Dovlatov –
was presented as having threatened the pair’s larger aspirations through first-hand
knowledge of their Civil War-era activities. The Procuracy “[e]stablished that Bagirov
disposed of (raspravilsia) certain old Communists who knew about Beriia’s service in the
Musavat counterintelligence and expressed their political mistrust of him.”685 One
veteran of the Baku underground, M.Ts. Manucharov, who survived to serve as a witness
in Baku, voiced his conviction that “all of the arrests of old Party members carried out by
the Azerbaijan NKVD were done at Beriia and Bagirov’s direct order to eliminate
witnesses to their sordid past.”686 Another witness, a former Azeri NKVD officer named
Klimenchich, recalled “in my presence Bagirov instructed that the prisoner Dovlatov Isai
be beaten…Bagirov ordered the investigator at his side Gabrielian, who headed
Dovlatov’s case, to beat Dovlatov, and in Bagirov’s presence Gabrielian began to beat
Dovlatov”; Dovlatov was subsequently shot based on “falsified materials,” but the
Supreme Court had since restored his good name.687 This settling of scores with Baku’s
tight-knit community of Old Bolsheviks was depicted as a precursor to Beriia and
Bagirov’s more ambitious and destructive joint campaign against Ordzhonikidze’s
kinship and patronage network.
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Based on its experiences from Tbilisi, the Soviet judiciary found the stories of the
Georgian Old Bolsheviks sufficiently compelling to repackage them for use against
Bagirov and his co-defendants. Detailing Beriia and Bagriov’s joint subversive dealings,
the Procuracy “established that Bagirov and the other defendants in the present case took
direct part in the collection of slanderous materials relating to the prominent figure of the
Communist Party and Soviet state Sergo Ordzonikidze undertaken by Beriia and his
accomplices.”688 Following his death,
participants in the conspiracy carried out a series of terroristic reprisals
against Sergo Ordzhonikidze’s family members and friends. Thus the
former Secretary of the Zakkraikom of the Communist Party Mamiia
Orakhelashvili, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Georgia Mikhail Kakhiani, Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of Georgia Levon [sic] Gogoberidze, Sergo
Ordzhonikidze’s brothers Papuliia and Dmitrii and other individuals were
killed.689
Having demonstrated that Bagirov was actively involved in collecting prejudicial
materials against those who could frustrate his and Beriia’s ambitions, the indictment
turned to the case of Kosarev – also employed to apparent effect against Rodos – and his
extended family, which was presented as a “a typical example, indicative of the close
criminal ties between Beriia and Bagirov,” illustrative of their ability to inflict suffering
beyond the periphery.690
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Called to serve as a witness for the prosecution, in her deposition Mariia
Naneishvili-Kosareva recounted the most detailed version yet of the story she had been
expressly flown out of Noril’sk to recount to Cheptsov and Kitaev nearly two years prior:
Bagirov came with my husband to our apartment or rather to the dacha in
Volynskoe (near Moscow on the Mozhaiskoe highway), which was, as I
recall, the only time that Bagirov came to our house. I don’t know what
the occasion for this visit was…And that evening over dinner in Bagirov’s
presence my husband proposed the following toast: “To true leadership in
Transcaucasia, which does not currently exist there.” Bagirov said
nothing, clinked glasses and drank. After dinner Bagirov quickly left.
After this incident some time passed and one day my husband came home
from work upset, and told me that Bagirov informed Beriia of the contents
of the toast that he proposed at our place over dinner.691
Bagirov’s involvement in Kosarev’s undoing did not end with his betrayal of his host’s
confidence. His codefendant Borshchev testified that in the course of interrogations
Azerbaijani NKVD operatives obtained compromising statements about “a number of
leading workers in the center, including Kosarev. Before long Sumbatov was dispatched
to Beriia in Tbilisi with all these materials […] For what purpose Sumbatov brought all
these materials to Beriia Borshchev supposedly does not know, as all of this was kept in
strict secrecy.”692 Given his position, Borshchev deemed it impossible for Bagirov to
have been unaware of the collecting of kompromat on Kosarev, or of Sumbatov’s mission
to Tbilisi. In the indictment’s terms, the aid that Bagirov rendered Beriia in dealing with
such “problematic” persons as members of Ordzhonikidze’s circle and Kosarev did not
represent simple tributes owed by a client to a patron: “If Bagirov, knowing about
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Beriia’s Musavat past, helped Beriia in every way to hide his crimes,” the Procuracy
observed, “then Beriia, in turn, covered Bagirov’s crimes.”693
The Procuracy sought to demonstrate that personal enmity existed between
Bagirov and many of the figures he targeted, further casting the Terror in the Caucasus as
the product of clannish feuds and individual resentments. During his tenures as both chief
of state security and Party Secretary of Azerbaijan Bagirov accumulated a host of
adversaries, including many of those who had preceded and succeeded him in his various
posts. Upon being dismissed from the position of chairman of the Azerbaijan GPU in
1927 as an “intriguer and troublemaker (sklochnik)” at the initiative of the then-Party
Secretary, Karaev, Bagirov complained to the Azeri Central Committee and the
Zakkraikom about his replacement, Novruz Rizaev, and Karaev.694 In the spring of the
following year the Presidium of the Azeri Central Committee, chaired by Karaev,
rejected Bagirov’s insinuations as “in tone and content unacceptable and totally
unfounded,” and urged him to put an end to “the squabbling surrounding the Azeri
GPU.695 However, rather than acceding to the Party’s demands, Bagirov instead
forwarded his grievances to Beriia, through whom they presumably made their way to
Moscow; at the time Beriia also wrote a “special letter” in support of Bagirov to
Ordzhonikidze, in which he alleged that Orakhelashvili and the rest of the Zakkraikom
were conducting a campaign of “provocation” against Bagirov.696 The Procuracy
pointedly observed that within a decade all of the major players in this controversy,
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including Orakhelashvili, Karaev, and Zakkraikom members Levon Mirzoian and Dadash
Buniat-Zade, had been arrested and executed at Beriia and Bagirov’s directive.697
The animus that Bagirov harbored for Buniat-Zade purportedly dated back to
1918 or 1919, when, according to Markarian, the two first encountered each other in
Astrakhan: “Some sort of dispute transpired between them there, and afterward Bagirov
grew to hate Buniat-Zade.”698 From that point on Bagirov considered Buniat-Zade “his
personal enemy,” something that he made no effort to conceal.699 A rivalry of more
recent vintage was to be found in Bagirov’s dealings with Sultan Medzhid Efendiev, the
chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan, whom he also openly
reviled. Bagirov chose the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan in June
1937 as the venue to go public with his threats against Efendiev, exclaiming that
“Efendiev wants us to allow him to openly take the floor while armed (chtoby my
pozvolili emu otkryto s oruzhiem vystupit’). You’ll croak (sdokhnesh’), but we won’t
tolerate it, we’ll be done with you then and make short work of you.”700 Bagirov was
apparently offended that Efendiev had sent his “so-called relatives, in quotation marks,”
to Moscow, “having giving them applications for the leadership of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, to bait (na travliu) us.”701 The indictment treated
Bagirov’s promises to settle accounts with his adversaries as far more than idle chatter,
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claiming that he deployed the forces at his disposal to harass and ultimately liquidate the
cadres that stood against him.702
In a lengthy section of the indictment entitled “Criminal Cases against Innocent
People Falsified by the Accused,” Rudenko foregrounded some 17 Party and state figures
from Azerbaijan whose clashes with Bagirov had precipitated their downfalls. Drawing
extensively upon the same materials that were cited in rehabilitation reports submitted to
the Central Committed, Rudenko assiduously noted at the end of each man’s profile that
he had been “fully posthumously rehabilitated.” Just as Akhundov’s rehabilitation
constituted the nucleus of the vindication of Azerbaijan’s early Soviet leadership, the
Procuracy depicted him in court as the linchpin for the repressions in Azerbaijan. Taken
into custody on December 17, 1936 and expelled from the Party at Bagirov’s initiative
for Trotskyism and introducing “personal Arabism and Ottomanism” into his translations
of Lenin and Stalin, Akhundov’s forced confessions implicated dozens of individuals at
all levels of the republic’s political, governmental, cultural, and agricultural sectors.703
One former NKVD officer testified that Akhundov had the unfortunate distinction
of being the first person upon whom the rubber truncheon was employed “as an
instrument of torture”; another provided the following recollection of Akundov’s physical
condition: “R. Akhundov was beaten to the point that after interrogations he was literally
carried out of Sumbatov’s office on a stretcher…We even wondered how he, a sickly
man, endured all the torments to which he was subjected.”704 The indictment made it
clear that Bagirov was behind Akhundov’s arrest and had a particular interest in seeing
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his resolve broken by citing a third onetime local NKVD officer, who maintained that at a
daily briefing in the summer of 1937 the investigators handling Akhundov’s case “gave
the following instructions word-for-word: ‘an order came from the boss (i.e. Bagirov) to
obtain a confession of membership in a counterrevolutionary organization from R.
Akhundov over the course of the next 24 hours by any means.’”705 Bagirov’s ultimatum
yielded the intended effect, as it was “precisely in summer 1937 [that] Akhundov
confessed and named many workers from Transcaucasia as members of
counterrevolutionary organizations while under interrogation by Sumbatov, Gerasimov
and Tsinman.”706 Though Akhundov quickly attempted to recant, the authorities in Baku
had the evidence they required to initiate a wide-ranging purge that swept up the
republic’s elites and regular workers alike.
Most of the accused counterrevolutionaries were rounded up in the aftermath of
the 13th Azeri Party Congress during the early summer of 1937. Taken into NKVD
custody on July 1, Karaev stood accused of having plotted “on Rukhulla Akhundov’s
orders […] a terroristic act against Bagirov.”707 Karaev assiduously denied these charges
for five months, until he, in the words of former special investigator G. G. Sarkisov, “was
beaten senseless (do pocherti soznaniia). Not confessing to anything, Karaev was forced
under the influence of beatings to state: ‘Write what you want. I will sign.’”708 When
pressed to account for such actions, Borshchev recounted his work with seemingly
clinical detachment: “I beat Buniat-Zade with one of the field officers, perhaps
Meshcheriakov. I personally hit him with my hands, while the field officer struck him
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with a rubber truncheon. Sumbatov, who was in attendance, also beat Buniat-Zade.”709
Efendiev, arrested a week before Karaev and shortly after Buniat-Zade, was subjected to
a particularly harsh regime of physical coercion and derision – he was said to have been
beaten “so severely that after interrogations he could only lie down,” and was “doused
[…] with water to bring him back to his senses.”710 Compounding the humiliation – as
two NKVD agents attested – during such ordeals “Tsinman insulted Efendiev,
contemptuously calling him ‘president’ […] when Efendiev filed a complaint with
Sumbatov against the investigators’ malicious insults Sumbatov punched Efendiev in the
face and left, and the beatings continued.”711 The indictment catalogued the litany of
indignities to which these men were subjected as a means of illustrating the depravity of
Azerbaijani state security, as well as the Bagirov’s personal vindictiveness toward those
who challenged his unchecked authority.
Bagirov insisted he knew nothing of the plan to detain Usein Rakhmanov– the
Komsomol leader-turned chairman of the Sovnarkom of Azerbaijan – at a Moscow
hospital while both men were on assignment in the capital, but the Procuracy claimed to
have evidence revealing that in addition to arranging Rakhmanov’s abduction Bagirov
“took direct part” in beatings.712 Following interrogations administered by Sumbatov,
Tsinman, and Bagirov, Rakhmanov and his fellow prisoners “could not walk themselves
out of the office, they were dragged out by their arms (ikh uvodili pod ruki).”713 A former
Azerbaijani NKVD operative spoke of efforts to stifle Rakhmanov’s cries during one
particular session: “Usein Rakhmanov lay on the floor in one of the offices of the secret709
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political department and was brutally beaten by 3-4 field officers […] in order to ensure
that Rakhmanov didn’t scream, one of the field officers present held a pillow over his
head while the rest beat him.”714 Although Rakhmanov eventually capitulated and began
detailing his associations with Akhundov, he attempted to explain that the “center” into
which he was recruited was dedicated to changing Azerbaijan’s leadership within the
framework of the Party, a distinction that did nothing to shield him, given that Akhundov,
Karaev, and Efendiev had already named Rakhmanov a principal participant in their
conspiracy.715
Akhundov and Karaev, along with the Old Bolsheviks Pleshakov and Dovlatov,
also implicated Levon Mirzoian under duress, which the indictment alleged brought
about his arrest in May 1938; he then, in turn, confirmed after being tortured that he had
been aware since 1926 or 1927 of the existence of a “counterrevolutionary nationalist
organization” within Azerbaijan comprised of his accusers.716 The Procuracy suggested
that Bagirov’s animus toward Mirzoian survived the latter’s death in February 1939, as
Novruz Rizaev’s second arrest in January 1940 was attributed to his close association
with Mirzoian.717 Markarian testified “[of] course I know well that Bagirov hated Rizaev,
for the very least because in 1927 upon Mirzoian’s recommendation and with his support
Rizaev was assigned to the post of chairman of the Azeri Cheka in Bagirov’s place, and
afterward Bagirov had to leave Azerbaijan and go to Tbilisi.”718 Borshchev seconded
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Makarian’s impressions, noting that when Rizaev was first arrested Bagirov “wanted to
deal with Rizaev personally, as a supporter of Levon Mirzoian […] Bagirov obviously
decided to take vengeance (otomstit’) on [Rizaev] and Mirzoian.”719
When Bagirov became aware of Rizaev’s return to Baku after being acquitted of
charges in Kazakhstan he “was very indignant that Rizaev, being one of Mirzoian’s
people, would turn up in Baku,” and ordered him taken in.720 Rizaev resisted attempts to
induce him to incriminate himself or others through the usual repertoire of what he called
in May 1940 “cursing with the most vulgar words, threats of arresting my family and,
finally, beating of the most inhumane and brutal manner (with a rubber truncheon),” so
Grigorian, Markarian, and Emelianov enlisted the Military Collegium to overrule
Rizaev’s acquittal.721 Rizaev’s execution in early July 1941 made him one of the last of
Bagirov’s adversaries to face the firing squad. Thus the indictment laid out how the
handful of cases fabricated at Bagirov’s behest spun out to encompass and ultimately
devastate the first generation of Azerbaijan’s Party faithful, portraying the extreme
violence unleashed against these men as the product of personal enmity, rather than
Stalin’s systemic drive to destroy the vestiges of the Party that forged the Soviet state.
When the Baku hearing opened on April 12, 1956 it brought back together many
of the principal actors from seven months prior: Cheptsov chaired the visiting session of
the Military Collegium, Rudenko stepped back into the role of public prosecutor, Nikolai
Smirnov again served as acting secretary, and even the lead defense attorney, V. N.
Gavrilov, repeated his role from Tbilisi. In his opening remarks, Rudenko drew direct
parallels between the proceedings against Rapava and Rukhadze and the case he was
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about to argue, noting that all the defendants were bound together through their
complicity in Beriia’s criminal conspiracy. In the early 1920s, he pointed out, Bagirov
had been Beriia’s immediate superior in the Azerbaijani Cheka, and it was only through
gross violations of legal and political norms – abetted by Beriia – that he had managed to
hold on to power for so long. Rudenko further emphasized Bagirov’s subordinates’
willingness to falsify at their boss’ behest investigations against “prominent” Party and
Soviet figures and Old Bolsheviks who could oppose his machinations. In line with the
baleful consequences of their actions, Rudenko closed his speech by “demand[ing] the
execution of all the accused, to a man.”722 It is difficult to determine whether this was
intended as a genuine call for all of the defendants to receive capital punishment or a
rhetorical flourish, as the two junior-most chekisty, Atakishiev and Emel’ianov, received
camp terms of 25 years, but given the Party Central Committee’s degree of involvement
in plotting out the judicial spectacles in Tbilisi and Baku it seems highly doubtful that
Cheptsov and the other two justices of the Military Collegium would have so openly
defied the Party’s will in the matter. That said, there was discord within the Kremlin
regarding the wisdom of carrying out Bagirov’s and his fellows’ death sentences.
Though Deputy Procurator Baranov and Cheptsov claimed in their report to the
Central Committee from May 4, 1956 that the “over seven hundred” people in attendance
at the Dzerzhinskii Palace of Culture met witness testimony, Rudenko’s speech, and the
reading of the sentences with “unanimous approval,” at least one member of the
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Presidium was not convinced of the need to do away with Bagirov.723 During a meeting
three days later to confirm Bagirov’s sentence, Mikoian – who of all the leaders present
counted the most friends among those repressed at Bagirov’s sanction – averred that “the
current international situation is such that we should wait two years” before proceeding
with the execution.724 While it is not entirely clear whether Mikoian was referring to the
political fallout from the Secret Speech or the potential optics of putting to death the only
leader from a Muslim-majority republic to rise to the heights of the Party’s inner circle,
his caution was not groundless, as Bagirov’s arrest had already roiled non-Muslim
Georgia. Among the demands read out during the so-called “March Events” in Tbilisi,
when Georgian nationalist students took to the streets in protest against the new antiStalin Party line and the perceived marginalization of Caucasians at the center, was a call
for Bagirov to be released and restored to his previous position.725
Mikoian may also have been disquieted at the prospect of further bloodshed in the
name of restoring the Party’s primacy, and harbored the vain hope that with the passage
of time, Bagirov’s death sentence might be quietly commuted. The likelihood of such a
reprieve was exceedingly slim, however, given the lengths to which the Procuracy went
to demonstrate that the defendants had been intractable foes of Soviet power both before
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and after their induction into Beriia’s criminal conspiracy. The Presidium
overwhelmingly approved Bagirov’s punishment and resolved that the trial’s verdict be
announced in the Azerbaijani press, and later that month the Supreme Soviet duly denied
all four defendants’ requests for clemency. The announcement of the results of the
hearing, published in Bakinskii rabochii on May 27, listed over twenty individuals from
Azerbaijan’s Party and state elite – including Akhundov, Mirzoian, Karaev, and
Mikoian’s comrade Anashkin – who had been killed under Bagirov’s watch and since
judicially rehabilitated.726 This dramatic expansion of the discussion of posthumous
rehabilitees’ in the press – albeit in Azerbaijan’s official Russian-language newspaper –
represented the Soviet government’s increasing reliance upon exonerated figures from the
past to incriminate elements from the organs of state security while ensuring that the
Party and its leadership remained entirely insulated from any hint of culpability, even
following Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s legacy.727
Aftermath: A Farewell to Terror
Though the Tbilisi and Baku proceedings were only publicized within their
respective republics, their results attracted the attention of foreign press outlets, which
wasted little time in speculating about the wider implications of these affairs that
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bookended the more dramatic revelations of the 20th Party Congress. The Tbilisi trial
appeared to be, in the words of a New York Times editorial, “a means of warning potential
dissenters of the consequences of opposition”; the same publication described the
“Bloodshed in Baku” the following year as yet another instance of “white [becoming]
black by fiat of the Kremlin rulers” in reference to Bagirov’s precipitous fall from
grace.728 With these ominous turns of phrase the Times sought to situate the
developments in Tbilisi and Baku within the Soviet purge paradigm, preparing its
readership for further upheaval at the highest levels of power. Similarly, The Spectator
labeled Bagirov’s execution “a striking actuality to set against the torrent of fine words
which has led some people to imagine that the Soviet Union is being liberalised,” and
suggested that “there are signs that the purge might spread.”729
Despite the Western media’s prognostications, no new spate of killings directed
against suspect elites materialized in the months and years following the 20th Party
Congress, and even amidst serious challenges to Khrushchev’s authority from factions
within the Party, Bagirov remained the final former member of the ruling clique to face
the firing squad. This development was not purely circumstantial – the lessons that
Khrushchev and his supporters gleaned from the trials against Beriia’s accused
collaborators were used to mediate power struggles in the years that followed. Perhaps
the clearest example of this new mode of politics can be found in the struggle with the socalled “Anti-Party Group” composed of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, which
unsuccessfully attempted to unseat Khrushchev in June 1957. Khrushchev parried by
calling a Party plenum – stacked with his appointees to the Central Committee – at which
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the plotters were assailed for their complicity in the purges, including a particularly
ferocious speech on the part of Minister of Defense Georgii Zhukov, in which he
revealed that between February 27, 1937 and November 12, 1938, Molotov and
Kaganovich signed off on lists of nearly 39,000 people to be sentenced to death by the
Military Collegium.730 In his address to the gathering, Komsomol First Secretary and
soon-to-be KGB Chairman Aleksandr Nikolaevich Shelepin laid into the Stalinist trio for
having “done away” with his predecessor, Kosarev, explaining the latter’s demise
through the narrative introduced to the wider public in Baku: “Why was this case cooked
up (sostriapali)? Only because Kosarev, while resting in the South, badmouthed Beriia in
Bagirov’s presence.”731 Tellingly, by moving the action from the western Moscow
suburbs to the nondescript “South” – presumably meaning the Caucasus – Shelepin
reinforced the perception of Kosarev’s repression as the product of a regional vendetta,
even as he attempted to implicate figures from the center in the commission of the crime.
Rudenko managed to incorporate a direct allusion to the Tbilisi proceedings into
his denunciation of the Anti-Party Group. Opening his attack upon Khrushchev’s rivals,
Rudenko described an exchange between himself and Kaganovich from September 1955,
when the latter chaired the Presidium while Khrushchev was vacationing. The question of
amnesties and the reopening of old cases was raised, to which Kaganovich “tossed out”
the following “remark (brosili repliku)”: “You are now bringing to account those who
previously arrested [others], but we will bring you in for those you are freeing, if you do
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free them.”732 Rudenko took exception to this characterization of the Procuracy’s work,
but opted to wait until the following day to call Kaganovich, just prior to his scheduled
departure for Tbilisi; Kaganovich explained to the Procurator General that he did not
“blame [him] personally.”733 Regarding this exchange, Khrushchev interjected that
Kaganovich had raised such objections in order to prevent the “disclosure of all the
crimes [the Anti-Party Group] committed against innocent people who must be
rehabilitated.”734 Rudenko’s pointed reference to his role in the prosecution of Rapava
and Rukhadze in the context of his dispute with Kaganovich underscored the putative
parallels between Beriia’s confederates and the Anti-Party Group: all had reason to fear
revelations emerging from the rehabilitation process.
The constructed affinity between the executed cheksity and the Anti-Party Group
was made even more explicit during the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961. In his
remarks before the assembly, Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, a Presidium member from
Uzbekistan, decried the lawlessness that had previously been allowed to proliferate in the
outlying republics:
In some republics bankrupt people of Bagirov’s type, riding the coattails
of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov, and occasionally at their direct
order, perpetrated despotism and lawlessness. The representatives of
Central Asian, Transcaucasian and other republics present here at the
congress remember well how many senior officials and representatives of
the intelligentsia were undone in the republics at that time.735
Employing Bagirov as a synecdoche for all the Stalinist potentates who ruled the
southern and eastern reaches of the Soviet Union with impunity, Mukhitdinov portrayed
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the Anti-Party Group’s members as their enablers in Moscow. Despite such attempts to
link Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich to the parties held legally accountable for
much of the Terror, there was no corresponding call for them to face similar
punishment.736 All of the participants in the Anti-Party Group were expelled from their
posts, but continued to live freely, albeit far from Moscow. This pattern held in
subsequent years: after Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964, he too was permitted to
live out his days in relatively comfortable exile. Although no guarantees of mutual
security were ever officially given, following the excision of a relatively small number of
secret policemen, having used the example of posthumously rehabilitated Bolsheviks as
the grounds for conviction, the post-Stalin rulers of the Soviet Union set aside lethal force
as a means of deciding conflicts within the halls of power.
Conclusion
The palace coup against Lavrentii Beriia and his closest confederates is generally
depicted as marking the beginning of – in Anna Akhmatova’s terms – one of the Soviet
Union’s “vegetarian periods,” during which domestic disputes were not resolved through
killing and mass repression.737 Yet as this chapter has demonstrated, even as state terror
was reined in during the early post-Stalin years, the party-state maintained a decidedly
carnivorous approach toward certain state security officers who were made to answer for
the decimation of the Party’s old guard during the latter Terror years. The peace that
Khrushchev and his contemporaries forged at the top levels of the government was not
the product of a single, decisive strike against Beriia, but rather of judicially-sanctioned
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violent retribution that took the form of several trials against designated scapegoats.
Mobilizing the information it had gathered through the rehabilitation process, the
Procuracy used the posthumously exonerated to substantiate the narrative that Beriia had
perverted the organs of state security to enact revenge on his adversaries and conceal his
perfidious past, crimes in which the Party remained blameless. Even following
Khrushchev’s decision to air Rodos’ admission that his orders came directly from Stalin,
the takeaway message from the trials of chekisty in Tbilisi, Moscow, and Baku was that
the Party, embodied by posthumously rehabilitated figures, was the victim of Beriia’s
lawlessness. As the Party and judiciary made use of their husbands’ and fathers’ stories
of martyrdom to justify the execution of a new cohort of “enemies of the people,” the
survivors of several of the Old Bolsheviks invoked during the trials found themselves
among the earliest beneficiaries of policies designed to make restitution for housing,
property, and other privileges that had been denied them in connection with their
families’ repression.
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Chapter Five – The Commissars’ Upright Piano: Restitution of Elite
Housing, Property, and Privileges
Property restitution is therefore, like Kundera’s
proverbial struggle of memory against forgetting,
a struggle of certain groups and persons to tie property
down against others who would keep its edges flexible,
uncertain, amorphous. It is a struggle of particularization
against abstraction […] and of particular individuals
and families, reasserting thereby their specificity
against a collectivist order that had sought to efface it.738
In December 1957 Soviet cyberneticist Mikhail – born “Melik” – Samuilovich
Agurskii telephoned the Party Control Committee in Moscow to complain about the
handling of an appeal he filed that September. Agurskii had requested that he and his
family be assigned a larger apartment in Moscow than the 16 square meter space they
currently occupied, which had replaced the one of 30 square meters they lost while in
evacuation between 1941 and 1951. Agurskii pointed to the fact that his father – former
Evsektsiia (the Jewish section of the early Communist Party) historian Samuil
Khaimovich Agurskii – had been posthumously rehabilitated the previous year to argue
that his family deserved priority consideration in their housing assignment. Yet as the
KPK determined, in conjunction with the Moscow City Council, the case was not as
straightforward as Agurskii initially suggested: at the time of his arrest, Samuil Agurskii
had been working and living in Minsk, while most his family remained in Moscow. It
was only Agurskii’s Minsk residence that was seized in connection with his repression,
and the party-state refused to assume any responsibility for replacing an apartment that
the surviving Agurskiis were deprived of thanks to their wartime flight.739 This
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distinction reflects the opaque hierarchy of needs and obligations constructed by Soviet
authorities as they grappled with the persistent aftereffects of the purges that ravaged the
ranks of early Communist stalwarts.
For early Soviet elite families, whose material comforts distinguished them from
the rest of society, the property confiscations they incurred as “enemies of the people”
loomed large in their reactions to and recollections of Stalinist repression.740 Property
restitution consequently emerged as a pressing concern when the post-Stalin government
began posthumously exonerating high-ranking figures purged in the late-1930s and early1940s. Having lost the most – in material terms – at the hands of Stalin-era courts and
NKVD investigators members of Soviet leading cadres and their relatives stood to regain
the most once the party-state assumed responsibility for compensating survivors of the
Terror.
To date, the issue of such reparations in the Soviet Union has attracted
comparatively little scholarly attention; recent works on property rights in the postwar
USSR have obliquely touched upon the challenges of providing housing to rehabilitees,
while those dealing with former political prisoners have either elided or deemphasized
their subjects’ ability to reclaim seized possessions.741 Through documents generated by
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the Soviet judiciary, administrative bodies of the USSR Council of Ministers (Sovmin), as
well as citizens’ appeals, this chapter considers efforts on the part of the families of the
posthumously rehabilitated to attain restitution of and compensation for their confiscated
housing and property alongside measures that authorities pursued in granting – or
denying – them redress. By engaging in this early form of restorative justice for the
families of the posthumously rehabilitated the Soviet government afforded them the
opportunity to dramatically improve their material standing while reconstructing a
semblance of the privileged identities that had been shattered by state violence.
The drive to restore the trappings of their former status to rehabilitated families
coincided with a singular moment in the Soviet experiment with individual property
rights and mass housing. On the one hand, the Soviet Union of the immediate post-Stalin
period was a polity still wracked by endemic shortages due to the triple ravages of rapid
industrialization, existential war, and repeated famine; on the other, the “consensus”
among the new leadership, according to Sheila Fitzpatrick, was that “living standards had
to be radically and swiftly increased.”742 Though the regime aspired to promote this
objective through collective ownership of consumer goods, in keeping with the mission
of building Communism, in practice Khrushchev and his circle “put an ever increasing
quantity and array of goods into individual or household hands.”743
This trend was exemplified by the massive housing construction initiatives
undertaken in the mid-1950s through the 1960s, which enabled tens of millions of
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urbanites to escape the crowded conditions of Stalinist kommunalki in favor of singlefamily units.744 The transition from living cheek by jowl with one’s neighbors to having a
modicum of seclusion engendered the well documented and widely studied emergence of
a private sphere under mature socialism.745 As revolutionary as these developments may
have been for the vast majority of Soviet citizens, to former elites allowed back into their
previous cities of residence for the first time in decades it marked a broader dissemination
of the conditions to which they had grown accustomed prior to their falls from grace and
their attendant loss of status.746
As historian Yuri Slezkine writes, the “extraordinary thing about the living
conditions of high Soviet officials in the 1920s was how extraordinary they were by
Soviet standards.”747 The single edifice that perhaps best encapsulates this remove of
early “builders of socialism” from those over whom they ruled – and a space that lies at
the heart of this chapter, as well as Slezkine’s work – is the complex at 2 ulitsa
Serafimovicha, directly across the Moskva River from the Kremlin, which at the time of
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its construction was the largest apartment building in Europe. Built to house the Party,
state, and cultural elite, provide them with day-to-day essentials and recreation, and keep
them under close watch, it was officially dubbed both the Government House and First
House of the Soviets, but is today known popularly as the “House on the Embankment”
thanks to Iurii Trifonov’s autobiographical 1978 novella. At a time when the average
Muscovite had between 4 and 5.5 square meters of living space to him or herself in either
a dormitory or kommunalka, the families selected to take up residence in the Government
House enjoyed multi-room apartments that often afforded individuals two to four times
the typical amount of space.748 Yet in their recollections of the Government House and
similarly luxurious environs, some surviving spouses and children of repressed cadre
members insisted that they did not harbor any proprietary feelings toward these abodes
and the objects that filled them, as everything “belonged to the state”; apartments were
disbursed by official bodies, and most pieces of furniture came from state warehouses
with “brass tags with inventory numbers on them.”749
Sheila Fitzpatrick, citing Pierre Bourdieu, characterizes such assertions as clear
expressions of “misrecognition” of privilege on the part of Soviet elites. To avoid
acknowledging that they constituted a new nobility of sorts, members of the
nomenklatura abjured any interest in material concerns; that they did not technically own
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the apartments, furnishings, and vehicles they were assigned or that were placed at their
disposal made such distancing all the easier.750 While memoirs of Stalin-era elite life may
tell one story about their authors’ indifference to material possessions and other
perquisites, archival documents from the post-Stalin years reveal that this cohort related
to its belongings – mourning their loss and actively seeking their return – in ways that run
counter to the ascetic image that they cultivated. The appeals to Anastas Mikoian and the
Housing Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers’ Administrative Department
(Khoziastvennoe upravlenie Upravleniia delami Soveta Ministrov SSSR) – which
managed official residences such as the Government House – that constitute the source
base for much of this chapter evince clear attachment to certain buildings and personallyowned items that the state seized from purported counterrevolutionaries.751 The Stalinist
regime’s leveraging of property rights as a reward for service to the state and a cudgel
against those accused of disloyalty put it well within the vein of its tsarist and early
Bolshevik forebears;752 what distinguished the post-Stalin authorities from their
predecessors was their willingness to make significant restitution to those who were
wrongfully targeted in the past.
In his study of the various mechanisms by which states have acknowledged and
attempted to make amends for mass atrocities and injustices since the Second World War,
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Elazar Barkan distinguishes between two leading models of redress: restitution and
reparations. The latter “refers to some form of material recompense for that which cannot
be returned, such as human life, a flourishing culture and economy, and identity,” and
therefore serves as a type of indemnity, providing compensation – almost always to
groups – for intangible losses, irrespective of the recipients’ former socio-economic
standing.753 The leading example of this approach that Barkan highlights is West
Germany’s payments to Jewish survivors of the Nazi Final Solution, which he deems a
“Faustian predicament” due to the Federal Republic’s need to rehabilitate its image,
particularly in the United States, and some Jews’ reluctance to see their communal
aspirations financed with German “blood money.”754 Conversely, restitution occurs in
response to individual demands for the “return of the specific actual belongings that were
confiscated, seized, or stolen,” and is therefore predicated on restoring a violated, but
recognized property regime.755
For most of the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev years, the Soviet government’s
approach to providing rehabilitees and their survivors recompense remained largely
within Barkan’s mode of restitution: financial and material assistance was predominantly
calculated based not on the length or severity of one’s sentence, nor the urgency of one’s
need, but on one’s prior salary and standing, as well as the amount and quality of
confiscated articles. By dint of their exceptional service to the state, leading Soviet cadres
were afforded access to a far broader variety of goods than most of the populace; such
luxury items were appropriated almost without exception upon an “enemy of the
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people’s” conviction. This put them in a position to make extensive restitution claims on
the government, provided that they could document their ownership of the items in
question, which at times proved impossible, as NKVD operatives frequently put together
incomplete and falsified inventories during apartment searches.756 Posthumous
rehabilitation engendered its own array of complications in the realm of property
reclamation. Because service to the state was the primary criterion for determining an
individual’s standard of living, it was not immediately evident that the wives and children
of men who were long-dead and no longer fulfilling any official function could expect,
post-rehabilitation, to resume living in the manner to which they had become accustomed
while the heads of their households were still alive. By taking considerable pains to
ensure the material comfort of select elite survivors, whose deceased breadwinners could
no longer directly contribute to the cause of Soviet power, the party-state reinforced an
understanding of social status that, like the property that came with it, was inheritable
across generations.757
Although posthumous rehabilitation in the Soviet Union was in many respects a
prime example of restorative justice, it has yet to be meaningfully incorporated into the
literature on this subject. This can be attributed – to some extent – to the lack of scholarly
familiarity with conditions in the USSR, but also largely stems from the supposition that
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only democratizing states engage in such practices.758 Yet as the present chapter
demonstrates, the comparative lessons of restorative justice are immediately applicable to
the Soviet case, which in turn shows that such studies need not exclude illiberal,
authoritarian states from their frameworks. Barkan observes that by “accepting a policy
of restitution, governments implicitly or explicitly accept a mechanism by which [victim]
group identity receives growing recognition.”759 Based on this understanding, one can
argue that the Soviet government’s indulgence of rehabilitees’ demands transformed
them, over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, into what Mark Edele has termed, in
reference to veterans of the Great Patriotic War, an “entitlement community,” defined by
its “claim to the right to special treatment by the wider community.”760
Perhaps the most important perspective here, however, is drawn from the work of
the historian of European material culture Leora Auslander. In a seminal article,
Auslander analyzes the importance for French Jews returning to Paris of compiling
inventories of property seized by the Nazis as a means of articulating a sense of “home”
and belonging in the postwar Republic.761 While the circumstances surrounding the
homecomings Auslander discusses are quite distinct from those that the survivors of
purged Old Bolsheviks faced, and the nature of property ownership in these two cases
was utterly dissimilar, the roles that specific places and objects played in reconstituting
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traumatized selves in both cases are readily evident from the available sources. The postStalin authorities contributed significant resources – in terms of housing stock, moveable
property, funds, and manpower – to ameliorating the material condition of the families of
posthumously rehabilitated luminaries; in doing so, they reconfirmed the elite identities
of individuals who over the past two decades had been ostracized and penalized for the
putative transgressions of their husbands, fathers, and brothers. Yet, as with other efforts
associated with the expansion of the Soviet welfare state under Khrushchev, the state’s
professed goals for providing relief to the rehabilitated ultimately outstripped its capacity
for – or commitment to – meeting citizens’ demands and expectations, leaving many
without recourse in resolving socio-economic issues that were rooted in Stalin-era
repressions.
Kith and Clan: The Paternalistic Genesis of Posthumous Restitution
When the Presidium took up the resolution endorsing Mikhail Kaganovich’s full
rehabilitation on May 7, 1953, two of the decree’s three articles concerned financial
arrangements for Mikhail’s widow, Tsitsiliia Iul’evna. The Party’s inner circle granted
her a one-time payment of 50,000 rubles – an amount unmatched by any subsequent
rehabilitation-related single disbursement – as well as an additional lifetime pension of
2,000 rubles per month.762 While as previously noted this extremely early instance of
posthumous rehabilitation was remarkable in that its subject had never faced formal legal
charges, and could therefore be officially cleared by Party fiat, with the collusion of
Beriia’s MVD, it was also emblematic of the vein in which instances of restitution would
operate over the next two-odd years. Though the Soviet government’s internal discourse
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surrounding rehabilitation shifted dramatically once Beriia and his “accomplices” within
the Party and organs of state security were deposed, the informal mechanism in place for
making compensation to survivors of the “unlawfully repressed” remained largely
unchanged through the autumn of 1955.
It stands to reason that the families of Beriia’s adversaries – who were some of
the first to undergo posthumous rehabilitation – were also among the initial beneficiaries
of the Soviet government’s largesse; as the new ruling clique embraced stories of their
martyrdom at the hands of Beriia’s band, it began to entertain requests for material
assistance on a case-by-case basis.763 Sergo’s cousin Dmitrii Georgievich Ordzhonikidze
was officially exonerated on April 24, 1954 after his daughter, Meri, appealed to
Malenkov in February – a remarkably quick turnaround, even at that early juncture – and
that December Procurator General Rudenko addressed himself to the Council of
Ministers on behalf of Dmitrii Georgievich’s widow – the same Mariia Minaeva whom
Gazarian later recalled breaking down on the stand in Tbilisi:
Following D. G. Ordzhonikidze’s conviction the organs of the NKVD of
Georgia confiscated his personally-owned property. Moreover, D. G.
Ordzhonikidze’s family was moved from the good apartment they
occupied into a damp apartment located in a basement room […]
Ordzhonikidze D. G.’s family has presently returned to their previous
apartment and taken measures toward compensation for the value of the
confiscated property.764
Despite these developments, hardship continued to stalk the family; as a result of their
dire living conditions after 1937, the eldest son was “absolutely deaf,” while the youngest
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suffered from tuberculosis of the vertebrae, and they all, including Dmitrii Georgievich’s
91-year-old mother, subsisted solely on the eldest son’s salary of 700 rubles a month.
Having enumerated these challenges in a letter to Rudenko, Mariia Minaeva “request[ed]
that material help be rendered and a pension allocated for her and her husband’s mother,”
which he considered “possible to support.”765 Although the Procuracy’s files do not
indicate what, if any response was proposed by the Council of Ministers – which
controlled the Committee for the Establishment of Personal Pensions – given the high
premium placed on the Ordzhonikidze name at the time it seems unlikely that the
authorities would allow any members of the extended clan to continue to languish
without aid.766 Other cases of restitution to the survivors of Beriia’s opponents from this
period further evince the piecemeal, and in some instances quite informal channels
through which such measures were enacted, along with the importance of highly-placed
patronage ties.
Rehabilitated and summoned back to Moscow from her Noril’sk exile in the
spring of 1954, Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva quickly reached out to Mikoian. She
informed him on July 16 that although the Administrative Department of the USSR
Council of Ministers had apportioned her a room in a kommunalka near Sokolniki Park
on the capital’s outskirts, as a rehabilitated individual she was “entitled to the living
space [she] previously occupied,” which she had not seen since November 1938 when
Beriia appeared in person at the Government House to oversee the Kosarevs’ arrest.767 In
support her claim Naneishvili-Kosareva cited Resolution 1 of the USSR Supreme Court
Plenum from January 22, 1954, which abrogated key articles of the body’s December 12,
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1940 decree that allowed for tenants who received housing through their places of work
to be evicted upon termination of employment; she presumably deduced that, having
been exonerated, her status as a worker in good standing had been restored and therefore
the grounds for both her dismissal and dislodgment were null and void.768 NaneishviliKosareva’s situation was further complicated by the fact that she was living with her
daughter and son-in-law, and she contended that – barring the return of their former home
– the trio would be “more comfortable in a space of at least the same area,” as their
current lodgings, “but divided into two rooms.”769 Mikoian’s instruction to I. I. Makarov
at the Council of Ministers’ Administrative Department – sent only five days later – to
“fulfill Naneishvili-Kosareva’s request” helped to guarantee that her family’s
accommodations improved, as such a direct order from the Sovmin’s deputy chairman
would not go unfulfilled by one of the body’s functionaries, though there is no indication
that they were able to further press their claim to reoccupy their erstwhile apartment.770
The direct manner in which Naneishvili-Kosareva attempted to mobilize her
rehabilitation stands in stark contrast to the dynamic that historian Christine Varga-Harris
has observed among rehabilitees in Leningrad, who were reluctant to foreground their
legal status.771 This distinction could be attributed to Naneishvili-Kosareva’s
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revolutionary pedigree, or the fact that she was writing to Mikoian, a sympathetic family
friend, rather than an anonymous bureaucrat, though local political realities may also help
to account for this apparent disparity. Varga-Harris’ research is drawn from Leningrad,
where much of the city’s apparat proved openly hostile to former political prisoners’
interests: the oblast’ Party boss, Frol Romanovich Kozlov, stated “outright” that his
committee would not consider pension claims from the rehabilitated, while housing
officials viewed former political prisoners as interlopers and “opportunists,” and
conspired to keep them off waiting lists for apartments.772 While such suspicion toward
returnees was undoubtedly present in other municipalities, it does not appear to have been
sufficiently prevalent in the capital to dissuade housing-seekers from prominently
identifying themselves as rehabilitees, as Naneishvili-Kosareva was by no means
anomalous in her readiness to cite her exoneration as grounds for improving her living
situation.
Once he was fully rehabilitated in October 1954, Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva’s
brother Pavel similarly ventured to Moscow in an attempt to claim an apartment
comparable to the 33-square-meter room he had occupied between 1926 and 1936 at the
27th House of the Soviets – formerly the Hotel International at the corner of ulitsa
Gor’kogo (today’s Tverskaia) and Otkhotnyi riad, which was demolished to make way
for the Council of Ministers building, presently the home of the State Duma. Yet
Naneishvili was rebuffed the following month by both the Administrative Department of
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the Council of Ministers and the Moscow City Council for lack of formal proof that he
had ever been a resident of the building in question. Like his sister he pointed to the
January 22 ruling by the Supreme Court Plenum as grounds for his claim, yet in the
absence of the requisite documentation the Administrative Department informed him that
all the former denizens of the “International” had been transferred to the purview of other
organizations, demonstrating that property restitution remained compartmentalized from
the legal work of rehabilitation.773 Although Pavel Naneishvili had lost his home due to
decisions enforced by the Soviet judiciary, the courts were under no apparent obligation
to aid his resettlement efforts, and without hard evidence of his having been a leaseholder
at the 27th House of the Soviets, the Administrative Department was similarly free to pass
on his case. Thwarted by official avenues of redress, Naneishvili also drew upon his
family’s relationship with Mikoian.
In a letter dated December 21, Pavel bemoaned the loss of his apartment and his
inability to secure a replacement because “during my 18 years of forced absence from
Moscow I didn’t preserve, and was unable to preserve formal proof that I had a room in
this building.”774 He requested that Mikoian intercede in the matter, provided that it was
“not a hindrance” for him, as it would “allow [him] the opportunity to leave Noril’sk in
the future.”775 Mikoian once again reached out to Makarov and instructed him to
“consider Naneishvili P. V.’s petition and call me” on January 12, 1955; less than two
weeks later he was informed that “the Moscow City Executive Committee
(Mosgorispolkom) plans in January of this year to provide Comrade Naneishvili with an
apartment of 16-18 square meters,” twice the sanitary norm of nine square meters per
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person set by the authorities.776 These cases’ swift resolution testified not only to
Mikoian’s ability to procure resources for his clients, but also to the Soviet state’s
willingness to divert scarce resources to those whose experiences dovetailed with the
Party’s new anti-Beriia narrative.
A month prior to Pavel Naneishvili’s legal exoneration, the Gogoberidzes
attempted a similar gambit to lay claim to the apartment in the Government House where
Levan and Lana had lived for the first half of the 1930s, with little apparent success. The
family enlisted two intimates – former Deputy Foreign Commissar Sergei Kavtaradze
and Elena Davydovna’s husband, noted author and translator Evgenii Germanovich
Lundberg – to attest before the People’s Court of the Leningradskii district that Levan
and Lana were registered in apartment 112 at 2 ulitsa Serafimovicha until the former’s
arrest; the family also appended a copy of Levan’s rehabilitation certificate and a rough
diagram of the apartment’s layout, presumably to demonstrate their familiarity with the
space in question.777 However, at such an early juncture in the post-Stalin period the
official channels that mediated such demands were ill-disposed – or ill-prepared – toward
the ghosts of the old nomenklatura, as indicated by the response Pavel Naneishvili
received, and based on the lack of subsequent documentation it appears that in this regard
the Gogoberidzes also failed to gain traction with the responsible parties.
Lana Gogoberidze did not go homeless in Moscow for long, however. “One
splendid day (odin prekrasnyi den’),” as she recalled, Mikoian’s secretariat telephoned
her and reported that she had been granted, at Mikoian’s “initiative,” a one-room
apartment in the Council of Ministers’ new building on Frunzenskaia naberezhnaia in
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place of her previous home at the Government House.778 Furthermore, Mikoian
dispatched an official car to ferry Lana around Moscow, and, according to his son Stepan,
secured her a position at the Institute of Cinematography.779 Lana attributed this
attentiveness to Mikoian’s feelings of “guilt” toward the family of his fallen “comrade,”
sentiments that evidently were not shared by the new raft of Party heads in Tbilisi around
this time.780 In an irate letter from August 1955 – the same one in which she discussed the
possibility of Kakhiani having survived his captivity – Elena Gogoberidze wrote to
lament “yet again” about the state in which Levan’s widow, Nutsa, found herself: “Our
officials have done absolutely nothing for her (Nashi nichego, nichego ne sdelali dlia
neë), and she is helpless and morally depressed following her exile, because of judicial
humiliations (truly!) in housing issues, and above all, because of her shattered personal
life.”781 Without an apartment to call her own years after having returned to Tbilisi from
the distant camps, Nutsa was living, unofficially, with her sister, and given her frequent
illness and the “tone of relations that has arisen here (po sozdavshemusia zdes’ tonu
otnoshenii), she is hesitant to pursue anything.”782 As the Georgian leadership had
gathered in Moscow for the Party plenum, Elena urged Mikoian – if he happened to see
them – to “remember” Nutsa.783 This stark reminder of the dire conditions faced by the
majority of former political prisoners also underscores one of the underlying reasons that
rehabilitees from outlying republics directed their appeals to the Soviet center, besides
Moscow’s ultimate control over resource allocations: local elites, who had risen to
778

L. Gogoberidze questionnaire.
Ibid.; Stepan Anastovich Mikoian, Vospominaniia voennogo letchika-ispytatelia (Moskva:
Tsentrpoligraf, 2014), 45. Stepan independently confirms that his father intervened to find Lana housing.
780
L. Gogoberidze questionnaire.
781
GARF f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1168, l. 97.
782
Ibid.
783
Ibid.
779

275
prominence during late Stalinism, had little to no incentive to advocate for the interests of
the survivors of those whom they had supplanted.
One of the most prevalent themes across requests for improved housing and
material assistance was the desperate need of formerly repressed family units to
reestablish “normal” conditions of existence.784 What went unarticulated in these appeals,
however, was what precisely constituted “normality.” This question was particularly
pronounced for survivors of posthumously rehabilitated elites, as over the previous two
decades they had experienced vertiginous shifts in their standard of living. Many went
from occupying elaborately furnished multi-room apartments to confinement in unheated
Gulag barracks, and upon their release and return to Soviet urban centers often found
themselves in squalid kommunalki, crammed alongside ordinary workers and their
families. In bemoaning their housing arrangements, petitioners to Mikoian implied that
living conditions that were the quotidian reality for most Soviet city-dwellers were not
only unacceptable, but posed a direct hindrance to the resumption of the life trajectories
that they had been on prior to their relatives’ illegal arrest and execution. This suggests
that even in the wake of extraordinary privation, elite returnees’ sense of entitlement
remained largely unshaken.
Pavla Galkina, who originally contacted Mikoian in February 1954 regarding her
late husband Artak Stamboltsian, reached out to him again in late November of that same
year with a litany of complaints regarding her current living arrangements. In Galkina’s
words, “extreme necessity” compelled her to seek Mikoian’s aid “in obtaining housing
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suitable for normal existence.”785 At the time, Galkina was working as an assistant
director at a research institute while writing her doctoral dissertation, and was living
along with her university student daughter and septuagenarian mother in “an old wooden
building that lacks the most basic amenities – running water, plumbing, or a separate or
shared kitchen. The three of us occupy one fifteen square-meter room, which serves as a
living space, kitchen, pantry, and a study space.”786 The discomfort of these cramped
quarters was compounded by the fact that their room was “entirely pervious to sound
(zvukopronitsaema) because it is separated from neighboring apartments and the shared
corridor only by plank partitions; the daughter’s efforts to practice violin were met by the
neighbors turning up their radios “to drown [her] out,” forcing her to stop, “sobbing in
despair.”787 Similarly, the constant noise in the building hindered Galkina’s scholarship,
and her mother was “denied repose” by the “light and rustling” resulting from Galkina
and her daughter’s need to work at home “every day until at least 1 am.”788 Galkina
expressed dismay as to why she, who “never sullied [herself] in social-political life, being
a member of the Komsomol since 1919 and in the Party since 1927,” the wife of an Old
Bolshevik who had been “undone (pogublen) by enemies of the people in 1937” and had
since “been fully posthumously rehabilitated,” could not “obtain normal conditions of
existence.”789
The desire for a “normal existence” was the most prominent recurring theme in
Galkina’s appeal, as she insisted to Mikoian – somewhat hyperbolically – that she and
her family were not after material “comfort (we’ve never known it), but the opportunity
785
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to live and work normally, as intellectual work can never be confined by the limits of
work hours and facilities.”790 However, in light of the living conditions described by
Galkina, which would have been immediately familiar to denizens of Moscow’s postwar
kommunalki, and the privileged position that she had enjoyed as member of
Stamboltsian’s family, it appears that comfort – at least relative to the living standards
enjoyed by most Soviet urbanites – is precisely what she was seeking. Her notion of what
constituted “normal” life was indelibly informed by the perquisites she enjoyed prior to
her husband’s repression, and she was determined to leverage his rehabilitation as a
means of securing the concessions to which she had been accustomed.
Galkina’s previous requests to city and regional housing authorities, filed under
the aegis of the Ministry of Culture, had all been denied because her current space’s
meterage was regarded as “around the norms” assigned to a three-person family unit, and
for the “hackneyed (trafaretnyi)” reason of “lack of available housing.”791 Galkina –
confident of Mikoian’s ability to circumvent such bureaucratic obstacles based on his
handling of Stamboltsian’s rehabilitation – approached him with the request to resolve
her domestic dilemma, and, in keeping with his past conduct, Mikoian took notice. At the
end of December Moscow City Executive Committee Chairman Mikhail Alekseevich
Iasnov received a directive to “satisfy Comrade Galkina’s request,” Mikoian’s
imprimatur signaling that that her expectations were not out of line with what the state –
or at least one of its most powerful representatives – considered reasonable.792 The issue
of restoring normality – and the tension over what that term constituted for the families of
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repressed elites – would be articulated in subsequent appeals to the authorities from
others in Galkina’s position.
At the time of her appeal to Mikoian in April 1955 both Ketevan Mamievna
Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze and her parents, Mamiia and Mariia Orakhelashvili, had been
legally rehabilitated, but she had not seen her native city of Tbilisi for nearly eighteen
years. In early November 1937, shortly after her parents’ arrests, Ketevan and her
husband – the artistic director of the Georgian State Opera and Ballet Theater Evgenii
Semenovich Mikeladze – were also taken into custody by the Georgian NKVD, leaving
behind their three-year-old daughter and infant son. The children were promptly evicted
from the family apartment and their belongings seized without any provision being made
for their future housing. Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze’s sister-in-law, Tamara Mikeladze,
sheltered them for the next fifteen years, until the adolescents were reunited with their
mother in Kazakh exile.793 Though the Mikeladze children and their aunt returned to
Tbilisi in 1954, the exonerated Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze was prevented from doing so
by the fact that the charges against her second husband – whom she married while in
exile – had yet to be dismissed.794
Writing from the settlement of Taincha in Northern Kazakhstan, OrakhelashviliMikeladze’s primary concern was for the welfare of her immediate family in the
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Georgian capital, who were living “in a small room that belongs to [Tamara Mikeladze]
with no daylight or heating, without even basic necessities (predmetov pervoi
neobkhodimosti), seeing as when they were deported from Georgia on December 26,
1951 all of their ‘property’ was inventoried and valued at 3,600 rubles.”795 To ameliorate
this dire situation, Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze requested the restoration of her family’s
“illegally seized” apartment in Tbilisi and their “illegally confiscated property and
valuables, or suitable compensation,” and that the state “provide financial help to my
children […] until the completion of their educations, taking into account the fact that
their father, whom they lost as a result of the criminal actions of Beriia’s gang,
undoubtedly would have provided them a normal life and good upbringing, as would
have my parents Orakhelashvili M. D. and Orakhelashvili M. O., had they not suffered
the same fate.”796
Here Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze made explicit the paternalistic rationale behind
restitution with the contention that her children would have enjoyed a certain standard of
living and cultivation had their family not been subjected to repression that “already
extended to the third generation of [her] family”797; it therefore fell to the authorities to
set this disruption to rights. Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze signed off by explaining that she
had turned specifically to Mikoian “in the hope that in the past you knew my parents
better than others and that you must have warm memories of them (ne mozhete ne imet’ o
nikh teplykh vospominanii) as honest people who were dedicated to the Party,” a
trenchant reminder of the ties of obligation that bound Mikoian to the fate of the
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remaining Orakhelashvilis.798 After meeting with Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze in person,
Mikoian drafted an order to the Georgian Council of Ministers’ chairman requesting that
he “consider K. M. Orakhelashvili-Mikeladze’s petition to grant Mikeladze’s children
pensions until they complete university.”799 In this way the Soviet government assumed
responsibility for the uplift and education of a select few whose lives had been derailed
by the Terror.
Although Mikhail and Igor’ Kedrov were two of the first individuals to be
posthumously exculpated for having stood against Beriia, their survivors – including
Mikhail’s eldest son, the philosopher Bonifatii Kedrov, Igor’s wife Raisa Fedorovna
Melikhova, and their children Boris and Natal’ia – still acutely felt the effects of the
privations to which they had been subjected as part of Beriia’s “reprisals.” In a secret
memorandum from August 1, 1955 to Petr Georgievich Moskatov, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers’ Personal Pension Committee, Rudenko outlined the dire conditions
in which Melikhova and her teenage children found themselves and proposed a remedy:
Melikhova R F. is in a difficult financial situation, as she underwent breast
cancer surgery, after which [she] was declared an invalid of the second
group […] Given Melikhova’s difficult financial situation, her practical
inability to work, and also the special role of Kedrov M. S. and Kedrov I.
M. in exposing the enemy of the people Beriia, I am petitioning that
Melikhova R. F. be allocated a pension for life, and Kedrov B. I. and
Kedrova N. I. until they complete their higher education.800
The pension committee took up Rudenko’s recommendation four days later and
resolved “to establish from August 1, 1955 a Union-level personal pension for the family
of the deceased Kedrov I. M. in the amount” of 600 rubles per month for Melikhova “for
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the duration of her disability” and 400 rubles per month each for Boris and Natal’ia until
they either finished their educations or reached the age of 23.801 In the absence of a
paterfamilias whose personal contribution to the Soviet project should have guaranteed
his family financial security and comfort, the state took it upon itself to provide for the
needs of Igor’s wife and children for as long as they would have been dependent on him,
had he survived Beriia’s wrath. This was entirely in keeping with established Soviet
practice, as beginning in July 1920 individuals who “rendered particular services” to the
Bolshevik cause were entitled to retirement pensions in the event of illness or infirmity;
these benefits would go “to their families in case of their death.”802 Though the financial
provisions of such pensions were modified extensively over the following decades, the
grounds remained consistent. In Igor’ Kedrov’s case, it was only after his innocence had
been established, years following his death, that his “particular service” to the state in the
form of the “special role” he played in documenting Beriia’s crimes came to be
appreciated, thereby obliging the Soviet government to make provisions for his family’s
welfare.
Sanitary Norms: Luxury Housing as the Site of Recuperation
The acute medical crisis that Rudenko cited to secure financial aid for Raisa
Melikhova found analogous expression in Mikoian’s clients’ demands for the restoration
of their erstwhile abodes. As Polly Jones has aptly described, the public culture of
Khrushchev’s “Thaw” was suffused with concern for healing the psychic wounds and

801

GARF f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4001, l. 46.
Mervyn Matthews, Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles under Communism
(Florence, US: Routledge, 2013), 86. It should be noted that the rate Melikova received of 600 rubles per
month was the maximum under regulations introduced in 1949; see idem., 104.
802

282
other traumas of the Terror years.803 Christine Varga-Harris has built upon Jones’
analysis, which is primarily concerned with the literary world, and extended it to the
housing sphere, noting that for housing-seekers in Leningrad “the opportunity to ‘settle
down’ would enable them, as well as their family members, to restore or create the sense
of place they needed to ‘move forward’ with their lives.”804 For a large number of those
who had been driven out of the desirable homes during the Terror and since returned to
Moscow, one of the most enduring holdovers of their repression was continued physical
infirmity, and the clearest path to recovery lay behind the walls of Sovmin-administered
apartment buildings, with financial security assured through government payouts.
On January 20, 1955 the daughter of Mark Levitin, a former deputy of Mikoian’s
at the People’s Commissariat of the Food Industry, expressed concern about the
wellbeing of her mother, F. A. Dorfman, who had only recently returned to Moscow after
her own exoneration and was “completely unable to work (nerabotosposobna),”
requiring “long periods of bed rest.”805 According to Levitina, the only way to restore her
mother’s health was through “a significant improvement in our living conditions,” which
at the time consisted of a single room for the whole family; Dorfman had already
solicited “the return of our apartment in the Government House” or the provision of “a
different apartment in exchange” from Makarov at the Housing Directorate, but no
response was forthcoming.806 In late February Mikoian brought Levitina’s case to the
attention of Dmitrii Vasil’evich Krupin and Anatolii Vasil’evich Korobov, the chief
administrators (upravliaiushchii delami) of the Central Committee and USSR Council of
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Ministers, respectively, as they were best positioned to effect immediate change in
Dorfman and Levitina’s domestic arrangements. Though there is no immediate indication
of how Krupin and Korobov responded to this mandate, Levitina’s conflation of her
mother’s wellbeing with the resumption of their residence at the Government House or a
suitable replacement exemplifies the presumption common to former members of the
nomenklatura that they would most readily be restored to full health in the peace and
solitude of their apartment.
In a lengthy letter from May 17, 1955, Mariia Abramovna Maksimova related
how the arrest of her husband, Konstantin Gordeevich Maksimov – another Mikoian
comrade – resulted in her and her daughter being deprived of their health and any
semblance of security. The Maksimov’s daughter, Zinaida, was left in the care of a nanny
after her parents’ were arrested in late 1937, at which point she fell ill with pulmonary
tuberculosis, was evicted from the family apartment, and “denied her effects, furniture,
and any sort (kakoi-libo) of material or emotional aid.”807 Mother and daughter were
reunited upon the former’s release from a camp in 1940, and Mariia Abramovna, a doctor
by training, was able to secure treatment for Zinaida, who at the time was “dying of
tuberculosis”; in 1953 she had an operation to remove her left lung, which allowed her
health to improve to the point that she was later able to enroll in the Institute of Foreign
Languages, but that same year heart disease forced Mariia Abramovna to retire her
commission as a military medical officer and she went on pension as a second-category
invalid.808 Maksimova made it clear to Mikoian that inactivity did not suit her: “My
illness oppresses me – before I was never weak and always worked. I understand that my
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ailment (nedug) is tied to suffering (perezhitim), and upon being cured I could once again
be useful, as I have thirty years’ experience in medical and scientific work.”809 For
Maksimova, her ability to transcend the lingering effects of the Terror and once again
become a contributing member of society was intimately bound up with reoccupying a
familiar space in Moscow.
Following Maksimovs’ rehabilitations (posthumous in Konstantin Gordeevich’s
case, though this was still unknown to his wife), Mariia Abramovna was “advised to
apply (vozbudit’ khodataistvo) for the return of our former apartment,” which was
occupied by one Ryzhenkov, an employee of the Sovmin’s Administrative Department.810
The Sovetskii district people’s judge summoned Maksimova and Ryzhenkov to make
them both aware of her right to the apartment, and the Party Control Committee reiterated
these instructions. With evident discomfort Mariia Abramovna reported that despite
Ryzhenkov’s “warm” treatment of her and his assurance that he would “take care of
everything,” he had yet to take “energetic measures because he is otherwise occupied (izza zaniatnosti).”811 Maksimova found it “somewhat awkward (nelovko)” to “hurry”
Ryzhenkov out of the apartment, but she cast his inactivity as a direct impediment to her
and her daughter’s recovery: “the housing conditions in which we’re currently living are
very difficult (tiazhely) and our installation at our former hearth and home (pepelishche)
will help us, to a certain extent, to physically and emotionally recuperate (okrepnut’).”812
This sentiment is directly in line with Auslander’s observation that Jewish returnees to
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Paris “cited the trauma of flight and the intense desire and need to reclaim their homes in
order to both mourn past lost lives and imagine future ones.”813 With this in mind
Maksimova pressed Mikoian “to instruct Comrade Ryzhenkov to expedite our move
‘home,’” the strategically placed quotation marks suggesting that she herself understood
that in this context the term implied far more than a physical space.814
To further speed along their convalescence, Maksimova bade Mikoian to arrange
for her and Zinaida to receive treatment in a sanatorium, which her “meager means and
limited opportunities [did] not permit,” reminding him that Zinaida had “been on the edge
of life and death because of extensive (obshirnogo) lung disease.”815 Maksimova’s final
request involved her daughter’s education: Zinaida had only been well enough to enroll at
an institute in 1954, and required four more years of study to receive her diploma.
However, her academic pursuits had been disrupted by “the presence in our family of yet
another dependent – a profoundly aged (glubokoi starushki)” 85-year-old female relative,
which obliged Zinaida to “work, and as a teacher at that” to support the entire
household.816 Operating within the paternalistic logic of the moment, Maksimova made
the “major request” of Mikoian to arrange a pension for Zinaida, “the daughter of an Old
Bolshevik […] even for the period of her study at the Institute, so she can complete her
education and feel solid ground under her feet.”817 Once again, in the absence of a father
figure, it was hoped that the party-state would serve as a surrogate source of stability.
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Late that July Mikoian forwarded Maksimova’s petition to Moskatov at the Personal
Pension Committee, recalling Maksimov as “a good worker from the USSR People’s
Commissariat of Internal and Foreign Trade,” and recommending that Moskatov consider
providing Zinaida a pension; at the beginning of the following month a Union-level
pension was established in Maksimov’s name.818 That a copy of Maksimova’s letter was
found in the Administrative Department’s files suggests that Mikoian also sought to
ameliorate their housing situation, and though there is no indication of how, or whether
this particular issue was resolved, the fact that the Administrative Department was at least
partially under Mikoian’s purview suggests that this claim could not have gone entirely
ignored.819
The imperative of securing assistance from the party-state led some survivors to
air mental health struggles that under most circumstances would have been considered
taboo in Soviet society. Rozaliia Isaakovna Lipskaia’s husband, Nikolai Pavlovich
Chaplin, had been an early First Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee who also
put in time in the Transcaucasian Party apparat prior to his repression. Mikoian took an
active hand in securing Chaplin’s posthumous rehabilitation; even though the extended
Chaplin family had addressed its story of “woe” to Khrushchev, it was Mikoian who
signed off on it with Rudenko.820 In her July 19, 1955 letter, Lipskaia noted how “deeply
touched” she was by Mikoian’s “warmth and concern,” and effusively assured that his
818
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“heartfelt response (serdechnoe otnoshenie) to the Chaplin family’s woe will never be
forgotten.”821 Prompted by Mikoian’s “sensitivity,” Rozaliia Abramovna ventured to
address “things that in my position are uncomfortable and difficult to call to mind” with
him.822 She was confident that Mikoian would not “condemn” her for stating that in light
of her own infirmity and the “constrictions” on the lives of her children, particularly her
daughter, a patient at a psychiatric clinic who “after a grave illness was rendered an
invalid,” the provision of a one-time payment and pensions for her family would do much
to ease their misery, and inquired whether there was anything he could do to bring about
such benefits.823 Presumably prompted by Mikoian, or those on his staff, Lipskaia
reproduced the major points of this correspondence three days later in a concise,
officially-worded petition still addressed to Mikoian, but stripped of all the previous
iteration’s endearments.824 What carried through, though, was the emphasis on the
family’s unwarranted impoverishment and its consequences for their wellbeing:
From the moment of my husband’s arrest until the present time, in
addition to emotional suffering, I have endured great material hardships. I
have two children – a son Boris, who just graduated from the Mining
Institute, and a sick daughter Klara, who is registered at the Kiev District
Psychiatric Clinic. I myself suffer from angina and with difficulty work as
a nurse at the Moscow Council Polyclinic No. 13.
I ask you to lend me assistance by issuing a one-time payment.825
Within several days of receiving Lipskaia’s revised missive Mikoian forwarded copies to
Moscatov regarding the pensions and Krupin for the lump sum assistance; in memos to
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both he identified Chaplin as a “former candidate member of the Central Committee.”826
With this action, Mikoian gave tacit endorsement to the notion that the physiological and
psychological wounds of the state’s betrayal of its loyal servitors warranted could be
mitigated through financial recompense.
As with Maksimova, Aleksandra Konstantinovna Volkova – writing to Mikoian
in December 1955 – envisaged a return to the luxurious environs of the domiciles built
for the Soviet elite as key to surmounting the enduring consequences of state repression.
In the aftermath of the arrests of Volkova’s husband – onetime deputy to the People’s
Commissar of Light Industry Petr Iakovlevich Volkov – and herself, all of her family’s
“property and belongings were seized and confiscated from our sealed apartment at our
previous place of residence,” apartment 351 in the Government House.827 In response to
her inquiries about the disposition of her property, Volkova was informed that “a portion
of the property [had been] sold based on the first estimate at very cheap, obviously low
prices,” while their “major property was not included on the inventory, thus nothing was
left from the apartment.”828
Without any meaningful assets to her name, Volkova “fervently ask[ed]” Mikoian
to “order” the provision of relief to her family of six in the form of “a living space,
preferably in the USSR Sovmin building in Moscow at 110/120 Frunzenskaia
naberezhnaia, or in the Government House at 2 ulitsa Serafimovicha, which would make
our difficult lives easier, as in this building we would be guaranteed complete calm and
peace of mind after enduring serious trauma.”829 Additionally necessary to efface this
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past, in Volkova’s estimation, was “monetary assistance for the acquisition of clothes,
belongings and property that my family and I need […] the establishment of a personal
pension for me through my husband” and “required [medical] treatment” for herself and
her immediate relatives.830 Perhaps as a means of securing Mikoian’s compliance – or as
a reflection of his prior track record with other rehabilitees – Volkova closed with an
expression “in advance” of “deep appreciation and gratitude for your sympathetic, kind
treatment of and help for my children and me – the family of a rehabilitated
Communist.”831 Mikoian quickly determined that her claims warranted support, and
before the year was out he mandated that Moscatov “expedite” Volkova’s pension
application and that Korobov “fulfill as possible (po vozmozhnosti udovletvorit’)” her
housing requirements.832
Remarkably – though as other cases will demonstrate, not uniquely – Volkova’s
stated preference for being rehoused at the official Council of Ministers residence on
Frunzenskaia naberezhnaia was deemed within the realm of possibility and ultimately
honored. A memorandum written by the deputy chief of the Administrative Department
from late August 1956 ordered the Moscow police (militsiia) passport division to register
(propisat’) Volkova and her daughter, along with the latter’s two children, in apartment
177 of this fashionable building, while her mother and son were allowed to maintain their
residency at the space that all six members of the extended family previously occupied.833
While it was rare that rehabilitees were able to dictate the terms of their own restitution to
the point that Volkova did, the outcome of Volkova’s overture to Mikoian indicates that
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the Party leaders and bureaucrats responsible for administering and directing the Soviet
state’s massive distributive apparatus proved – albeit in limited circumstances – to be
unexpectedly attuned and responsive to the specifics of entreaties from Old Bolsheviks’
survivors for relocation.
Regimes of Redress: Courts, Bureaucrats, and the Kvartirnyi vopros
While the previously cited sources suggest that many if not most requests for
housing were handled without judicial intervention, in some instances Soviet courts did
indeed mediate between the recently rehabilitated and the current occupants of disputed
dwellings.834 Through December 1937, the Latvian Civil War-era Red Army commander
Reingol’d Berzin, his wife Gil’degart Dimze, and their daughters Ariia and Margarita
lived in two rooms at 13 ulitsa Vesnina (near the present-day Italian embassy on what is
now Denezhnyi pereulok), but were dispossessed in connection with Berzin’s arrest and
subsequent execution in March 1938.835 Despite their parents’ status as enemies of the
people the daughters were allowed to remain in the building, but moved into a single
room less than half the size of their previous domicile.836 Following her own
imprisonment – but prior to her husband’s exoneration – Dimze brought suit to evict the
current residents, one A. G. Trofimova and her family, from her former apartment. Dimze
834
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invoked the same January 1954 Supreme Court Plenum decree Naneishvili-Kosareva
named to support her claim, which the people’s court in Moscow’s Kiev District
apparently found persuasive. On December 18, the court upheld Dimze’s suit, and
ordered that Trofimova be displaced and resettled into the single room that Dimze’s
daughters occupied, with the understanding that she would be apportioned a larger living
space elsewhere.837 Dimze’s victory was short-lived, however, as procedural errors led
the verdict to be overturned the following September.
In March 1955 Trofimova contacted the Moscow Department of Registration and
Allocation of Living Space to complain that the 25-square-meter apartment she had been
promised in the court’s decision had yet to materialize. Previously unaware of the lawsuit
and the relevant ruling, the department made its displeasure evident in a memo to USSR
Supreme Court Chairman Anatolii Volin from July 29. The department’s deputy chief
urged Volin to sign on to his organization’s protest to overturn the lower court’s ruling on
the grounds that its representatives had been improperly excluded from the earlier
proceedings.838 Although the department raised no objections to Trofimova’s initial
eviction, because she was living in a space deemed sufficient for one adult and two
children and registering her in a different region would “lead to a violation of the
passport regime,” it pushed Volin to “[rescind] the contested decision with regard to the
portion referring to the department’s obligation to provide Trofimova a second room.”839
The Moscow City Court Presidium heard Trofimova’s appeal on September 27
and overturned the December 1954 verdict on the grounds that the exclusion of the
Department of Registration and Allocation of Living Space from the previous trial
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constituted a breach of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure. The case was remanded to
the people’s court for final adjudication, with the understanding that the Moscow City
Executive Committee’s housing department would be involved in deliberations.840 The
Dimze family, which now consisted of five members, had enjoyed nine months of
relative comfort in their reclaimed home when they were informed on October 6 that they
once again had to vacate the premises and return to the single, 21-square-meter room.
Ariia brought this situation to the attention of Kliment Voroshilov, who had served with
her father during the Civil War and took an active part in his rehabilitation – even going
so far as to provide a photograph of Berzin to his surviving relatives – in the hope that he
could either intervene in the People’s Court hearing or help the family secure a suitable
domicile in the event that the judge did not decide in their favor.841 Though it is unclear
how precisely the court ruled, the Dimzes’ judicial frustrations are emblematic of the
inconsistently applied policies, confusion, and infighting among various state organs that
marred early Soviet restitution efforts to the families of the posthumously exculpated.
The absence of a standardized policy outlining the Soviet government’s
obligations before rehabilitated individuals afforded bureaucrats a great deal of leeway in
reviewing petitions, frustrating the ambitions of appellants who had what appeared to be
strong grounds for recompense. In keeping with his status as a leading figure within the
Soviet judiciary, onetime Procurator General People’s Commissar of Justice Nikolai
Krylenko, his second wife, Zinadia Zhelezniak, and their children were housed in the
1930s at the famed Constructivist Narkomfin (People’s Commissariat of Finance)
building, just outside Moscow’s Garden Ring. However, Krylenko ran afoul of one of his
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successors as head of the Procuracy, Andrei Vyshinskii, and was arrested at the height of
the Terror in January 1938; the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court sentenced him
to death on July 29 that same year.842 Following Krylenko’s conviction his remaining
family was ejected from their desirable apartment as “family members of an enemy of the
people.” In October 1954 his widow appealed to the Central Committee seeking his
rehabilitation, which was ultimately realized the following August; that same month
Rudenko addressed himself to Korobov at the Sovmin on Zhelezniak’s behalf.843 When
informed of her husband’s exoneration, Zhelezniak made a point of emphasizing to
Rudenko the “dire conditions” in which she and her family of four were living.844
Apparently eager to intervene on behalf of one of his fallen predecessors, who already in
the early 1930s had warned of concentrating too much power in the hands of the secret
police, the procurator general requested that Korobov “render N. V. KRYLENKO’s
family help in obtaining the requisite living space.”845
At this same time Rudenko’s deputy Vladimir Afanas’evich Boldyrev wrote to
Minister of Higher Education Viacheslav Petrovich Eliutin with a further complaint from
Zhelezniak. One of her sons with Krylenko, Sergei– who was living under his mother’s
last name to avoid association with his “criminal” father – had attempted to enroll the
previous year at Moscow’s Ordzhonikidze Geological Prospecting Institute, but was
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prevented from doing so by the mandatory committee when it was discovered that his
father had been “convicted of anti-Soviet activities.”846 Boldyrev explained that because
Krylenko’s conviction was predicated on “falsified materials” the Military Collegium had
“fully rehabilitated him,” and therefore asked that Eliutin “consider the possibility” of
allowing Sergei Zhelezniak to matriculate at the Geological Prospecting Institute; it bears
mentioning that Boldyrev did not object to such stigmatization in principle, only to its
application in the case of a now-undeserving subject.847 Although there is no response
from the Ministry of Higher Education on the matter preserved in the Procuracy’s fond,
the Council of Ministers’ Administrative Department’s handling of Rudenko’s initial
petition demonstrates the difficulties faced even by those who received direct support
from the highest levels of the Soviet state.
In a blunt memo dated August 29, 1955, a representative of the Sovmin
Administrative Department rejected outright Rudenko’s proposal to find suitable housing
for Zhelezniak as “impossible (ne imeet vozmozhnosti).”848 No further explanation was
provided for the dismissal, and there is no indication that the Procuracy pursued the
matter past this point. Even though Krylenko’s prior residency at the Narkomfin building
could have easily been established, once the Administrative Department made its
unwillingness to cooperate evident the Zhelezniaks’ appeal was rendered a dead letter. It
is unclear whether Zhelezniak and her children were able to successfully press their claim
at a later juncture, but the Procuracy continued to keep tabs on Krylenko’s direct
relations. A report from October 1956 drafted by the Chief Military Procuracy detailed
the fates of Krylenko’s siblings, including a brother who also faced execution and three
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sisters, two of whom were sentenced to eight years in the Gulag, and one of whom was
confined to a psychiatric hospital. Even though the courts eventually cleared both of the
sisters who “sat” for eight years of any supposed wrongdoing neither was able to secure a
living space in Moscow, and both were staying “in private apartments or with
acquaintances.”849 In this way, injustices acknowledged by the central authorities
continued to severely disrupt the lives of those who had been wrongfully persecuted for
the better part of two decades. In an attempt to rectify this situation, Party and state
bodies collaborated over the course of 1954 and 1955 to draft a decree that committed the
government to honor certain claims from the rehabilitated and their families.
Introduced into force on September 8, 1955, the Council of Ministers’ Resolution
1655, “On Seniority, Employment and Provision of Pensions for Citizens Who Were
Unjustly Prosecuted and Subsequently Rehabilitated” was intended to address the
material needs of Gulag returnees and the families of the posthumously rehabilitated. As
early as the autumn of 1954, the Council of Ministers Procuracy, Ministries of Justice and
Finance, and All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions were debating the merits of
various proposals intended to meet the needs of wrongfully convicted workers who were
filtering back into Soviet society in huge numbers. These men and women sought
employment commensurate with their qualifications and experience, but were often
thwarted in resuming their former posts, which had been filled upon their arrests. The
trade unions maintained that such laborers’ work history should not show a gap
regardless of the duration of their imprisonment, that their previous housing should be
returned to them via the courts, and that they should be granted a one-time payment
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equivalent to two months’ salary at their last place of employment.850 This final point was
included in deference to the Lenin-era labor code, which included a provision allowing
employees to claim two-months’ back pay from their places of work in the event that
they were arrested and either cleared before trial or acquitted in court; none of the
framers of the labor code anticipated the possibility that Soviet citizens would be unjustly
incarcerated for decades.851 Rudenko opined that existing legislation, including the
Supreme Court Plenum degree of January 22, was sufficient to resolve these issues, and
the Ministry of Finance – which would have been on the hook to come up with the
requisite funds – agreed that it was inadvisable to change the existing laws.852
Despite this resistance, the trade unions continued to advocate for some sort of
amelioration of rehabilitees’ standing, putting forward a series of recommendations over
the course of 1955 that came under the withering scrutiny of the Justice and Finance
ministries for supposedly replicating existing measures or failing to clarify how vital
issues, such as whether workers were entitled to their former positions, would be dealt
with.853 Nearly two years after the matter was first raised, though, the Council of
Ministers finally settled on a document that addressed the trade unionists’ concerns,
albeit in less ambitious fashion than initially proposed. Resolution 1655 incorporated the
1922 labor code’s stipulation on two-months’ pay, underscoring the government’s
position that rehabilitees were not due reparations for the extreme disruption to their
lives, but it allowed time served in prison, camps, or exile to be counted toward work
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seniority and pension calculations.854 There was no mention of courts’ involvement in
mediating housing issues; rather, the rehabilitated were to be assigned housing “as a
matter of priority,” which in practice created special waiting lists for exonerated former
prisoners without any actual guarantee that such people would receive new dwellings in a
timely fashion.855 The posthumously rehabilitated appear to have been included in the
measure as something of an afterthought, given that a version drafted short months before
its introduction made no mention of accommodating the survivors of workers who died in
custody.856 The resolution in its final form confirmed that in the event of posthumous
rehabilitation families members were entitled to the back pay and pensions that their
relatives would have received, had they lived.
The Council of Ministers did not seek to widely publicize Resolution 1655 – it
bore the heading “not for publication,” and only 680 copies were distributed.857 Yet,
through mechanisms that remain largely opaque, knowledge of the degree disseminated
among the populace. In some cases, it was representatives of the Party, judiciary, or state
security who informed rehabilitees of their newfound rights, while in other instances it
appears that unions and workplaces assumed the burden of ensuring that the major
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provisions were met.858 The September 8 ruling served to broaden the pool of those
eligible for restitution far beyond the small clique that had up to that point been able to
take advantage of the state’s largess, and additionally revised the grounds upon which
such claims were to be made. Appellants for housing and financial aid were no longer
required to justify themselves based on their relatives’ exceptional service or the
hardships they had endured since their repression. Rather, the restoration of property and
privileges became an obligatory transaction between the state and its citizens. However,
as documents from the Administrative Department of the Council of Minister attest, elite
families continued to be afforded a far greater degree of access to amenities and services
than that of the average homo Soveticus, and increased demand for already-scarce
resources served to further pit the rehabilitated against other Soviet welfare-seekers.
Among the first individuals to take advantage of the regime Resolution 1655 put
into place were the sons of Vlas Chubar’, who would become one of the most frequently
invoked posthumously rehabilitated figures. Chubar’s descendants wasted little time in
asserting their reclaimed status as privileged members of society. In a petition to the
chairman of the Party Control Committee written a month after Chubar’ was restored to
full Party membership that was eventually forwarded to Korobov, Aleksei and Vladimir
Vlasovich Chubar’ detailed the path their lives had followed since the upheavals of 1938.
Orphaned at the ages of 9 and 5, respectively, by the arrest of both parents Aleksei and
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Vladimir sought refuge with their infirm grandmother. The brothers remained with her
until 1941 when they were evacuated from Moscow, at which point they were taken in by
their maternal aunt, El’vis Ivanovna Adrianova, herself a political exile.859 Yet the “stain”
of their family name continued to haunt Chubar’s sons into the postwar years: between
1948 and 1950 both were “ripped from the training” they were receiving at vocational
schools and sent to Dzhambul (today’s Taraz, Kazakhstan).860 The ensuing years were
marked, in their words, by “great emotional torment […] and material hardship.”861
Determined to overcome the legacy of their time as “children of enemies of the people”
Aleksei and Vladimir presented the Party Control Committee with a list of demands for
assistance that they believed were their due in late December 1955.
The brothers first requested that the Party make provisions for Aleksei to
complete his interrupted education in the Department of Radio at the Krasin ElectroMechanical Technical School and provide them both with increased stipends through the
duration of their studies. On the domestic front, they sought an apartment large enough
for themselves, Aleksei’s wife, as well as their aunt and uncle to live together
comfortably, and “in accordance with Resolution 1655 of the USSR Council of
Ministers,” the two months’ back-pay they were owed as their father’s heirs – most likely
a generous sum, given the lofty positions Chubar’ held at the time of his arrest.862 In early
February the Council of Ministers announced a plan to displace one of its own employees
who lived in a 40.31 square meter apartment in the Arbat district, but this was evidently
insufficient for the extended Chubar’ family’s needs, as a week later Korobov instructed
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his assistants to give them apartment 171 at the Government House where the brothers
had previously lived; this unit had an additional room and was larger by some 17 square
meters.863 On February 9 Korobov received a briefing from his deputy on the fulfillment
of his orders: the Chubar’ family had successfully relocated to the Government House,
Moskatov at the Personal Pension Committee confirmed that both brothers would receive
funding while still in school, and they had received payments from both of their parents’
workplaces.864 As remarkable a case as this proved to be, given the fact that the Chubar’
family was granted more compensation by the authorities than they initially sought, it is
emblematic of the ways in which the Administrative Department understood its
obligations before the relatives of those notables who were newly returned to grace.865
From Personal Belongings to State Furnishings: Challenges in Reclaiming Elite
Property
Despite her setbacks in the courtroom, Gil’degart Dimze ultimately obtained
remuneration for some of the substantial losses her family incurred as a result of
Reingol’d Berzin’s arrest and execution. In December 1955 Voroshilov received a report
from the KGB – in response to his own directive – detailing the measures taken to satisfy
Dimze’s request for the restoration of her and Berzin’s belongings. After combing its
files, the KGB established that the organs of state security had seized a broad array of
items from Berzin, including unspecified “furniture, an upright piano, a typewriter, a
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camera, two radio receivers, hunting rifles, a bicycle, 16 pocket watches and other
valuables, 3,500 books, two rugs, two bolts of wool, men’s garments, shoes, and several
household items, and also 13,815 rubles’ worth of bank deposits and 4,395 rubles in
government bonds”; at the time of its expropriation, the Moscow City Financial
Department estimated the property’s value at 41,222 rubles in total.866
The report noted that of this hefty sum Dimze had already been remitted 36,582
rubles – nearly ninety percent, presumably at the KGB’s expense – and the financial
department assured the KGB that in “the near future” Dimze would “be issued the
remaining amount, and the cash deposits from the savings books will be restored and the
government bonds returned.”867 Apparently no provisions were to be made, however, for
to Berzin’s onetime domiciles: the 20-square-meter room that was sealed upon his arrest
had since been “inhabited by order of the Moscow City Council Housing Department,”
and there was no available information as to the seizure of his dacha.868 Though Dimze
was unable to wrest back her longtime home, this did not impede her efforts to obtain
significant financial concessions – with Voroshilov’s help – from the Soviet state.
In mid-April 1955 Aleksandra Ivanovna Proskurova sought Voroshilov’s
assistance in locating items that had been taken from her apartment after the arrest of her
husband, Red Army Air Force Lieutenant General Ivan Proskurov, almost immediately
following the Nazi invasion in late June 1941. Proskurova expressed her appreciation to
the party-state for its “responsiveness (chutkosti) and fairness” in restoring Proskurov’s
good name and seeing to her needs after years in prison, camps, and exile, but she was
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dismayed at her inability to obtain compensation for the vast majority of her household
belongings.869 State security had already remitted over 12,500 rubles to Proskurova for
various confiscated items, but she maintained that this represented a fraction of the
articles that had gone missing. To substantiate her claim, Proskurova prepared a list
“from memory” of nearly 50 categories of objects, including a sedan “with a full
complement of spare parts and registration,” a pair of daggers, three bicycles, 250-300
phonograph records, and two quilts that remained unaccounted for.870 Voroshilov
forwarded the dossier to Serov at the KGB, who responded in late May 1955 with a
memo that absolved his organization of any obligations in the matter on the grounds that
the Proskurovs’ missing property “was neither seized nor confiscated by the organs of
state security.”871 Upon Proskurov’s arrest his property was “formally taken into custody”
but “left in A.I. Proskurova’s keeping.”872 The Nazis’ rapid advance on Moscow
forestalled any plans that the NKVD might have had for Proskurov’s belongings, and
when she was evacuated to Kuibyshev along with the rest of the buildings’ residents all
of their possessions remained in the apartment. Then-superintendent Bobkov and his
assistants seized upon this opportunity to “plunder” the homes of the elite; the KGB
estimated that in autumn 1941 they “helped themselves to a sum total of around one
million rubles’ worth of evacuees’ property.”873 Because of this malfeasance the KGB
was able to absolve itself and the Administrative Department of any duty to compensate
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Proskurova, either monetarily or in kind, thereby denying her recourse with regard to her
vanished articles.
Theft of a related, though far more widespread and pernicious variant prevented
other rehabilitees from pressing their claims on the government. As many historians have
noted, NKVD officers involved in property confiscations during the 1930s and 1940s
treated the execution of their duties as an opportunity to enrich themselves,
misappropriating all manner of goods and on occasion even taking up residence in the
already-furnished apartments previously occupied by their targets.874 In order to divvy up
spoils amongst themselves without leaving any trace of their offenses against “socialist
property” responsible chekisty deliberately falsified inventories drawn up during
confiscations, omitting items that they coveted.875 Anton Antonov-Ovseenko ruefully
recalled the NKVD inventory of items belonging to his father, Vladimir, which falsely
gave the impression of a “used-clothing shop”:
He had a very valuable collection of books, as you’d expect of an active
writer fluent in several European languages. But his library was not placed
on the list. The same with the original etchings by famous artists, the
typewriter, the phonograph with eight albums of records, his wife’s
jewelry, her squirrel coat, expensive French perfumes purchased in Paris
on the way home from Spain, and much, much more.876
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In this same vein, Adler quotes the wife of a posthumously rehabilitated Old Bolshevik
who noted incredulously when shown the NKVD’s list of items from her home,
“[j]udging by this description, we were sitting on stools and eating from earthen bowls
with tin spoons.”877 Once erased from official existence, though, plundered objects could
not be redeemed through Soviet bureaucratic means, which depended entirely on stategenerated documents to substantiate ownership.878
Izabella Emmanuilovna Belaia-Iakir’s ambition to be reunited with some of her
most valued possessions was frustrated by such misrepresentation. The sister of
renowned Red Army tactician Iona Iakir and wife of Moscow City Committee secretary
Semen Korytnyi, upon her return from Magadan Belaia-Iakir was uniquely positioned to
take advantage of the reformist efforts spearheaded by the post-Stalin leadership.879 By
April 1955, at which point both Belaia-Iakir and Korytnyi had been rehabilitated – the
latter posthumously – Belaia-Iakir enjoyed a standard of living far higher than that of
most former zeks. She and her daughter had been provided an apartment on the Garden
Ring (ulitsa Sadovo-Sukharevskaia), and afforded access to the inventory prepared by the
NKVD in 1939 when her apartment and personal belongings therein were expropriated.
However, in an indignant letter to the Sovmin Administrative Department she sharply
in the “Workers of Science and Art” dacha-building cooperative worth 18,041 rubles, and the copyright to
their fathers’ writings. This last provision was particularly significant, as in May 1957 the Sovmin
introduced a resolution stating that the descendants of posthumously rehabilitated authors could claim
copyright on their relatives’ work starting from the date they were notified of the latter’s rehabilitation; this
provided heirs with a major boon, as copyright typically expired 15 years after an authors’ death. See
GARF f. 8415, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 4, 7; Artizov et al, Reabilitatsiia, vol. 2, 273; Serge L. Levitsky, Introduction
to Soviet Copyright Law (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1964), 129.
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questioned the omission of several treasured items from the list, including a mirrored
cabinet and a dressing table.880 After pointedly noting that she could not understand how
certain of her possessions had come to be left off the NKVD’s register, she entreated the
Administrative Department to issue “instructions” mandating the return of her
furniture.881
The head of the Administrative Department’s Housing Directorate apprised
Belaia-Iakir in early September 1955 that his organization did “not possess any
documents confirming the presence of your furniture at 2 ulitsa Serafimovicha.”882
Inherent in this abdication of responsibility for the items in question was tacit
acknowledgment of a force majeure that prevented the Administrative Department from
meeting the demands even of former luminaries like Belaia-Iakir. A thoroughgoing effort
to recover the disappeared furniture would have necessitated a confrontation with the
KGB, which jealously guarded its institutional prerogatives from encroachment by other
state organs, and would likely have generated little additional information in light of
NKVD officers’ extensive fabrications. Given that the file on Belaia-Iakir’s petition ends
with the denial from the Housing Directorate it is doubtful that she pressed the issue any
further with the Administrative Department, and while she may have found an alternate
route for forwarding her claim through her ties to Khrushchev, even his influence might
not have been sufficient to surmount the combined effects of malfeasance and
bureaucratic inertia.
Even when official records attested to expropriated objects’ existence Sovmin
employees often exploited the porous distinctions between private and state property
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engendered by Stalin-era purges to stonewall those seeking restitution. By spring 1955
Mariia Abramovna Demchenko-Shmaenok, the widow of former Kiev and Khar’kov
Party obkom head Nikolai Demchenko, had been resettled in the TASS apartment
building on today’s Prospekt Mira (then 1st Meshchanskaia ulitsa) and promised
compensation for at least a portion of her family’s confiscated effects.883 While at the
Lubianka to collect payment a KGB officer “familiarized” Demchenko-Shmaenok with
the list prepared by the NKVD when apartment 349 of the Government House was
inventoried in February 1938, over six months after the Demchenkos’ arrest.
Demchenko-Shmaenok was dismayed to learn that some 48 items– including fourteen
oak chairs, seven soft leather-covered chairs, and four mahogany armchairs – had at the
time been turned over to the complex’s management, as she maintained that all of the
furnishings belonged to her family, and that they had not “take[n] a single thing from the
building management.”884 On these grounds Demchenko-Shmaenok petitioned for the
“immediate return” of the disputed furniture.885 Having produced copies of the
questioned inventory and an accompanying receipt signed by the Housing Directorate’s
deputy commandant “stating that the listed items belong to the building management,”
superintendent Grigorii Zhuravlev informed Demchenko-Shmaenok that it was “clear
from the documents” that all the furniture in apartment 349 was the Government House’s
property, and that in the intervening years it had been moved around the complex “as

883

The apartment that the Administrative Department granted Demchenko-Shmaenok previously belonged
to the musician and composer Mikhail Fikhtengol’ts, who sold it the previous year upon moving into the
Government House to live with the family of his wife, Iuliia Kaganovich, daughter of Mikhail Kaganovich.
See GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 53, l. 147.
884
GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 37. Slezkine maintains that all the Government House’s residents
received some furniture from the woodworking shop in the building’s basement, but confirms that many
households supplemented such pieces with property of their own to which they were particularly attached.
See Slezkine, House of Government, 389, 488.
885
GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, l. 37.

307
needed (po prinadlezhnosti)”; the prospect of returning pieces that could be located went
unacknowledged.886
Undeterred by Zhuravlev’s obstructionism, over the next two years DemchenkoShmaenok wrote multiple letters to the building management, assiduously maintaining
that none of her furniture had been drawn from the Government House’s stock and that it
was described as such on the inventory due to either “malice or haste (zloupotrebleniia ili
speshki).”887 Eventually, in March 1957 Zhuravlev tersely informed DemchenkoShmaenok that there were “no grounds to honor [her] request,” because the building
management could produce no documentation suggesting that it had taken possession of
any personally owned property from apartment 349; a memo addressed to the
Administrative Department written the following month confirmed that the matter was
considered “settled,” cutting Demchenko-Shmaenok off from any further recourse.888
However, despite Zhuravlev’s assurances to the contrary, recently uncovered records
attest to the validity of Demchenko-Shmaenok’s claim: a 1938 Housing Directorate
report itemizing “property received without compensation (bezvozmezdno) from
organizations outside our system” – i.e., taken from repressed families – listed Nikolai
Demchenko as one of the largest contributors to the state’s new store of appointments.889
This revelation suggests that as apparently benevolent as Sovmin organs may have been
in their dealings with some rehabilitees, the imperative to conceal past transgressions and

886

GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, ll. 38, 40.
GARF f. 9542, op. 1, d. 155, ll. 41-42, 50-51.
888
GARF f. 9542, op.1, d. 155, ll. 48, 53.
889
Shmidt, Dom na naberezhnoi, 92 fn36.
887

308
retain items that had since been disbursed to current-day residents of the Government
House often superseded considerations of former enemies of the peoples’ welfare.890
Although Resolution 1655 did not deal explicitly with moveable property
restitution, in the aftermath of its introduction – and the 20th Party Congress shortly
thereafter – the administration of the Government House proved somewhat more
accommodating of petitions for the restoration of individuals’ effects.891 One such
beneficiary of this turn was Margarita Levitskaia, whose father, Konstantin Levitskii had
been an early Social Democratic activist, while her husband, Ivan Kleimenov, was a
former protégé of Mikhail Tukhachevskii’s within the USSR’s nascent rocketry
program.892 Following her and Kleimenov’s rehabilitations in mid-1955 – which were
expedited thanks to the intervention of author Mikhail Sholokhov, whose novel And
Quiet Flows the Don was edited by Levitskaia’s mother – Levitskaia returned to 2 ulitsa
Serafimovicha in search of tangible vestiges of her former life there.893 As narrated in a
series of exchanges from late February and March of 1956 between the Sovmin
Administrative Department and the housing complex’s representatives, Levitskaia wrote
to the building’s management once she was allowed back into Moscow in reference to
several pieces of furniture belonging to her that had remained in apartment number 475
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when she was arrested, including a bookshelf, a writing table, a rifle cabinet, and an
armchair.894 An examination of the apartment revealed that the bookshelf and writing
table were “on temporary loan (vo vremennom pol’zovanii) to the current occupants” and
were listed in the building’s inventory, while the other two furnishings remained to be
found.895
Having reported the results of investigation into Levitskaia’s seized property to
his superiors at the Administrative Department, Zhuravlev, the Government House
superintendent, requested instruction as to how to proceed. Administrative Department
bureaucrats proposed that the bookshelf and writing table be written off from the
building’s inventory and returned to Levitskaia, along with a cabinet and armchair
selected from the building’s stock to replace the items that had gone missing between
1937 and 1956.896 Having uncovered documents that attested to the fact that the rifle
cabinet and armchair had “indeed been turned over to the house management” the
Administrative Department instructed Zhuravlev to proceed with the plan.897 Thus, in this
instance, the state bodies involved in property restitution not only returned items that had
been confiscated nearly twenty years prior, but also took pains to uncover documentary
evidence that compelled them to provide suitable substitutes for possessions that had
gone missing in that interval.
By the time Liia Vladimirovna Polonskaia and her brother, Vladimir
Vladimirovich, demanded the restoration of the Miul’bakh upright piano that had
belonged to their family the instrument itself had passed through a rather storied
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assortment of hands. A relic of Russia’s pre-Revolutionary years, the piano was
manufactured by the noted Miul’bakh firm in Saint Petersburg and managed to survive
the chaotic years of world war, revolution, and civil war before it made its way to the
Government House.898 It was apparently one of the Polonskiis’ most valued possessions
while they lived in apartment 233, but was confiscated along with the rest of their
property following the arrest of their father – the career revolutionary and onetime Party
Secretary of Azerbaijan Vladimir Ivanovich Polonskii – in June 1937.899 The piano
remained in the apartment, where Mikhail Kaganovich and his family took up residence;
although the surviving Kaganoviches were not dispossessed after Mikhail’s 1941 suicide,
the piano was eventually moved down the hall to apartment 235 in 1943, and it thus
became the property of the Ukrainian author Aleksandr Korneichuk.900 By June 1952 the
piano had once again passed into new hands, those of one I. O. Smol’ko, who was so
taken with the instrument that he purchased it from the building for the handsome sum of
3,500 rubles, even though it was only valued at 3,000 rubles according to the building’s
inventory.901 All these details emerged as representatives of the Government House’
functionaries attempted to locate the piano; when it became evident that it was no longer
898
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in their possession, they resolved to compensate the surviving Polonskiis monetarily, an
arrangement the two siblings accepted in June 1956, but with which they eventually took
exception when it became apparent that they had been shortchanged.
Because the payment to Liia and Vladimir Vladimirovich was calculated based on
the piano’s value as listed in the building’s inventory, rather than its sale price, they were
only issued 3,000 rubles.902 In a joint letter dated May 20, 1958 they complained that in
the time since the deal had been transacted it had become “absolutely clear that the
money restored to us represents a small part of the upright piano’s value.”903 The
Polonskiis demanded that the Administrative Department review its decision from June
1956 and either pay them the outstanding balance or “return the instrument to us upon the
condition that we refund the three thousand rubles we received.”904 Once made aware of
this discrepancy, the Administrative Department again set out to make amends, and
Zhuravlev was ordered to remit the difference to the Polonskiis.905 Though the additional
five hundred rubles the Polonskii siblings received in 1958 was likely far less than they
anticipated, the steps taken by the Council of Ministers’ subsidiary bodies to redress this
situation are indicative of the emphasis that was placed upon making restitution to certain
onetime members of the early Soviet elite, though much of the success that some heritors
experienced appears to have come down to the luck of the draw, as families that
theoretically should have enjoyed particular favor – such as the Demchenkos with their
ties to Khrushchev – encountered their share of prolonged frustrations. This haphazardly
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applied policy reaffirmed – for those fortunate enough to receive relief – that rehabilitees
were entitled to expect the restoration of key elements of their pre-repression living
standards. However, by that same token, individuals repeatedly denied recompense or
dissatisfied with the terms of their restitution were consistently reminded of the fact that
much of Soviet society had moved on from the founding years of state socialism and the
Terror, and for all their protestations, neither their status as survivors of honored servitors
of the Bolshevik project nor the letter of the law could guarantee them the exact manner
of compensation they believed they were owed.
The Frustrated and the Neglected
Recipients of aid under Resolution 1655 did not shy away from expressing their
dissatisfaction with the compensation afforded to them when it fell short of their
expectations, which were predicated on the benefits to which they had been entitled prior
to their repression. The most pointed critique preserved in the Sovmin’s files came from
Ekaterina Arkad’evna Kuznetsova, the widow of former USSR Deputy Commissar of
Trade Zakhar Samuilovich Bolotin. In a letter to Korobov from May 23, 1956
Kuznetsova wasted no time in asserting her rights as an aggrieved party. On February 23
of that year, one day after receiving word of her husband’s posthumous rehabilitation
from the Military Collegium, Kuznetsova presented herself at Bolotin’s former
workplace “with all the requisite documents to receive a so-called ‘stipend.’”906 By May
11 the Ministry of Trade had “settled up (rasplatilos’)” with Kuznetsova, an accounting
that she found inadequate.907
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Apparently Bolotin’s two months of back-pay had been calculated according to
the “‘harsh’ rate (po zhestokoi stavke)” of 4,000 rubles per month; Kuznetsova was
surprised to discover that income tax had been withheld from this amount, “given as a
‘stipend’ for the lives of innocently killed people,” and observed that the Ministry of
Trade had failed to factor the length of Bolotin’s service into its calculation of the
payment, as she claimed Resolution 1655 obliged.908. Apparently the most galling
omission, though, was the Ministry of Trade’s failure to pay the contents of the infamous
“second ‘packet,’” a supplemental sum provided to responsible Party members equal to
anywhere between half and their entire monthly salary.909 Kuznetsova could not “find
room in [her] mind for the notion that for people who have not suffered these ‘envelopes’
are necessary, while for those who for long years unjustly bore the yoke of ‘enemy of the
people’ they are not in order.”910 She thus understood Bolotin’s rehabilitation as a means
not only of making amends for the injustices of previous decades, but also as a way to
restore the pre-Terror socio-economic status quo.
Kuznetsova likewise gave voice to frustration over the apparent indifference and
parsimoniousness with which state functionaries responsible for dispensing aid
performed their duties. While taking delivery of Bolotin’s rehabilitation paperwork,
Kuznetsova was twice asked whether she was receiving a personal pension; when she
replied that she did not have enough time on the job, she was made aware that the
pension was dependent on her husband’s former position.911 Kuznetsova thus took issue
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with the fact that no one at the Ministry of Trade offered to assist her in claiming her
rights:
The cashier window opened, the cashier’s generous hand passed the
“stipend” in the amount of 2 months’ salary with income tax deducted and
THAT’S IT! And regarding how I feel, or whether I need something –
likewise no one took an interest.
We talk a lot about sensitivity (chutkosti), but where is it?912
Rejecting the notion that she was a “greedy person (korystoliubiva),” Kuznetsova insisted
that her dissatisfaction was born out of a desire to “defend [her] rights,” condemning
those “who so zealously guard the state’s ‘kopek’ while infringing on the interests of
traumatized people” for “committing an anti-political act (delaiut antipoliticheskoe
delo).”913 Though it remains unclear whether Korobov heeded Kuznetsova’s call to “do
all that you are obliged to by the PARTY” – a pension was created for Bolotin that July –
Kuznetsova’s impassioned rhetoric speaks to the resilience of deeply ingrained notions of
privilege even in the face of the privations and indignities of decades of state terror, and
the degree to which such perceptions continued to inform former elites’ individual
prerogatives.914
The experiences of one former ChSIR whose housing claims were repeatedly
denied provide a stark counterexample to accounts of successful resettlement and
property restitution narrated in many of the documents cited in this chapter. Tat’iana
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Petrovna Ivanova – whose husband Colonel Petr Ivanovich Ivanov served as the Soviet
Union’s military attaché in Finland from 1933 until the spring of 1938 – remained
trapped in a sort of interminable exile nearly a decade following her exculpation. Upon
being recalled to Moscow from Helsinki in 1938 the Ivanovs were placed in temporary
accommodations at the Hotel National – directly across Manezh Square from the Kremlin
– which, as Ivanova later deduced, was where military envoys returning from postings
abroad were “deliberately concentrated” before being taken into NKVD custody.915
Shortly after her husband’s arrest at the end of April Ivanova was herself imprisoned and
eventually transferred to a labor camp; after serving her sentence she settled to the
northeast of Moscow in the village of Petrovo-Gorodishche, near Suzdal’. It was there
that Ivanova first received confirmation of her husband’s death, though she noted that the
form provided contained a significant error: a functionary had mistakenly listed Ivanov’s
place of residence as Petrovo-Gorodishche, though neither he nor Ivanova – both lifelong
Muscovites before being dispatched to Finland – had ever been there prior to his arrest.916
When Ivanova brought this fact to the attention of the local state security officials she
was assured that “the error would be corrected, however to date this has not been
done.”917 This uncorrected typo, among other issues, ultimately cost Ivanova her ability
to reclaim residency in the capital, to which she was entitled as a fully rehabilitated
person.
Following her release from the labor camp system but prior to her rehabilitation
Ivanova – like all former zeks – was prohibited from entering Moscow for reasons of
“social undesirability.” Yet from autumn 1956, when she and Ivanov were both
915
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exculpated, Ivanova was determined to exercise her prerogative to return to her native
city and reestablish residence there. Undaunted by the fact that the house in Moscow
where her father had lived and raised her son while she was incarcerated had been
demolished, Ivanova maintained that “according to the USSR Council of Ministers’
Resolution 1655 from September 8, 1955, I, like many other innocent victims (nevinno
postradavshie), received the right to residence in Moscow, i.e. returning to our permanent
residence, and was granted the right to priority access to living space.”918 Ivanova
assumed that this guaranteed an end to her years of displacement, but as she soon
discovered her “suffering and torment began anew with regard to registering in Moscow
and receiving a living space.”919
Beginning in 1957 Ivanova turned to various agencies for redress, but in each
instance her overtures were automatically forwarded to the Moscow City Council, where
she came up against a strain of “callous bureaucratism (bezdushnyi biurokratizm) on the
part of those comrades who are entrusted with examining such petitions.”920 Ivanova
alleged that workers at the city council did not “want to see the long-suffering
(mnogovystradavshego) person behind the petition”; instead, they deferred to the “formal,
dry letter of the law, contriving all manner of reasons just to answer with a rejection.”921
When told that one denial was due to the “acute shortage of space in Moscow” Ivanova
bristled: how could such an issue apply to her, “a rehabilitated person who before her
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arrest lived in Moscow since childhood and who, like all rehabilitated persons, is covered
by Resolution 1655 of the USSR Council of Ministers?”922
Ivanova saw the obduracy of Moscow’s civil servants, compounded by the
unresolved confusion over Ivanov’s actual residence, as the source of a bureaucratic
impasse that she believed Minister of Defense Rodion Iakovlevich Malinovskii – to
whom she directed her appeal in March 1965 – might be able brush aside and thereby
bring her “woe” to an end.923 Unfortunately for her, it appears as though Malinovskii
proved similarly inattentive, as her letter was found among the personal papers of the
writer Sergei Sergeevich Smirnov, to whom a mutual friend had forwarded it in the hope
that he might be able to help break this impasse. In the absence of any additional
documentation, it seems unlikely that any progress on Ivanova’s behalf was made at this
relatively late juncture. This serves as a stark reminder that the guarantees enshrined in
decrees such as Resolution 1655 ultimately hinged on individual functionaries’
willingness and ability to carry them out, without which there was little to distinguish the
lot of a rehabilitated person from that of someone who remained an enemy in the eyes of
the party-state.
Conclusion
In February 1957, as the widow of the posthumously rehabilitated Komsomol
Secretary Kosarev, Mariia Naneishvili-Kosareva was assigned a small plot of land from
the state forestry fund. After initial interagency haggling between the Sovmin
Administrative Department and the Ministry of Defense, which controlled the land in
question, a parcel of .12 hectares near the village of Istra northwest of Moscow was
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settled upon. There, Naneishvili-Kosareva was to build her family a new dacha, to
replace the fabled one where 20 years prior her husband made the impolitic comment that
allegedly cost their family so dearly, but later served as her ticket out of perpetual
exile.924 Naneishvili-Kosareva would be responsible for covering the construction costs
herself – frowned upon by the nomenklatura of the time, who availed themselves of stateowned dachas lest they be suspected of “petty bourgeois materialism” – but once
completed the structure would indisputably belong to her and her family.925
The decision to grant Naneishvili-Kosareva the lot on which to build the new
dacha, narrated in two short memoranda written by the Administrative Department’s
chief, is a small but deceptively significant component of the Soviet government’s
attempt to provide once-privileged families with the trappings of their former existences.
In the years before Kosarev’s fall from grace, his access to a dacha symbolized his
responsible role within the Party leadership; during the Terror, it was a site of intriguing
and ultimately of loss, when it was seized with the rest of his possessions. That the
authorities facilitated Naneishvili-Kosareva’s acquisition of a substitute dacha by dint of
her marriage to Kosarev, and the suffering that she incurred as a result of his arrest,
eloquently reveals the material significance with which posthumous rehabilitation was
vested. For the surviving Kosarevs it represented, to a certain extent, the saga of their
experience of state repression having come full circle.
At the most pragmatic level, the Soviet government’s property restitution efforts
provided returnees with housing and material comforts at a time of profound shortages
and increasing demand on the state’s welfare system. Yet the adoption of this policy also
924
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held deep personal significance for the families of the posthumously rehabilitated.
Demands for the return of items that were of little apparent use to people who had spent
the better part of the past two decades in Gulag camps – such as rifle cabinets, upright
pianos, and overstuffed armchairs – were not only exercises in sentimentality, but also
constituted a central element in the reconstruction of elite identity. The notions of
normality of erstwhile denizens of the Government House and other exclusive dwellings
were indelibly shaped by their experiences within these edifices’ walls, and by the
coveted objects with which they surrounded themselves. As much as these buildings may
have been haunted by the specters of past violence and trauma, their attraction for former
residents remained undiminished.
If returnees could not occupy the actual physical spaces where they lived prior to
their repression, or reclaim many of the seized objects that previously distinguished them
from the vast majority of the Soviet populace, by acknowledging that they were entitled
to, and making compensation – albeit capriciously – for these possessions, the Soviet
government offered them the opportunity to re-inhabit the privileged status that they had
been afforded and suddenly denied under Stalin. Conversely, by obstructing other
rehabilitees’ efforts to recover property that had vanished in the 1930s, the authorities
reinforced their marginality and prevented them from attaining “rehabilitation” in the
fullest sense of the term. This suggests that even under Soviet state socialism – which
nominally sought to promote state and collective ownership of immovable property and
consumer goods – individuals’ homes and the objects within them were understood both
by citizens and the party-state as factors central to the fashioning, maintenance, and
reconstruction of the self.
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Conclusion
When Stalin was removed from the Mausoleum and
buried at the Kremlin Wall, a wreath appeared at
his grave with the inscription: “To the posthumously
repressed, from the posthumously rehabilitated.”926
On September 24, 1967, the Central Committee received an open letter from “the
surviving children of Communists wrongfully repressed by Stalin.” Though Stalin’s
corpse had been disinterred from the mausoleum it shared with Lenin’s remains
following the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, the letter’s drafters perceived a
softening of the Party line on the disgraced dictator since Leonid Brezhnev assumed the
post of General Secretary of the Communist Party. In anticipation of the fiftieth
anniversary of the October Revolution, this group cautioned against any official
backsliding on Stalin’s place in history, which would be an affront to “the memory of
people who perished in the hellish machinery of the cult of personality.”927 Among the 43
signatories were a considerable number of individuals whose families had been direct
beneficiaries of Khrushchev-era posthumous rehabilitation policies. These included Petr
Iakir, the tormented son of Iona Iakir and likely initiator of the open letter, along with his
daughter Irina and son-in-law Iulii Kim, Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, Ariia Dimze-Berzin,
the daughters of Gleb Bokii and Valerian Osinskii-Obolenskii, and the sons of Ivan
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Akulov, Vasilii Shmidt, Nikolai Demchenko, and Osip Piatnitskii.928 The overlap
between this cohort and those who successfully reclaimed vestiges of their pre-repression
lives speaks to these privileged survivors’ determination to harness the state’s
readmission of their relatives into the ranks of the Bolshevik faithful as a source of moral,
political, and at times even legal authority.929
Despite some scholars’ insistence that widespread social disaffection over living
standards and unrest among Gulag prisoners obliged Stalin’s successors to reform an
untenably punitive system, there were no demands from below that necessitated that they
pursue posthumous rehabilitation at all, let alone in the particular manner that they did.930
Like other rulers who participated in and subsequently inherited legacies of violence,
they could have refused to readjudicate the outrages of previous decades, trusting in the
ability of a state that had recently survived the existential threat of Nazism to weather a
power transition. This approach would not have been without considerable liabilities,
insofar as it likely would have required the maintenance of a high level of state coercion,
and could have occasioned further bloodshed at the top of the Party, but such challenges
were already familiar to those who had built their political careers under Stalin. Instead,
though, the new collective leadership opted to wrestle with the demons of the recent past,
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hoping to extract some lessons of value from the years of bloodshed and betrayal. The
decision to plumb the depths of the cannibalistic 1930s and 1940s – insofar as they
affected the Party – markedly diverged from both Soviet precedent and the conduct of
other authoritarian regimes.931
Marc Elie has dubbed rehabilitation in the post-Stalin Soviet Union “a policy
unachieved,” and in many respects this characterization is apt.932 Even the most generous
estimates of nearly one million completed legal exonerations prior to October 1964 – a
significant number of which, it should be noted, involved individuals arrested in the late
1950s for anti-Soviet agitation and quickly rehabilitated – left millions of falsely charged
former political prisoners whose appeals went unheard or were denied outright.933
Authorities took few steps to demystify the rehabilitation process for the populace at
large, and in critical matters such as death dates they actively obfuscated; promised social
benefits at times failed to materialize, or were seen as stinting, and acceptance of former
zeks among the wider populace was rarely forthcoming. Yet in the midst of these evident
shortcomings, rehabilitation was a transformative process that indelibly shaped the Soviet
Union and its successor states’ relationships to mass violence, justice, and the haunted
past by creating a mechanism through which the authorities acknowledged certain
atrocities, made partial amends, and opened grounds upon which the state’s history could
931
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be reassessed. Survivors of the rehabilitated as well as the regime itself took seriously the
categories that the legal and political processes created, and in the case of the former,
they sought to capitalize on their parents’ status as a means of influencing the trajectory
of Soviet political developments. Although such developments stand as a far cry from
what the Presidium’s members could have foreseen when they endorsed the first
posthumous rehabilitations in November 1953, the process largely functioned as intended
and its overarching objectives were met: the secret police no longer threatened the
primacy of the Party, the question of Khrushchev and his allies’ culpability in the Terror
was shunted aside, and Soviet power endured for nearly forty years after Stalin’s demise.
Thus, as much as the rehabilitation process may have failed to achieve the broader and
more abstract goals of promoting truth and reconciliation within Soviet society, it
ultimately succeeded in protecting the interests of those who first conceived it, and
demonstrably improved the lot of some of the most stigmatized families in the USSR.
While the early Brezhnev years have been depicted as a period of retreat from
Khrushchev-era policies that favored rehabilitees, the historical record suggests a more
nuanced picture.934 Though the number of rehabilitations indeed declined precipitously
over the course of the 1960s, this trend began before Brezhnev’s tenure as General
Secretary, and the winding down of the judiciary and Party Control Committee’s work in
this sphere did not curtail the public recognition of figures who had already been
posthumously rehabilitated.935 Articles marking significant birthdates of “loyal sons of”
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and “fighters for” the Party – many of whose names had already been brought up during
the proceedings against Beriia’s confederates or at Party Congresses – appeared with
regularity in Soviet press outlets alongside those of dignitaries who had never fallen into
disgrace, though they were devoted almost entirely to their subjects’ revolutionary
exploits, and denuded of the grim details of their demise.936 Streets were renamed in
honor of onetime pariahs, and memorial plaques were erected on certain buildings where
they previously lived; some of their visages would grace postage stamps. Works by
rehabilitated authors were returned to print – a potential boon for their heirs – and
laudatory accounts of rehabilitees’ lives could be found on the shelves of bookshops and
libraries. Rather than disappearing from view, posthumously rehabilitated notables whom
Khrushchev and others had named in moments of political extremis were gradually, but
surely, woven back into the fabric of Soviet daily life.937
This is not to suggest, however, that the controversy over posthumous
rehabilitation had been settled. Mikhail Gorbachev’s resurrection of rehabilitation as a
legal and political concern defied key precedents set in the 1950s. By exonerating almost
all of the lead defendants from the Moscow show trials, Gorbachev crossed the Rubicon
936
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that Khrushchev and his councilors could not ford, declaring that opposition to Stalin’s
general line was neither inherently criminal, nor did it constitute grounds for expulsion
from the Party.938 Furthermore, in the interest of radical truth-telling the authorities began
to abandon the pretense that executed persons had died while serving out camp sentences,
laying bare the scale of extermination during the Terror, and divesting functionaries of
the burden of misleading petitioners that had spawned so much confusion, turmoil, and
anger. Most significantly, a 1988 resolution opened all cases initiated under Stalin’s rule
to judicial scrutiny, regardless of whether a protest had been filed, and in 1989 the
Politburo issued a blanket decree rendering all verdicts imposed extrajudicially null and
void, and automatically rehabilitating all who had been repressed by bodies such as
NKVD troikas and the Special Board.939 In one fell swoop some 850,000 people were
exonerated, fulfilling the judiciary’s longstanding desire to rid itself of responsibility for
extrajudicial cases, and – arguably – realizing Mikoian’s fear of what such a
thoroughgoing reprieve might reveal about the nature of the Soviet regime.940
As Gorbachev lost his grip on power and the Soviet Union splintered into its
constituent republics, rehabilitation emerged as a wedge issue between the ascendant
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the All-Union establishment; the 1991
law “On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression” was introduced by the
RSFSR Supreme Soviet and signed by the republican President Boris El’tsin. In
recognizing any individual who had suffered repression “for class, social, national,
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religious, or other reasons” as eligible for rehabilitation, the measure cast Communist
state violence in most of its permutations as illegitmate, and it supplanted the existing
restitution regime by affirming victims’ rights to the restoration of seized property and
onetime residences, financial compensation calculated against time served up to 100
months, and priority access to medical treatment.941 Critically, for the first time
rehabilitees and their survivors were granted access to their archival investigative files.
This shattered the jealously guarded monopoly over information relating to the purges
that that had defined almost every aspect of the rehabilitation process of the 1950s and
1960s. Although citizens still had to go through the organs of state security, rather than
having curated details doled out by secret policemen, they were empowered to personally
examine unredacted documents, and draw their own conclusions from the grim contents
therein.942 While the newly independent Russian Federation relinquished its exclusive
authority over materials that had served as the basis for the destruction and subsequent
expiation of hundreds of thousands of innocents, it retained control over the legal
processes by which suspect cases from the past were adjudicated.
In addition to ruling on rehabilitations that went unheard in previous decades or
were denied for procedural reasons, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
continues to act as arbiter of who does not merit consideration for exoneration, thereby
serving as custodian of the Soviet legacy. In the years since the USSR’s dissolution the
Supreme Court has repeatedly been called upon to consider whether perpetrators of state
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repression who were themselves executed between the late-1930s and mid-1950s are now
eligible for legal rehabilitation. Though in a handful of cases the court has revised
individuals’ sentences – as it did with Viktor Abakumov, commuting his capital
punishment to 25 years’ imprisonment ex post facto – it has consistently refused to
reprieve state security chiefs such as Iagoda, Ezhov, Frinovskii, and Beriia, despite
having dismissed charges of treason, espionage, and conspiracy against the first three.943
Applying reasoning with strong echoes of that used to bar Izrail’ Dagin from attaining
rehabilitation forty years prior, the Supreme Court found that even though there was no
evidence to link these men to the concocted charges with which they had been impugned,
their demonstrable abuses of office were sufficiently egregious to disqualify them from
judicial absolution; succinctly put, the right men were killed, but for the wrong
reasons.944 The October 1991 law excludes individuals who have “committed offenses
against justice” from rehabilitation, but as Russian historian Alter Litvin notes, the
legislation does not specify the conception of justice to which it refers.945 As a result, the
present-day Russian judiciary, bound by precedents set during the 1950s and 1960s,
continues to operate within a framework of responsibility for the Terror that endorses the
results – if not the rationale – of Soviet-era proceedings against secret police perpetrators,
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while eliding Stalin’s guiding hand. Much in the same way that Stalin remained largely
invisible at critical junctures during rehabilitations in the Khrushchev years, in
contemporary Russia his responsibility for unleashing the Terror is obscured by the
state’s ongoing deference to its Soviet forebears.
Born out of the perceived need to tar Beriia’s reputation in the interest of asserting
the Party’s supremacy over state security, posthumous rehabilitation quickly assumed
dimensions far beyond its fairly limited tactical aims. As surviving relatives of the
disappeared clamored for some indication of the fates that had befallen their loved ones
and relief from the stigma that hounded them, the authorities concocted a patchwork of
responses that at once reaffirmed some of their most underhanded behaviors while
simultaneously extending consideration and privileges to families far beyond what most
citizens expected from the government. The archival record shows a strong correlation
between the men whom Khrushchev and his allies invoked to discredit and condemn their
rivals, and the survivors who had the most success in extracting concessions from the
state. Though the figures involved in this process were by no means benevolent actors,
the image of the state that emerges through the study of early posthumous rehabilitations
is one that was at times responsive to and invested in restoring patterns of duty and
privilege that dated to the Soviet Union’s formative years that were seemingly splintered
by the Great Terror. This readmission of onetime “enemies of the people” and their
descendants into the ranks of the valorized revolutionary elite figures among the most
enduring legacies of the post-Stalin revisionist project: just as posthumous rehabilitation
showed that physical death was no impediment to the restoration of an individual’s
reputation, or his ability to be of service to the party-state, so too did it underscore the
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persistence of notions of inheritance – in terms of both personal obligations and property.
In the post-Stalin Soviet government’s quest for a redemptive narrative of the recent past,
posthumous rehabilitation of Old Bolsheviks repressed by the regime they helped build
proved a compelling and enduring means of overcoming state violence and its
aftereffects.
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